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ABSTRACT 
Attempts to regulate competition in Brazil have been made since the early 
1960s without much success. However, with the adoption of trade liberalisation 
measures in the early 1990s, competition has gradually been regarded as an essential 
element of the process of liberalisation of the economy, and thus efforts have been 
made to develop and enforce competition law and policy. This thesis describes and 
evaluates competition law in Brazil during this last period. It critically analyses the 
legislation, the practices of enforcement agencies and the relevant case law. Emphasis 
is given to the study of cases which involve restrictive business practices as wen as 
mergers, and which have been decided at the administrative level. 
This thesis highlights four main points: 1) developing countries should try to 
develop their own approach to competition law, and avoid adopting models created in 
other countries that reflect another reality; 2) competition legislation must define the 
approach to be adopted in the implementation of competition law in order to avoid 
uncertainty in the market; 3) a well structured institutional framework is necessary for 
the enforcement of competition law and policy; and 4) competition policy should be 
part of a coherent set of economic policies adopted by the government. 
The conclusion of this thesis is that competition policy in Brazil has not yet 
produced significant results. Factors that undermine competition policy in Brazil are 
the system for the enforcement of the law, the lack of coherence in case law, and 
changes in economic policy. On the other hand, there has been some progress: the 
legislation covers the main aspects of competition; the performance of enforcement 
agencies is improving; these agencies are co-ordinating their enforcement practices; 
and there is growing awareness among economic actors in Brazil that competition is 
desirable and should be protected. 
ix 
EVrRODUCTION 
1. Goal of the thesis 
The regulation of competition is not a recent phenomenon in Brazil. As early 
as the 1930s Brazil had enacted Constitutional provisions and laws that in some way 
were related to competition; I however, these laws were not enforced. This can be 
explained by several factors. In the first instance, it was only in the 1960s that an 
institutional framework to implement these laws was first developed. Secondly, there 
was no political will to enforce competition law. Above all, the economic policies 
adopted by the various governments did not favour the existence, and also the 
necessity, of legislation regulating competition, since such policies supported State 
mtervention in the economy which did not encourage a competitive market. 
Thus, for almost 60 years since the 1930s competition law in Brazil existed 
only on paper. Only with the adoption of trade liberalisation measures in the 
beginning of the 1990s did the importance of competition law gain recognition by the 
govermne .2 
' Decree-law 869/3 8, Decree-law 7666/45, Law 1521/5 1, Law 1522/5 1. See chapter 2, footnote 159. 
2 For the purposes of this study, "liberal i sation measures" is understood here in its broad sense, to 
include every measure adopted by the government with a view to achieving a market economy, thus 
reducing the direct intervention of the State in the economic activities. These measures would be 
deregulation, privatisation, liberatisation of imports, suspension of price control, liberalisation of trade, 
among others. 
I 
Due to its only recent enforcement, an assessment of competition law in Brazil 
based on case analysis has never been attempted. The literature on Brazilian 
competition law is not extensive, and includes mostly analysis of the laws, without 
reference to cases. 3 As a matter of fact, in Brazil legal studies rarely take into account 
case law; on the contrary, importance has been given in the majority of such studies to 
theoretical aspects of the subject of the study, or to the legislation concerning it. 
Accordingly, as a civil law country, the decisions of the courts are based mainly on 
legislation, whereas similar cases are used only as support to the decision, not as a 
guidance or the grounds of the decision. 4 However, case analysis is essential for a 
more comprehensive understanding of the subject since it reflects the application of 
the law in practice. Case analysis thus places the law in the context into which it is 
applied, making the study of competition law more linked to reality. ju- 
This thesis aims to bring the study of competition law in Brazil to its context 
by investigating and evaluating Brazilian competition law mainly through the analysis 
of cases concerning competition decided by the competent administrative agency. 
However, the investigation would be deficient if based only on these cases, since 
other issues are also relevant. It follows that this investigation will also include the 
analysis of the legislation, as well as the role played by enforcement agencies. 
3 See, for instance, Vaz, I., Direito Econ6mico da ConcorrgnciA Forense, Rio de Janeiro, 1993; 
Shieber, B. M., Abusos do poder econ6mico, Ed. Revista dos Tribunais, Sdo Paulo, 1966; Fonseca, 
J. B. L. da, Lei deprote9do da concorr6ncid, Forense, Rio de Janeiro, 1995; Sodr6 Filho, A. C. de A. and 
Zaclis, L., Comentdrios 6 legislaVab antitrusle, Ed. Atlas, SAo Paulo, 1992; Cretella Jr., J., 
Coment&ios ti lei antitruste, Forense, Rio de Janeiro, 1995. 4 Similar cases may be the grounds of a decision only when there is no law regulating the issue (article 
4 of the Introductory Law of the Civil Code). 
2 
2. Bra2il as a case study 
Brazil is a sui generis, country. At the same time that it is an emerging 
economy, it presents serious developmental problems. While in the South of the 
country a process of industrialisation has been occurring, resulting in economic 
growth and wealth in the region, in the North stagnation and poverty have been the 
main features of the area. It follows that the government has been compelled to deal 
concomitantly with the problems arising from different economic environments. 
Moreover, Brazil presents the structural characteristics of the majority of the 
developing countries, 5 such as highly concentrated market, publicly owned 
enterprises, high concentration of ownership, unequal distribution of income, 
unemployment, among others. 
The regulation of competition in Brazil has to take into account this inequality 
of conditions. It is not possible to develop competition law and policy considering 
only the needs of the more industrialised region, otherwise the law would be 
ineffective. Competition law in Brazil thus has to reflect the differences between the 
economic agents, markets and consumers. If this is successfully achieved, than the 
Brazilian competition law can be a model to be adopted by other countries that are 
willing to regulate competition. 
Moreover, the history of the economic development in Brazil reflects that of 
many developing countries, especially in Latin America. Another factor of the 
relevance of Brazil as a case study is that Brazil has been enacting competition laws 
3 
since the 1960s, a time where there was little awareness in Latin America about the 
importance and necessity of regulating competition. Finally, the evolution of the law 
pertaining to the regulation of competition in Brazil took place against the backdrop 
of a socio-political and economic environment that was not suitable for proper 
enforcement of the law. 
Through the study of Brazil, it is possible to understand and analyse the factors 
which require consideration prior to the adoption of a competition law by an emerging 
economy. It is also possible to assess the regulations in their historical perspective and 
understand the shortcomings therein and the reasons for the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of certain provisions. And last but not the least it is possible through 
this study to investigate the different enforcement mechanisms and evaluate their 
effectiveness. Brazil can thus work as a paradigm for the analysis of competition law. 
2.1 Overview of the economic history of Brazil 
Up to World War 11 the Brazilian government had been following the liberal 
approach of not intervening in the economy nor adopting any "economic 
development" policy, though sometimes it supported specific sectors of the economy. 
Until the 1930s, the economy was based mainly on the production and exportation of 
coffee .6 At that time, due to a successful scheme of price-support 
implemented by the 
coffee-producing states, where they applied directly to international credit sources 
without the help of the State, the coffee growers achieved strong political power and 
therefore were able to impose their economic ideas on the government. Coffee export 
5 Obviously it is not possible to consider identical each developing country, since in the first place there 
are differences in the level of development. However, developing countries present common features 
4 
earnings financed the import of manufactured goods to satisfy consumer needs. At the 
same time the domestic market was growing and attracted investments for the 
production of consumer goods, food processing and textiles. However, this production 
was still in its infancy and did not represent a significant share of the economy. 
After the 1929 crisis, a transition to an industrial system began to take place. 
Due to its high price, coffee was being produced on a large scale. With the world 
crisis and the consequent price fall, the losses were transferred to the community as a 
whole, as the economy had developed a series of mechanisms to protect the coffee 
ruling class. This was achieved by withholding and destroying part of the coffee 
output, which resulted in the maintenance of the level of employment in the export 
8 
economy, as minimum buying prices were guaranteed . It was the first time that the 
federal government directly intervened in a productive sector of the economy. 
According to Furtado, this "protection of the coffee sector during the years of 
the great depression was actually an authentic prograrn of boosting the national 
income". 9 This prograrn was also responsible for an external disequilibrium, which 
was corrected by a sharp decline in the external buying power of the currency. This 
decline was reflected in an increase in prices of imported goods, which reduced the 
demand for imports. As the internal demand remained steadier than demand abroad, 
that allow a generalisation in specific situations. 
6 Baer., W., The Brazilian Economy - grow1h and development, 3' ed., Praeger, New York, 1989, p. 32 7 it 
... 
in 1931 industrial production had fully recovered from a decline that started in 1928, and in the 
following eight years it more than doubled". Baer, supra n. 6, p. 37. 
8 Furtado, C., The economic growh of Brazil -a surveyfrom colonial to modern times, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1971. 
9 id. 
5 
the sector producing for the domestic market afforded better investment opportunities 
than the exporting sector, attracting capital generated in that sector. 'O 
The government however did not adopt any kind of policy to promote its 
industrial sector - at that time the liberal idea of no State intervention in the economy 
was still followed. This inertia of the State led to private enterprises adopting practical 
methods and developing an import-substitution industry, without plan or help from 
the State. " The Constitution of 1934 determined that the intervention in the economy 
should only occur in case of public interest, 12 and provided for the nationalisation of 
banks, insurance companies and mines. In order to become effective, the 
Constitutional provisions had to be complemented by regulation; as this did not 
happen, the provisions were ineffective. ' 3 
The situation remained the same approximately until the end of the 1930s, 
when in 1937, through a coup detat, the Brazilian President Getulio Vargas 
established a dictatorship which was called Estado Novo and lasted until 1945. The 
Estado Novo was characterised by having very nationalistic ideals, which were clearly 
reflected in the attitudes towards not only politics but also the economy. In that way, 
it was during the Estado Novo that State intervention in the economy began to take 
place. 
During that period Instruction 70 was issued, which nationalised exports of 
agricultural commodities and alienated the agrarian elite; a major goverment steel 
10 id. 
Jaguaribe, H., Economical andpolitical development, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1988, 
chapter 10. 
'2 Article 116, Constitution of 1934, which authorised the monopolisation by the State of an economic 
activity in cases of public interest. 
6 
plant was established; major hydroelectric dams were built; a national petroleum 
monopoly, Petrobras, was established; the Vale do Rio Doce Company was created to 
enlarge mining operations; and the government was working on the creation of a 
national electric company, Eletrobras. The adoption of these policies resulted in 
major changes in the national economy, as the share of agriculture in GDP dropped, 
while the share of industry increased, and the annual growth rate increased after the 
war. 
14 
Moreover, during the war the import of goods became more difficult; while in 
one hand it caused adverse effects on the industrialisation of the country as supplies of 
plant and equipment were cut off, on the other it stimulated domestic production in 
order to meet the need for local sources of manufactured goods. 15 Domestic and 
export prices increased rapidly during that period, while import prices grew much 
more slowly, which led to a "subversion of the relative price level which had served 
as a basis for Brazilian industrial development from the beginning of the thirties". 16 
It was during the war years that planning by economists began in Brazil. Most 
of them consisted of a systematic analysis and evaluation of the economic structure of 
the country, in order to influence the direction the development would take. 17 In 1942 
a group of engineers and specialists from the USA came to Brazil and produced a plan 
13 Franceschini, J. I. G., and Franceschini, J. L. V. A. Poder Econ6mico: Exercicio e Abuso, Ed. Revista 
dos Tribunais, SAo Paulo, 1985, p. 7. 
14 Dalland, R. T., Brazilian Planning - Development, Politics and A&ninistratior4 The University of 
North Caroline Press, Chapel Flill, 1967. 
15 "Industrial production grew at an annual rate of 5.4 percent in the period 1939-1945. Especially 
noteworthy are the yearly average growth rates of metal products (9.1 percent), textiles (6.2 percent), 
shoes (7.8 percent), and beverages and tobacco (7.6 percent), which were all industries whose imports 
were drastically curtailed. " Baer, supra n. 6, p. 39/40. 
16 Furtado, supra n. 8. 
17 Baer, supra n. 6, p. 43. 
7 
of investment for a ten-year period. 18 The USA was interested in using Brazil as a 
pilot area to test new methods of industrial development; however, after the war the 
project was dropped. 
In the meantime a new project was developed, consisting of a list of capital 
expenditures with a duration of five years and characterised as a supra-agency budget, 
without any special arrangements for its execution. In 1943 another US mission came 
to Brazil and worked with a group of Brazilian technicians; 19 they produced a report 
that did not constitute a plan but was the basis for a planning work developed later by 
economists. At the end of that year a second five-year plan was developed, consisting 
again of a public works budget but this time providing the elements of a system of 
implementation. 20 
After the war, imports were liberated and the external supply became 
regular. 21 The goverment returned to the liberal tradition of free trade, resulting in 
the importation of non-essential goods and thus exhausting the country's reserves. At 
the same time, though the idea of planning as a regular govermnental function had 
gained much ground, this return to liberalism suspended the planning activity of the 
State. 22 Besides, there was no political and administrative will to implement the plans, 
" This was the Taub Mission. See Lopes, C. T. G., Planejamento, Estado e Crescimento, Pioneira, Sao 
Paulo, 1990, p. 82. 
19 This mission was known as the Cooke Mission See Baer, supra n. 6, p. 44, and Lopes, supra n. 18, 
F6 82. 
Piano de Obras e Equipamentos - POE. See Takahashi, C. S., Direito do Planejamento Econ, 6mico e 
Social, dissertation submitted for the degree of Master in Law, Universidade de Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, 
199 1, p. 74/75; and Lopes, supra n. 18, p. 82/83. 
21 Baer, supra n. 6, p. 53. 
22 As pointed out by Lopes, President Dutra (1946-1950) did not show much enthusiasm towards the 
idea of planning. Lopes, supra n. 18, p. 83. 
8 
and the new Constitution of 1946 was written which did not provide for any agency 
for national planning. 23 
As reserves felL however, the authorities abandoned the import liberalisation 
measures adopted after the war and established a series of selective quantitative 
import controls, maintaining the official rate of exchange of the currency but reducing 
imports of fmished consumption manufactures, to the benefit of capital goods, raw 
materials, plant and equipment required for home production. This policy had strong 
protectiomst effects, and obviously favoured. the industrial sector as competition from 
abroad was reduced and raw materials and equipment could be acquired at relatively 
low prices, leading to the intensification in the process of growth. 24 
The period between the end of World War 11 up to 1954 can be considered the 
final stage of the "take off' to Brazil's industrial development. At this "take-off' 
stage, which occurred during the second administration of Get6lio Vargas (1951- 
1954), central planning gained more support and was relatively successful. 25 Me idea 
of State intervention in the economy and adoption of national development policy was 
consolidated and since then has been enforced by the different govermnents that have 
been in power. Many plans and measures to protect the Brazilian industrial and 
23 However, agencies for regional planning and development were created to deal with the problems of 
the two most depressed areas of the country, Amazonia and the Northeast (articles 198 and 199 of the 
1946 Constitution). See Takahashi, supra n. 20, p. 50. 
24 In the period 1948-1950, the distribution of imports were as follows: capital goods, 35.2%; raw 
materials (except fuel), 23.8%; food products, beverages and tobacco, 17.9%; fuels, 12.8%; 
manufactured consumer goods, 9.7%; other, 0.6%. Baer argues that these data reflect the import 
substitution measures adapted by the government. See Baer, supra n. 6, p. 48. 
25 In 1951 a Joint Brazil-US Economic Development Commission was formed in order to make 
technical studies, decide on projects that needed subsidy and prepare projects that met the technical 
standards required by the financing institutions. Later on, the National Development Bank was created 
initially in order to carry out the program of the Commission, but later it was transformed into a 
mechanism for the execution of plans and in a planning agency. See Lopes, supra n. 18, p. 84/85, and 
Baer, supra n. 6, p. 63 and 243/244. 
9 
agricultural sectors have been adopted. 26 The import-substitution policy initiallv. 
developed by private enterprises was later taken over by the State and strongly 
enforced during the years. Regulation of the economy by the State has been a 
common practice, as the country has developed an economic system characterised by 
an expanded role of the State in the economy. 27 
During the goverment of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1960), the Plano de 
Metas was created with the purpose of supporting the industrialisation of the country 
through import-substitution policy, especially of durable consumer goods. The plan 
was based on studies that had demonstrated that there was a demand for such goods; 
by developing that sector of the economy, other sectors would also be affected and 
grow. 28 Most of the goals of the plan were achieved, which resulted in rapid economic 
growth. 29 However, there were negative consequences, such as inflation caused by the 
issue of money to finance public investments, increase of the external debt, increase 
of income concentration, and lack of stimulus to agriculture. 30 
It was in the beginning of the 1960s that the first competition law was created 
in Brazil. The bill of Law 4137/62, which was enacted in 1962, was first submitted to 
Congress in 1948. In a speech at the Congress, the Congressman who proposed the 
26 An example is Law 1474, enacted in 1991, which increased income taxes and determined that the 
resources resulting from such increase would be invested in docks, railways, electricity, 
inclustrialisation and agriculture. See Lopes, supra n. 18, p. 85. 
27 According to Baer, "the present dominance of the state over the Brazilian economy has not resulted 
from a carefully conceived scheme. It is largely the result of a number of circumstances that, in most 
cases, forced the government micreasingly to intervene in the country's economic system. Those 
circumstances include reaction to the international economic crisis; the desire do control the activities 
of foreign capital, especially in the public utifity sector and in the exploitation of natural resources; and 
the ambition to rapidly industrialize a backward economy", Baer, supra n. 6, chapter 11, p. 238. 
28 Takahashi, supra n. 20, p. 77. 
29 id. P. 79. 
" Vasconcellos, M. A. S. de, Gremaudý A. P., and Toneto Jr., R-, Economia Brasileira Coraempordne4 
Ed. Atlas, SAo Paulo, 1996, p. 180/182: and Lopes, supra n. 18, p. 87. 
10 
bill explained that it was based on the American laws - both Sherman Act and Clayton 
Act - which were adapted to the Brazilian reality. 31 However, the bill spent 14 years 
in Congress, during which time it underwent several modifications and thus lost the 
approach adopted in the original bill. 
At that time Brazil was facing a serious economic crisis which resulted from 
those negative effects of the process of import substitution. A new economic plati, 
PAEG, was then adopted by the first military government, 32 in order to solve these 
economic problems. Its goals were to increase economic development, control 
inflation, diminish the imbalance between sectors and regions, increase investments 
and increase employment. 33 This should be done through structural reform and 
combating inflation. 34 These reforms led to a period that was called "the Brazilian 
economic miracle", where economic growth was high, prices were stable, and 
inflation was controlled. However, this growth was based on borrowed money from 
international sources, which resulted in an increase in the external debt of the country. 
Another characteristic of this period is the expansion of State intervention in the 
economy through price controL investments and subsidies. 35 
This period of economic growth did not last for long, since it depended on a 
favourable external situation which did not exist due to the oil crisis of 1973. Thus, 
inflation started to increase, and there was a deficit in the balance of paymentS. 
36 The 
31 Shieber, supra n. 3, p. 18 
32 In 1964 the Armed Forces took the power and established a military dictatorship, which lasted until 
the middle 1980s. 
33 Takahashi, supra n. 20, p. 81/82. 
34 Vasconcellos, supra n. 30, p. 184. 
31 Baer, supra n. 6, p. 86. 
36 Baer argues that, after the 1973 oil cnsis, "[i]nstead of engaging in an austerity adjustment program 
to cope with the dramatic decline in the countrys terms of trade, the government opted for a growth 
policy that resulted in substantial structural changes in the economy, in a resurge of inflation, and in a 
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government then adopted a new economic plan, the II PND, which opted for 
maintaining the economic growth of 10% per year by supporting the manufacture of 
capital goods, instead of consumer goods. 37 The government took the plan in its 
hands, by making the public enterprises implement the policies . 
38To finance the goals 
of the plan, these public enterprises borrowed money from international sources, 
while the private enterprises were granted subsidies from the government. Thus, the 
external debt increased rapidly, and the State lost its capacity of financing the 
implementation of the policies, since it did not have much money and could not 
borrow more, otherwise the external debt would increase much more than it was 
desirable. 39 
At the end of the 1970s there was the second oil crisis, which resulted in the 
growth of the international interest rates, thus deeply affecting Brazil, due to its 
increasing external debt and the fact that it was in American Dollars . 
40 The flow of 
money to developing countries was suspended, and the government had to seek 
balance of payments surplus, by reducing the public deficit, increasing the internal 
mterest rates, reducing credits, decreasing the rate of exchange of the currency, and 
stimulating competition through suspension of public prices and subsidies. These 
measures were part of the agreement with the International Monetary Fund to which 
the govenunent had to tum after 1982 in order to re-negotiate the extemal debt .4' The 
result, on one hand, was recession, inflation and reduction in growth levels; on the 
rapid expansion of the countrys international debt". Baer, supra n. 6, p. 96. See also World Bank, 
Brazil, Industrial Policies and Manufactured &ports (a World Bank counny study), The World Bank, 
Washington DC, 1983, p. 45. 
37 Vasconcellos, supra n. 30, p. 200/203. 
38 Takahashi, supra n. 20, p. 92 
'9 Vasconcellos, supra n. 30, p. 200/203. 
40 Baer, supra n. 6, p. 107. 
41 id., p. 116/118. 
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other, there was a change in the balance of payments, moving from deficit to 
surplus. 42 
A L1. 
Amer 1985 the government focused its attention on combating inflation. In 
1986 a new economic plan was adopted, the Plano Cruzado, which created a new 
currency and froze prices, among other measures. 43 It resulted in a decrease of 
inflation, an increase of consumption, lack of goods in the market, and negative 
mterest rates, as well as a negative balance of payments. However, after prices were 
"defrozen", inflation increased rapidly. " It was during that time that the government 
started to use competition law and the competition authorities as one of the tools to 
control prices. 
In the following year another economic plan was adopted, the Plano Bresser, 
with the purpose of combating the increase of inflation and avoiding hyperinflation. It 
succeeded in recovering the balance of payments, controlling inflation in the first 
stages of the plan, and decreasing the public deficit. However, in the end it resulted in 
a decrease in industrial production and increase of inflation. 45 Yet another plan was 
adopted in 1988, the Plano Verdo, which intended to restrain the demand through the 
decrease in public expenditure and increase in interest rates. It also established 
46 
another price freezing. However, at the end inflation was around 80% per month. 
The 1990s has been characterised by a neo-hberal approach to the economy. 
The govermnental policies have been attempting to reduce the State participation in 
42 Vasconcellos, supra n. 30, p. 207/212. 
43 Takahashi, supra n. 20, p. 98/99. 
44 For a thorough analysis of the Plaw Cruzado, see Baer, supra n. 6, p. 164/194. 
45 Vasconcellos, supra n. 30, p. 220. 
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the economic process and let the market work by itself. Due to the long tradition of 
State intervention in Brazil, this transition has been slow and gradual. Nevertheless, 
measures towards the hberalisation of the economy has been adopted with some 
success. They include privatisation of State enterprises, import liberation, and end of 
price controL among others. 
It started with the CoRor government in 1990 which adopted a new economic 
plan that provided for freezing of saving accounts, with the purpose of avoiding 
pressure from consumption so that the Central Bank could adopt monetary policieS. 47 
It also provided for fiscal and administrative reforms, alteration in the exchange 
48 
regime, and liberalisation of trade, through the decrease in import taxes. However, 
with the impeachment of President Coflor in 1992 there was a certain discontinuity in 
such measures. 
It was during the Collor government that it was felt that changes were 
necessary in order to adapt competition law to the new Constitution49 and to the neo- 
liberal approach adopted by the government. Thus, a new competition law was 
enacted. However, it did not revoke the previous law. Moreover, at the same time that 
the government was adopting liberalisation measures, it once again used competition 
law to punish companies that were not complying with the policies on price control. 50 
It follows that there was not a coherence in the policies adopted nor in the 
enforcement of competition law. 
46 Takahashi, supra n. 20, p. 107. 
" Vasconcellos, supra n. 30, p. 227. 
48 Takahashi, supra n. 20, p. 108. 
49 A new Constitution was written in 1988. See below, Chapter 2, subsection 2.1. 
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In 1994 the laq, economic plan was adopted, the Plano Real, against a 
background of economic liberalisation and a new flow of foreign resources to the 
country. It established high interest rates, and succeeded in reducing inflation, but also 
resulted in an increase of demand .51 The adoption of trade liberalisation measures was 
resumed, and included the enactment of a new competition law as one of the policies 
to support the new plan. 52 
According to the World Trade Organisation - WTO, 'ýBrazil has made 
considerable progress in dealing with some economic constraints it faced in the early 
1990s: principally, in restoring growth and confidence in the economy and lowering 
inflation. Since economic growth resumed in 1993, the economy has proved resilient 
to external shocks and foreign capital has flowed copiously into the country. Trade 
liberalisation, privatisation, the gradual opening of key activities to foreign 
investment, and general deregulation are creating an increasingly competitive 
economy". 
53 
3. Four hypothesis 
In order to evaluate Brazilian competition law, I shall work with four 
hypothesis on the adoption and enforcement of competition law in developing 
countries. The first hypothesis is that, though developing countries do need a 
competition law, they cannot adopt wholeheartedly models that already exist in more 
'0 See Chapter 5. 
51 Vasconcellos, supra n. 30, p. 229. 
52 This time the new law revoked the previous two competition laws. 
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economicaUy developed nations. They may seek inspiration in these models, but they 
can-not copy them To have a competition law properly applied it is necessary that it 
takes into account the specific necessities of the country, 54 as wefl as the 
characteristics of its market and industries if the law is to achieve its purposes. 
Further, the same antitrust provisions do not necessarily cause the same effect in two 
different countries. Therefore it follows that though the precedent of existing laws. 
their enforcement and consequent results achieved in a country can be useful as an 
indicator for the efficacy of the law, it can at best serve as a guide and not more. 
The second hypothesis is that competition law cannot be effective if the 
legislation concerning it does not define with rigour the approach towards competition 
and the issues inherent to a proper regulation of competition, such as the types of 
conduct that may be anticompetitive, the concepts involved in such conduct, the acts 
of economic concentration, and the procedure to be adopted in the process of 
enforcement of the law. In order to bring certainty to the economic agents and to the 
market in general, a detailed legislation is necessary for developing countries that do 
not have a tradition of well-articulated and enforced competition law. 
The third hypothesis is that, in order to be implemented, competition policy 
and law need a well structured and effective institutional framework to enforce them. 
It is not important whether this system is administrative or judicial, or both, because 
what is important is that the system works properly and performs well the tasks to 
which it was created. 
53 WTO, Trade Policy Review Bodý - Brazil, Report by the Secretariat, Press/TPRB/45,24.10.96. 
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Finally, the adoption of competition law and policy not only has to take into 
consideration the special needs of the country and the characteristics of its economy, 
but also must be inserted into a coherent economic policy framework. By this I mean 
that competition law cannot be isolated from the other economic policies adopted by 
the government. On the contrary, aH of them must work together in order to reach a 
common final objective, that is, to achieve economic development. Thus, if the 
government wants to regulate competition in order to have a competitive market, it 
cannot adopt other measures and policies that are against it, such as price controls or 
an inconsistent privatisation policy. 
4. Overview of the thesis 
Chapter 1 will provide an overview of the theoretical debate regarding 
competition in order to decide on an approach that best suits the necessities of the 
developing countries. It will cover the relation between macroeconomics and 
competition, the discussion on the necessity of regulating competition as well as on 
A- - the purpose of competition law and policy, and the attempts to regulate competition 
both on individual and global basis. Chapter 2 will start the investigation of the 
Brazilian case by examining the development of the legislation regarding competition 
in Brazil. Chapter 3 will focus the attention on the institutional fi-amework created for 
ý1- - the enforcement of competition. Chapters 4 and 5 will analyse the administrative 
proceedings decided by CADE regarding restrictive business practices, while 
Chapters 6 and 7 will be directed to the analysis of the acts of economic 
54 such as the sectors of the economy that must be enhanced, the level of development of the country, 
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concentration. In the conclusion I will bring together the main points discussed 
throughout the thesis in order to develop the assessment of Brazilian competition law. 
5. Some methodological remarks 
The development of this thesis is based on two main points: the analysis of the 
legislation that regulates competition enacted since 1962, and the analysis of cases 
concerning competition decided by the competent administrative agency. One 
problem faced during this research is the lack of literature regarding competition law 
in Brazil, especially in relation to case analysis. Studies on the analysis of the 
legislation can be found, " but none of them has made any systematic analysis of the 
competition cases. Nor any commentaries on these cases could be found. It follows 
that the analysis carried on in Chapters 4 to 7 could not benefit from the arguments 
and critique developed by other authors in relation to the competition cases decided in 
Brazil. 
During the analysis of the Brazilian cases reference is made to cases decided 
in other jurisdictions. This happens because, though the Brazilian competition law 
differs in several aspects from other legislations, there are situations where the 
competition authorities seek inspiration and help in the laws of especially the USA 
and the EEC. It has to be stressed that the Brazilian case law is not based on the 
American and European decisions; these decisions are used only as reference in the 
development of a determined argument. 
the needs of the population, among others. 
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Reference also is made to the model law on competition proposed by the 
56 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development - UNCTAD . When 
pertinent, the provisions of Brazilian competition law will be compared to those of the 
model law, in order to assess the likelihood the Brazilian law being successfully 
enforced. Though the first hypothesis proposed in section 3 must be applied also in 
relation to the model law, 57 one can argue that UNCTAD's model law was created 
with the view to being applied to developing countries and thus can be used as a 
starting point for adoption of competition law. 
Another methodological issue is related to the compilation of the competition 
cases decided by the administrative agency, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa 
Economica - CADE (Administrative Council for Economic Protection). With the 
exception of some cases decided between 1962 and 1980, which were published in the 
periodical issued by CADE at the time, Revista de Direito Economico, the remaining 
cases were not published. Even where cases were published, it was done sporadically, 
and sometimes took the form of brief synopsises of arguments and decisions. It 
follows that, in order to collect these cases, fieldwork at CADE was necessary, and 
this occurred in March and April of 1996. 
it has to be stressed that during the period of the fieldwork the work at CADE 
was suspended, because the term of office of the majority of the Commissioners had 
expired and the new Commissioners were not yet appointed. At CADE I was given 
access to the cases started since 1991, because there are no records for the period 
55 
see note 2 supra. 
'6 See Chapter 1, section 4. 
5' The first hypothesis is that developing countries should not adopt models of competition law that 
already exist. 
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before that. Thus, I examined 62 cases decided between 1991 and March of 1996 (37 
were administrative proceedings, while the remaining 25 were acts of economic 
concentration). Of these, I selected 16 cases, of which seven are administrative 
proceedings on anticompetitive behaviour and nine are cases of economic 
concentration, to be analysed in this study. This selection was made based on the 
issues that were discussed in the case of the administrative proceedings, and on the 
defences accepted in the case of the acts of economic concentration. These 16 cases 
are representative of the issues that CADE had to deal with during the period of the 
research. 
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CHAPTER1 
1. Introduction 
- THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter discussýes the theoretical framework on which competition law is 
based, in order to identify the main issues involved in the debate on the regulation of 
competition. We shall analyse the debate on the macroeconomic aspect of 
competition, in particular how theoretical concepts such as perfect competition, 
monopoly and workable competition affect the regulation of competition. After this 
analysis, we will proceed to the debate on the necessity of regulating competition, and 
thus identify the main arguments of the theories in favour of such regulation and those 
against it. It will also be necessary to distinguish between the different approaches 
towards competition, in order to attempt to establish the one that is most suitable for 
developing countries. 
We will then investigate the situation in developing countries in relation to the 
regulation of competition. We shall identify the arguments in favour and against the 
regulation of competition in developing countries, the reasons for the lack of 
regulation in these countries, the development that has been achieved in this area, and 
ý1- - the attempts towards the creation of a model law regarding competition. 
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However, it is not possible to develop this discussion without bearing in mind 
the hypothesis proposed in the Introduction that developing countries should not 
apply the competition laws and theories of developed countries without considering 
their own necessities and the characteristics of their markets. It follows that the issues 
discussed in this Chapter must be seen only as a guidance to competition laws and 
policies of developing countries, as aspects of competition that have to be critically 
assessed and adapted to a particular reality before being embraced. 
2. Economics of competition 
According to Scherer and Ross, "[i]n modem economic theory, a market is 
said to be competitive (or more precisely, purely competitive), when the number of 
firms selling a homogeneous commodity is so large, and each individual firm's share 
of the market is so small, that no individual firm finds itself able to influence 
appreciably the commodity's price by varying the quantity of output it sells". 58 
This is the definition of perfect (or pure) competition. It follows that perfect 
competition involves a great number of producers and consumers, where the former 
produce identical or homogeneous goods or services for the latter. The fact that a 
great number of buyers and sellers can be found in the market means that the actions 
adopted by them will not cause any perceivable effect on price. There are no barriers 
neither to enter nor to exit the market, which facilitates the emergence of new 
competitors or the leaving of the market at any time. Moreover, under perfect 
22 
competition the market is transparent, in the sense that consumers have perfect 
information about market conditions. Therefore, buyers and sellers are able to make 
their own decisions, without consulting or seeking the collaboration of their 
competitors. " Thus, under perfect competition there is no need to collude. It is argued 
that, if consumers do not have enough information and a producer takes advantage of 
their ignorance, competition will eliminate this abuse, since other competitors will 
60 inform consumers of what is happening. Perfect competition also means that 
resources can go from one industry to another without obstruction. 61 
One of the effects of perfect competition is allocative efficiency. This means 
that producers will manufacture only what consumers are willing to buy, and they will 
increase their production as long as this brings profits, that is, until the moment when 
the costs of producing the last unity becomes higher than the benefits it brings. Thus, 
the market will be efficient when the marginal benefits of the last unit produced is the 
same as the marginal CoStS. 
6' This means that efficiency will occur when the 
additional benefits of producing the last unit is equivalent to the additional cost of 
producing this same unit. Scherer and Ross argue that efficiency of resource 
allocation results from the marginal cost being equal to the price paid by consumers, 
because this equality "is a necessary condition for profit maximization, given the 
competitive firm's perception that price is unaffected by its output decisions". 63 
58 Scherer, F. M. and Ross, D., Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 3'11 ed., 
Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1990, p. 16. 
59 see Areeda, P., Antitrust Analysis, Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1967, chapter I -A. 
60 McKenzie, R. B. and Tullock, G., Modern Political Economy: an Introduction to Economics, 
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1978, p. 13 1. 
61 Whish, R., Competition Law, P edition, Butterworths, London, 1989, chapter 1, p. 2. 
62 McKenzie, supra n. 60, p. 124. 
63 Scherer, supra n. 58, p. 20. 
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Perfect competition, however, is a theoretical model that does not exist in 
practice. It is an ideal situation that cannot be found in the marketplace. Armentano 
points out that, according to this theory, competition is impaired when we move away 
from perfect competition, as there is an economic waste in doing so. On the other 
hand, competition is improved if we move towards perfect competition, because then 
markets become more efficient. Thus, this "neoclassical analysis appears able to 
demonstrate scientifically what has always been assumed concerning monopoly, 
namely, that the prices tend to be higher, the outputs less, and the equilibrium costs 
greater than under comparably competitive conditions". 64 
Frazer, in its turn, argues that "the notion of 'perfect competition' has no real 
use in practical antitrust policy", 65 because it is not related to the imperfections that 
can be found in real markets. Moreover, he understands that the expression "perfect 
competition" is equivocal, since "productive rivalry" between firms is not to be found 
in perfect competition, which is essential to the purposes of antitrust policy, as this 
rivalry should result in price reductions and product development. Since the market 
does include imperfections, he argues that "the theory of second best suggests that the 
public interest will be best served by permitting other imperfections to exist as a 
counterweight, rather than to remove". 66 
The opposite situation to perfect competition is monopoly, where only one 
producer supplies the goods or services to the consumers. The most important 
64 Armentano, D., Antitrust and Monopoly - Anatomy of a Policy Failure, Hohnes and Meier, New 
York, 1990, chapter 2, p. 20. 
65 Frazer, T., Monopoly, Competition and the Law, 2d edition, Harvester Wheatshe4 New York, 1992, 
5. 
id., p. 5. 
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requirement for the survival of monopolies is the existence of barriers to entry. 67 They 
include the sole ownership of a strategic resource by the monopolist as well as the 
possession of a patent or copyright; the granting of an exclusive government franchise 
to sell a product in a defined geographical area; the existence of a well-known brand 
name among customers; a production conducted on a very large scale; the need for 
very large financial resources. 68 
The costs to enter the market are so high that it prevents the emergence of new 
competitors. Therefore, the monopolist is able to affect the price of the goods or 
services he/she produces, as there is no one else in the market who can supply these 
products with a lower price. Moreover, the economic resources are not allocated in an 
efficient way. As the monopolist is not confronted by other competitors, he/she does 
not have to attract more consumers, and therefore he/she does not have a stimulus to 
mnovate nor to develop new products. 
The goal of the monopolist is to maximise his/her profits, what can be 
achieved by not producing as much as he/she could. He/she will produce until the 
marginal cost of his/her production is the same of the marginal revenue. The amount 
of output he/she will sell in the market will be smaller and the prices charged will be 
higher. Since the consumers do not have the option to change to another similar good, 
as there is no substitute in the market, they will have to pay more than they are 
prepared to at normal conditions. 
67 McKenzie, supra n. 60, p. 166. 
68 icL, p. 167. 
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Posner explains that "a monopolist will always charge a price higher than the 
competitive price if demand at the competitive price is inelastic, that is, if the 
proportional reduction in the quantity demanded as a result of the higher prices is less 
than the proportional increase in price". 69 Consequently, the monopolist will rise the 
price until it leads to a proportionally larger reduction in the quantity demanded, as 
the increasing of the price raises total revenue at the same time that reduces total cost. 
According to Posner, the monopolist will raise his/her price until the point at which 
his/her profits are maximised, which is "the point where any further increase would 
reduce total revenues by more than the reduction in total cost resulting from the 
smaller quantity produced". 
70 
The existence of monopoly causes several negative effects in the society. In 
order to acquire monopoly power, a firm may spend money to erect barriers to entry 
into its market, money which could have been allocated in the production of goods 
that would increase consumers' welfare. Another aspect is that the governmental 
agencies will spend time, money and efforts to prevent the acquisition of monopoly 
power by a firm and to fight against those who have already acquired this power. 
Moreover, wealth will be transferred from the consumers to the producer, as 
ý1- - me latter, through his/her monopoly power, will raise the price of his/her goods and 
consequently have his/her profits increased. Another negative effect is that, in order to 
gain more advantages, a monopolistic firm may influence the level and the 
distribution of governmental expenditure through political campaign contributions, 
paid lobbyists, and bribes. 
" Posner, R. A., Antitrust Law - an Economic Perspective, The University of Chicago press, Chicago, 
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The problem with the theory of perfect competition and monopoly is that it is a 
theoretical model and does not reflect the imperfections that exist in the real market, 
where intermediate situations between the two extremes can be found. For instance, 
there are markets that present a situation of monopolistic competition, where, though 
a producer has some power derived from his/her product being differentiated from 
others, the consumers' loyalty to his/her product is not necessarily unconditional, as 
they may change to the brand of a competitor if the prices rise too much. 
Monopolistic competition is characterised by a market where a number of competitors 
sell "a similar but differentiated product", 7' and entry is not free but relatively easy. 
Under monopolistic competition, a producer does not have monopoly power over a 
product but over a relevant product market, which shall include all substitutes to that 
good. 
72 
Another example of these intermediate situations is the oligopolistic market, 
where "there are few major competitors, generally no more than six and certainly no 
more than a dozen, who sell similar or differentiated products". 73 As the market is in 
the hands ofjust a few producers, any action from any of them can significantly affect 
the market position of the other producers. Moreover, it is usually dffficult to enter an 
oligopolistic market, due to high costs and the consumers' attachment to the brand 
names of the producers. 
Thus, economists have been trying to find a model that reflects the 
imperfections of the market, and they have developed the theory of workable 
1976, chapter 2, p. 9/10. 
70 i(L' P. 10. 
71 McKenzie, supra n. 60, p. 168. 
72 Whish, supra n. 61, p. 5. 
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competition. According to Frazer, workable competition is a "compromise which 
takes account of irremovable imperfections, the nature of the market, and that degree 
of attainable competition which will satisfy public PoliCy5i. 
74 It follows that, under 
workable competition, firms will have more control over price, because product 
differentiation, imperfect knowledge and collusion can be found in the market. As 
Armentano explains, "if products are differentiated, individual sellers discover that 
the demand curve for their own product is downward sloping and not horizontal, and 
that they will not loose all of their customers with a price slightly higher than a 
competitor' S95.75 These aspects - price control and product differentiation - are the 
characteristics of an imperfect market, and thus of workable competition. 
The importance of these economic theories is that, notwithstanding the fact 
that they are only economic models, they provide the elements to justify the adoption 
of any policy regarding the regulation of competition, by Wghlighting the advantages 
and disadvantages of competition and monopoly. By taking these elements into 
account, as well as the characteristics of the market and the economy of the country, 
the policy maker has the necessary tools to opt for the regulation - or not - of 
competition, and, in the case of a positive decision, to put more weight on those 
aspects that are more important for the necessities of the country. 
The knowledge of such models is thus fundamental for the understanding of 
the organisation of the markets. Consequently, it can be applied to the different 
contexts of developed and developing countries, because the understanding of the 
McKenzie, supra. n. 60, p. 168. 
Frazer, supra. n. 65, p. 06. 
75Armentano, supra n. 64, p. 19. 
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structures of the market allows a clearer comprehension of the operation of any kind 
of market. 
76 
3. Regulation of competition - relevance and approaches 
3.1 Is it necessary to regulate competition? 
The above discussion on the economics of competition leads to two questions 
that are intertwined: is it necessary to regulate competition, or is it enough to let the 
market settle by itself the problems that may arise from the struggle between 
competitors? It would not be incorrect to give an affirmative answer to both questions. 
Competition does not necessarily have to be regulated. A State may adopt a 
competition law in order to avoid abuse of economic power or may adopt no law at all 
and leave the market to supervise monopoly power. 
Against the regulation of competition there is what has been called the 
"laissez-faire approach to market power". 77 According to this approach, the problem 
of market power does not exist, or, if it exists, it cannot be corrected by public policy. 
This is based on the assumption that market forces are per se adequate to maximise 
social welfare, without the help of external intervention. Moreover, the fact that the 
market is extremely competitive would allow new firms to enter that market, or 
existing competitors to increase their production, so that they would be able to take 
advantage of monopoly profits, provided that there are no great economies of scale. 
76 Gremaud, P. G. and others, Manual de Economi4 3rd ed., Saraiva, Sao Paulo, 1998, Chapter 7, p. 
182. 
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The high profits deriving from monopoly power would be the means and 
inducement to innovative activities; other firms would be attracted by the high profits, 
would copy the innovation and drive down prices and profits to the benefits of the 
consumer. 78 kiSO , entry barriers are not likely to harm competition in the long run. 
Another argument is that "[e]ven market power based upon scale economies is 
susceptible to technical progress and, in the last event, market power grounded upon 
such economies would be endorsed even by a fully-fledged cost-benefit analysis". 79 
The laissez-faire approach also maintains that the State is not so "charitable" 
as it is represented in the economic theory of public policy, nor is an impartial and 
ornniscient servant of the public good, because State intervention can be considered 
more like compromise solutions that do not promote social welfare, and thus cannot 
be relied upon. Consequently, it is held that it is better "an imperfect market solution 
than an emasculated antitrust alternative", because, by not being impartial, regulation 
involves a commitment by the policy makers to the interests of the government, which 
in its turn is subject to political pressure. Moreover, it is argued that in the end the 
policy makers will not be able to maintain their independence from those that are 
subjected to the regulation. 
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It has been claimed that it is not possible to create a logical antitrust system if 
based on abstract rules that define "desirable" and "undesirable" economic 
structures. 8' Therefore, it would be preferable to reject the prohibition principle and 
77 Rowley, C. K., Antitrust and Economic Efficiency, Macmillan, London, 1973, p. 72. 
78 id., p. 85. 
79 id., p. 73. 
"0 id., p. 74/75. 
81 As argued by Professors Vito, Marchal, Wessels and Woitrin. In McLahlan, D. L. and D. Swann, 
Competition Policy in the European Community, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, chapter 5. 
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adopt a policy of preventing firms from Mowing harmful policies, which would 
82 include the threat of nationalisation. 
In favour of the regulation of competition, it is said that the market alone is not 
able to supervise monopoly power, and that only the law can protect the competitive 
process. "In almost any markets left without government intervention or regulation", 
Goyder points out, "it is likely that the competitive process itself will ensure that 
sooner or later participants in them will gain a degree of market power". He adds that 
"[flt is the function of competition policy to seek to prevent the unfair acquisition of 
market power by individual undertakings, without at the same time becoming too 
ovMrotective of rivals". 
83 
Another argument favouring the regulation of competition is that competition 
policy in general has a dynamic character, which means that it can be adaptable to the 
different economic and political tendencies of the policy makers. 84 It follows that the 
standard embraced at the time of the adoption of an antitrust policy does not 
necessarily have to be definitive - the purpose of the policy, as well as its 
enforcement, can be changed. An example of this assertion can be found in the 
antitrust laws of the USA, which have been changing over the years, according to the 
approach of those who are in power towards the problem. 
The idea of letting the market itself regulate competition has not prevailed. 
However, the degree to which competition laws and policies should intervene in the 
82 id., p. 86. 
83 Goyder, D. G., EC Competition Law, 2 nd edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, chapter 2, p. 12/13. 
84 Green, N., Hartley. T. C., and Usher, J. A., The Legal Foundations of the Single European Market, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, chapter 14, p. 198 
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competition process, as well as the manner this regulation should be done, depends on 
the approach adopted towards competition. Before discussing this issue. it is 
necessary first to examine the role played by law in the regulation of economic policy. 
3.2 Law and the regulation of economic policies 
The most appropriate instrument the State can use to implement economic 
policy is the law. However, this has not always been the case, and even today there is 
not a consensus regarding this issue. The liberal tradition of separating the State from 
the economy viewed the law in two distinct areas: the public law, which would 
organise and structure the State, and the private law, which would co-ordinate the 
market exchange as well as the private rights and duties derived from it. The State 
would be connected to the protection of these rights only through the enforcement 
machinery. The use of the law by the State to implement its economic policies would 
lead only to negative results. The laissez-faire position is one extreme of this 
understanding - according to it, State interference in the economy would lead to 
misallocation of resources, economic inefficiency and a net wealth 
IOSS. 85 
The Chicago school inclines towards laissez-faire, as it proposes that any law 
which is the vehicle of State interference must be bad. 86 Also rejecting law as an 
instrument of economic policy is Hayek, who defends the idea that "the dynamics of 
the market are too complex and variable to be grasped by the policy-maker who, 
continually erring in his appreciation of nwket malftinctions, enacts ccorrective' 
8' Daintith, T., "Law as policy instrument: comparative perspective", in Daintith, T. (ed. ), Law as an 
instrument of economic policy: comparative and critical approaches, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1988, 
9. 
for an overview of the arguments of the Chicago School in relation to antitrust, see below, subsection 
3.3. 
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legislation which leads sooner or later to visibly inefficient results and calls for further 
correction". 
87 
As a result, the only way to have an economy that works properly would be 
"by avoiding this kind of intervention and relying on the free play of competition 
guaranteed by appropriate permanent legal rules". 88 Therefore, the only acceptable 
rules of law would be those that are general and abstract, which is not the case of 
interventionist laws such as the laws for regulation of prices. 
On the other hand, one can argue that this view is quite drastic and cannot be 
applied to all economic systems due to their different aspects and characteristics. 
Therefore, the law is the most suitable instrument of economic policy. It is the means 
of reaching certain political, social and economic ends, as well as of promoting and 
implementing the various kinds of public policies. As Daintith points out, the 
necessity of the law as an instrument of economic policy is explained by the 
assumption that economic life is arranged by private law, and the State is linked to it 
through its courts. 
89 
Economic policy is bound to impose unilateral alterations to private law rights, 
therefore these alterations must be made through the law. Moreover, he argues that 
this law should "assume a similar shape to the law ( ... ) which maintains those 
rights". 90 It should then be general in coverage, precise in form, abstract in 
expression, individual in focus and long-standing in duration. There are certain types 
87 Daintith, supra n. 85, p. 10. 
88 id-, p. 10. 
icL, p. 13. 
icL, p. 13. 
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of law that do not alter private rights but nonetheless can be used as an instrument of 
policy as they derive from the need to provide "formal recognition and protection for "I 
collective interests". 
These laws are related to the management of State funds and property as well 
as to areas where private rights cannot or do not exist, such as national defence. Their 
mandatory effects are indirect or confined to organs within the State apparatus, 
therefore these laws may have considerably different forms from those that deal with 
the maintenance or alteration of private rights. An example is the annual budget laws 
that, even though have almost nothing in common with private legal rights, have 
considerable effect on the economy and therefore can be used as an instrument of 
economic Policy. In that way, these laws use the private relations of the economy 
without unilaterally altering them. 9' 
3.3 Debate on the approaches towards competition 
The debate on the approaches towards competition has been developed in the 
USA, based on the intent of the American Congress when enacting the antitrust 
statutes, and seeking to explain how the regulation of competition may result in 
consumer welfare. The approach towards competition has been changing over the 
years, and they are represented by different schools of thought. 
91 icL, p. 14. 
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On one hand, there is the "old Chicago" schooL92 which, by giving mre 
attention to the historical and social aspects of antitrust, considered monopoly. both 
private and public, a serious problem in real markets. 93 Therefore, the old Chicago 
school defended a strict antitrust policy in order to dissolve concentrations of 
economic power, as they could result in the exploitation of the community. the 
disruption of the flow of social income and the sabotage of the whole system. 
Moreover, the old Chicago held that "concentrated markets and corporate giantism 
were the artificial results of corporate mergers and acquisitions, rather than the fruits 
of superior economic performance in any meaningful sense". 94 
This approach, which has been called also the populist approach, " is based on 
the assumption that the American Congress, when enacting antitrust laws, intended to 
promote competition through the protection of small businesses. It has been argued 
that the Sherman Act, when approved in the Congress, was not the result of "a 
consensus among economists as to its utility in enhancing economic efficiency, but a 
rough consensus in society at large as to its value in curbing the dangers of excessive 
market power... [I]t is based on a political and moral judgment rather than economic 
measurement or even distinctively economic criteria". 96 
92 Shepherd agues that a sign of the difference between the "old Chicago" and the Chicago schools is 
"the total amnesia about the old Chicagoans which the new Chicagoans display". See Shepherd, W. G., 
"Tbree 'efficiency school' hypotheses about market power", The Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 33, Summer 
1988, p. 397, footnote 3. 
93 id., p. 396/397, footnote 3. 
9'4 Adams, W., Brock, J. W., and Obst, N. P., "Pareto optimality and antitrust policy: the old Chicago and 
the New Learning", Southern Economic Journal, vol. 5 8, July 199 1, p. 3. 
95 Baker, D. and Blumenthal, W. "Ideological cycles and unstable antiUmst rules", The Antitrust 
Bulletin vol. 3 1, Summer 1986, p. 324 
96 Hofstadter, R., "What happened to the antitrust movementT'. in The Paranoid Slý'Ie in American 
Politics and other Essays, 1965, p. 232, cited in Ponsoldt, J. F., -The unreasonableness of coerced 
cooperation: a comment upon NCAA decision's rejection of the Chicago school", The Antitrust 
Bulletin vol. 3 1, Winter 1986, p. 10 10/ 10 11 - 
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Thus, the purpose of antitrust laws would be to protect the competitive market 
system "by guaranteeing free and easy market entry, by stimulating potential rivalry, 
and by dispersing market power". 97 Rivalry would then be an encouragement to 
greater efforts by the producers, therefore a market of small econornic units and 
decentralised power would be necessary - the larger the number of competitors. the 
more competitive the market is, and consequently the more the consumers can obtaim 
The populist enforcement policy is supported by traditional economics, which 
hold that concentration gives rise to market power and excess profits, this situation 
being sustained by market imperfections such as barriers to entry. 
Opposed to the old Chicago, the "new" Chicago school of antitrust analysis 
developed another approach to competition, based on efficiency. This school started 
with the ideas developed by Aaron Director in the 1950s, who sought in basic 
economic theory explanations for business behaviour. He gave special attention to the 
question of a firm achieving and maintaining monopoly power by itself. Roughly 
putting it, he argued that tie-in sale, resale price maintenance and selling below cost 
are not rational methods of obtaining monopoly. Therefore, firms are not able to 
achieve monopoly power by unilateral action. It follows that antitrust should focus 
only on cartels and horizontal mergers that could directly result in monopoly or 
facilitate cartelization. 98 
These ideas were the basis of the Chicago school, which evolved to propose 
efficiency as the ultimate goal of antitrust. Efficiency, as defined and measured in 
97 Ponsoldt, supra n. 96, p. 1007. 
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terms of consumer welfare, "consists in offering anything, whether products or 
services, that consumers are willing to pay for". 99 Efficiency is the maximisation of 
consumer welfare, therefore the school puts more emphasis on market performance, 
concluding that inefficient firms will not stay in the market, as they will not be able to 
compete with the efficient firms. 
Thus, the Chicago school understands that monopoly should not be per se 
condemned, because it may be the result of efficiency. 100 The argument is that a firm 
will achieve higher profit rates or will create natural monopoly if it has superior 
management and its technology leads to large economies of scale. After obtaining 
dominance of the market, the firm will only be able to maintain it if it continues with 
its superior performance. Therefore, its profit will not be due to monopoly, but instead 
they will reflect its cost superiority. 
It follows that monopoly power can only occur through collusion among rival 
firms; since this monopoly power does not derive from efficiency or economy of 
scale, it should be condemned. However, the Chicago school argues that the profits 
made by firms with monopoly power are dissipated in advance, during the process of 
acquiring this monopoly power. This happens because, while struggling to achieve 
this position, the firms spend a large amount of money, which will be "up to the 
amount of the prospective supra-normal profits that they hope to gainl"). 101 As a 
consequence, the profits made as a monopolist will be only "a competitive rate of 
" Posner, R., "The Chicago School of Antitrust AnalYsis", University of Pen? mylvania Law Review, 
vol. 127,1979, p. 925/928. 
()Q Bork, KH., The Antitrust Paradox, Basic Books, New York, 1978, p. 105. 
'00 Shepherd, supra. n. 92, p. 397. 
101 id., p. 401. 
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return (its profits, as a percentage of its real investment plus the sum of its dominance- 
gaining expenditures)". 
102 
The school argues that the monopoly power will not last for a long time, as the 
existence of higher prices wifl attract other producers to the market. As entry into a 
market takes some time, the monopolist will enjoy his/her power for a while, but in 
the long run substitutes to his/her products will be available and competition will be 
restored. 103 On the other hand, the monopolist knows that a more efficient producer 
may enter the market, therefore he/she will have a stimulus to minimise its costs, 
otherwise he/she will lose his/her place to the new entrants. 104 The same happens in 
relation to cartels, as new competitors may break them down. If the members of the 
cartel do not have their costs minimised, they will not be able to compete with the 
other firms of the market. 
Moreover, members of a cartel have an additional incentive to minimise costs 
because, as Posner points out, those in the cartel that have "the lowest costs will press 
for a reduction in the cartel price, since the lower a firm's marginal costs, other things 
Im--ing equal, the lower the price that will maximise its profits". 105 
Apart from the danger of new entrants, the members of a cartel are threatened 
by the possibility of "cheating" by the other members. There is a situation of 
competition between the members of the carteL which means that there is an incentive 
for them to break the agreement and reduce their price in order to obtain a larger share 
'02 id., p. 40 1. 
'0' Posner, supra n. 69, p. 9. 104 id., p. 17. 
105 i cL, p. 17. 
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of the market. 106 Finally, it is argued that cartel or monopoly should not be per se 
condemned as there is no theoretical or empirical proof that it leads to lack of 
innovation or slackness about Costs. 
107 
The Chicago school does not believe that social goals should be taken into 
consideration in the regulation of competition. Elzinga argues that socio-political 
goals are "indirectly and costlessly promoted by a direct attack on inefficient, anti- 
competitive market structures and practices". ' 08 He defines these socio-political goals 
as equity objectives, which include redistribution of income, promotion of small 
business enterprise, promotion of the liberty of the entrepreneur and neutral treatment 
of minorities. This opposition of values - efficiency and equity - should not be 
supported, he argues, as these non-efficiency goals are not outside the scope of 
economic studies. 
By attempting to prove that these equities goals can be achieved through the 
efficiency approach to competition, Elzinga seeks to answer the criticism that the 
theoretical presuppositions of economic theory do not correspond to the real world. 
Although conceding that this may be true, he argues that the usefulness of the 
paradigm is not vitiated, as "science continuously postulates impossibilities in order to 
understand existing situations". 
109 
The Harvard school has also developed an approach to antitrust, which is 
L- 
based on the maintenance of competition in the market. The Harvard school 
106 McKenzie, supra, n. 60, p. 178. 107 Posner, supra. n. 69, p. IT 
108 Elzinga, K. G., "Ibe goals of antitrust: other than competition and efficiency, what else countsO", 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 125,1977, p. 1202. 
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understands that there are other elements other than efficiency to be taken into 
account in antitrust analysis. According to Sullivan, there are assumptions of the 
Harvard school that are in opposition with the Chicago school. In the first place, the 
Harvard school is "skeptical of the reassurance that neoclassicists provided about the 
industrial status quo", and thus they do not believe that a rigid group of 
presuppositions is able to explain a particular market. This means that they assume 
that changes can occur in the markets from time to time. Moreover, the Harvard 
school believes that concentration can bring problems to competition. ' 10 
Another characteristic of the Harvard school is that it does not necessarily 
view monopoly as a result of efficiency. Also, it has a more unrestricted 
understanding of barriers to entry, among which it includes control of scarce 
resources, high capital requirements, product differentiation and also vertical 
relationships. Moreover, the school regards "certain characteristic aspects of 
competitive style, such as high advertising expenditures, as capable of dampening 
competition either by increasing capital requirements for entry, or by increasing 
product differentiation and, thereby, tending to disaggregate markets". "' 
Other scholars have also contributed to the debate. Fox, for instance, 
understands that antitrust should include both efficiency and non-economic goals. ' 12 
She argues that it is not possible to narrow the goal of antitrust to efficiency only, as 
this would go against the language of the statutes, the history of these statutes and the 
10'9 id, p. 1212. 
110 Sullivan, L. A., "Antitrust, microeconomics, and politics: reflections on some recent relation sh ips7, 
California Law Review, vol. 68, n. 1, January 1980, p. 8. 
111 Sullivan, L. A., "Economics and morýe humanistic disciplines: what are the sources of wisdom for 
antitrust? ", Universin, ofPennsytvania Law Review, vol. 125,1977, p. 1217. 
40 
case law related to competition. Moreover, she holds that, although scholars and 
jurists agree that competition law "should tend to increase the responsiveness of 
producers to consumers' wants", they are not in accordance regarding how this end 
should be achieved. She argues that, whatever the approach adopted, it means that the 
same questions will have to be confronted. Therefore, the assumption that efficiency 
is the only "clear and certain path" to antitrust, as it eliminates difficult choices, is 
false. 
She does not discard efficiency as one of the goals of antitrust. On the 
contrary, she argues that "efficiency defined in terms of serving consumers' long run 
interests and implemented by protecting the competition process is and should 
continue to be a major goal of antitrust". However, as she sees competition as a 
process that is concerned with power, consumers and opportunity for entrepreneurs, 
she understands that socio-political values, which do not include the protection of 
small business for its own sake, do not conflict with the efficiency goal. Moreover, 
after 100 years these socio-political values are already embodied in competition law, 
which means that it would be destructive to try to take them out. 
Another example is what Ellig called "the market rivalry schoor, which views 
competition as a rivalry process. He argues that, as the economic agents do not 
possess information, or rather, as they possess imperfect information about the real 
world or other agents' intentions, they have to bear costs related to this lack of 
information. These costs are called transaction costs and they include discovering 
prices and consumer preferences; disseminating knowledge about products; 
112 Fox, E., "The modemization of antimist: a new equilibriLun", Cornell Law Review, vol. 66,1981$ p. 
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measuring and securing agreement on characteristics of products and iaputs; among 
other difficulties. " 3 The market rivalry school takes these difficulties as the central 
economic problems to be analysed, while market institutions and structure are 
considered a result of the efforts made by the economic agents to gather and interpret 
information. 
This overview of the debate allows us to conclude that there are three main 
ap roaches to competition: the efficiency approach, the social approach, and the Ip 
competitive approach. They have been developing throughout the years, but at 
specific times one of them has been predominant. For instance, the approach adopted 
by the Chicago school has exerted great influence over antitrust analysis in the USA 
during the 1980s, where it reached its peak. ' 14 
The theoretical debate on the approaches to competition is extremely helpful 
to identify the main paths that are open for competition law to follow. However, when 
investigating the competition laws of developing countries, one has to bear in mind 
that the debate is to be considered only as a guidance, as options that exist for the 
enforcement of competition law. It is not possible to apply the arguments of the 
different schools of thought directly to the developing countries, due to the lack of 
similarities between the USA and these countries. 
In the first place, there is an enormous difference in relation to the market 
itself In the USAand in developed countries in general, a market economy has been 
1140/1192. 
113 Ellig, J., "Untwisting the strands of Chicago antit-ust", The Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 37, Winter 1992, 
Fi4 866. 
Amato, G., Antitrust and the Bountis ofPo-twr, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1997, p. 24. 
42 
developed for a longer time, which means that the markets are usually competitive, 
the intervention of the State in the economy is not extensive, the economic agents 
have more freedom to act. As it will be seen in the next section, this is not always the 
case in developing countries, which are now starting to adopt trade liberalisatioD 
measures and decreasing the role of the State in the economy. 
There are also political differences that stress the non viability of the 
application of the arguments to developing countries, such as instability in the 
government, lack of coherence in the adoption of economic policies due to these 
constant changes, lack of political will to implement policies, and so on. The political 
and economic models of developing and developed countries are different, which 
means that the arguments of any of the school of thoughts cannot be embraced 
completely; it is necessary to see the discussion only as an indication of what are the 
approaches to, and effects of, competition law. 
Having in mind the hypothesis proposed in the Introduction that the 
competition models existing in more economically developed nations cannot be 
wholeheartedly adopted by those countries that are commencing to regulate 
competition, ' 15 one can argue that emerging economies must criticafly assess the 
issues considered in the theory of competition if their competition laws and policies 
are to be effective. It must be taken into account the effect of State monopolies in the 
market, the appropriateness of privatisation of such monopolies, the existence of 
highly concentrated markets, the needs of the economy, as well as other relevant 
characteristics of a particular economy. These issues, along with the goals that are to 
"' Introduction, section 3. 
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be achieved by the regulation of competition, must guide the development of 
competition laws and policies in any country. 
4. Regulation of competition and developing countries 
Until the beginning of the 1980s competition had seldom been subjected to 
regulation in developing countries. When this occurred, however, the law was not 
enforced. One of the motives behind it is that these countries supported price control 
policies, State monopolies dominated the economy and competition was weak due to 
a lack of independent companies in the market. ' 16 Gray and Davis give 
complementary reasons for this lack of adoption or enforcement of competition laws. 
In the first place, many industries have been started by State enterprises or by 
enterprises supported by the government; consequently, the government was not 
interested in seeing these enterprises compelled to face competition. 
Another reason is that governments have believed that their markets would 
only allow one or a small number of enterprises producing at economic scale in a 
given industry, therefore monopoly or a monopolistic market was necessary. Also, 
these govenunents have seen competition that leads to excess capacity and exit of less 
competitive companies not only as a waste of capital but also as socially and 
politically costly, as it would result in unemployment. Moreover, they have believed 
that their bureaucracies would have the necessary knowledge to establish the desirable 
price ceilings, so it would not be considered indispensable to supervise price fixing. 
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Also, those countries that supported exports believed that only concentrated 
industries with market power would be able to compete in the international market 
with the enterprises of the developed countries. Finally, consumer protection 
organisations were not very common in developing countries, which means that 
enterprises would have more freedom to act. ' 17 
"D- 
Regarding the relevance of the control of anticompetitive practices, Gray and 
Davis ask whether it is efficient to adopt restrictive business Practices control or 
whether it is better to give the enterprises complete freedom of action. According to 
them, trade liberalisation by itself is not a guarantee that competition will be restored. 
They base this argument on the fact that, notwithstanding the open economy and the 
high level of industrialisation in the developed countries, it has been necessary to be 
attentive to the conduct adopted by the firms of the nwket, because these firms 
continue to engage in restrictive business practices. Thus the significance of 
restrictive business practices control. ' 18 
It follows that there are several reasons for developing countries to adopt 
legislation regulating competition. Davidow points out some of them Initially, he 
argues that a law against cartels would protect the State from "bid rigging or other 
cartel conduct directed toward it". This would emphasise the necessity of respecting 
the competition principle. Moreover, the existence of a law against the abuse of 
dominant position may improve the performance of State enterprises and monopolies, 
as well as "speed economic development in traditional societies". Finally, he argues 
116 Davidow, J., "The relevance of antimonopoly policy for developing countries", The Antitrust 
Bulletin Spring 1992, p. 278. 
'17 Gray, C. S. and Davis A-A., "Competition policy in developing countries pursuing structural 
adjustment", The Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 38, Summer 1993, p. 429. 
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that the creation of a competition commission would result in a centre of expertise of 
antitrust policy, which would help also in the processes of privatisation, deregulation, 
restructuring, and, ultimately, in achieving market economy. "' 
However, Davidow warns that developing countries should develop their own 
legislation concerning the regulation of competition, instead of copying those already 
in practice in developing countries, as a complement to trade liberalisation measures, 
such as privatisation, restructuring and deregulation. 120 This argument supports the 
first hypothesis presented in the Introduction, that is, that developing countries should 
not adopt models that already exist in other countries, without first taking into account 
their own necessities. 
The adoption of competition law and policy in developing countries is a 
necessary step to secure the existence of a competitive market by checking the 
behaviour of the economic agents, in order to avoid the adoption of practices that may 
result in damage to the market. This is particularly true if we take into consideration 
the transition to a market-oriented economy that has been taking place in developing 
countries. The existence of highly concentrated nwkets in these countries is by itself 
a threat to the market, due to the potentially negative effects that may arise from 
market power. It is not possible to carry out this transition without a market that 
works properly. The adoption of legislation regulating competition would help this 
transition. 
"8 Id., p. 448/449. 
119 Davidow, supra n. 116, p. 279. 
120 IcL, p. 278/279. 
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A report of the World Bank on competition in Argentina supports the 
argument that regulation of competition can be necessary in order to secure the 
implementation of trade liberalisation measures. This report affirmed that, "in order to 
ensure that the full benefits of the privatisation and deregulation program are realised, 
and in order to protect against future recidivisn-4 it is necessary to have a program 
under which the government continues to protect conswners from the threat of 
cartelization and monopoly, whether these tendencies arise solely in the private sector 
or as a result of government responses to private economic interests 91 . 
121 
The report claims that in Argentina barriers to international trade have been 
reduced and practically all quantitative restrictions on foreign trade have also been 
removed, which should help to increase competition in the economy. Moreover, the 
macroeconomic situation is being stabilised, price control have been eliminated, a 
deregulation effort is under way and the taxation system has been made more 
efficient. According to the report, "as these policy reforms take effect, and 
competitive pressures are restored to the Argentine economy, there will be increasing 
efforts by firms to avoid competition. It is therefore important to complement the 
other economic reforms with an intensified effort to promote competition policy". 122 
Accordingly, competition law can be adopted as an alternative to State 
intervention in the economy. An OECD paper holds that 
"[c]ompetition PolicY is based on the belief that competitive markets are 
more likely than detailed government intervention to place decision-makers 
12 1 Economists Incorporated, Report of the Advisory Team on Competition Policy and Consumer 
Protection in Argentinq Economists Incorporated, Washington, 1992, p. 2. 
122 id., p. 10. 
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close to information on costs, supply and demand and technology that are 
essential to efficient decision-making by economic agents. Reliance on 
market signals ensures that correct decisions are rewarded and encouraged 
and that incorrect decisions are discouraged or rectified quickly. Thus, 
barring market failures or significant externahlies, competition is a superior 
alternative to government management of the economy". 123 
The approach towards competition adopted by developing countries has been 
changing in the last decade. Developing countries have been abandoning their 
strategies of intervention in the economy and thus adopting trade liberalisation 
policies. Gray and Davis argue that one of the reasons for this change of approach is 
that the State enterprises were not performing well and therefore retarding economic 
growth. Also, the governments are now seeing import competition as a positive 
aspect, that leads to lower consumer prices and lower customer industries' production 
costs. 
Another reason is that they are starting to regard excess capacity as a factor for 
inducing competition between producers. Accordingly, easy of entryand exit has now 
I- - been considered a positive aspect. Moreover, the experience of the developing 
countries with price control has shown that it "discourages investments, decapitalizes 
enterprises and wastes valuable management time". One more reason is that, though 
the concentration of certain markets has been important to create enterprises able to 
compete in the international market, in some cases this is not happening any more and 
therefore the development of certain sectors has been impaired. Finally, consumer 
123 OECD, Competition and Economic Development, OECD, Paris, 199 1, p. 7. 
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associations have been created in developing countries, and they have been 
performing their role in the fight against anticompetitive conduct adopted by 
producers. 
It follows that now there is not only more space but also more government will 
for the adoption and enforcement of competition law, which has been done gradually. 
For instance, in 1989 Kenya transformed its price control office into a monopolies and 
prices department of the Ministry of Finance. Morocco has started the process of 
regulating competition in 1985. Sri Lanka, in its turn, created a Fair Trading 
Commission in 1987 in order to supervise anticompetitive conduct and administer 
price control. Moreover, price control in Sri Lanka has been decreasing. In 1980 
Iv- 
Korea enacted a Fair Trade Law to fight the effects of a interventionist policy that had 
been adopted by the government. 
124 
Developing countries can make use of the work developed by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development - UNCTAD regarding competition 
law and policy. In 1980 the United Nations General Assembly's Resolution n. 35/63 
approved the "Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the 
Control of Restrictive Business ]Practices", 125 which gave UNCTAD the mandate of 
promoting competition law and policy. Since then UNCTAD has been playing an 
active role in that area, be it by giving technical assistance, organising seminars and 
training authorities, preparing reports on the effects of market concentration on 
124 
see Gray, supra n. 117, p. 457/465. 
12' 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly, 05.12.1980. 
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international markets, 126 producing study on the relation between competition policy 
and economic reforms, 127 or by developing a model law on competition, 128 among 
other activities. 
When enacting a competition law, developing countries can take into 
consideration the general principles that LNCTAD has developed specially for this 
purpose. According to these principles, the law must be clear and simple, and define 
its goal as the enhancement and protection of competition. Also, the law has to 
develop a system of enforcement that is fast and effective. Another principle is that it 
1- - must be created an institutional framework that is adequate for the enforcement of the 
law. In this case, UNCTAD suggests the use of independent competition authorities. 
Finally, competition law must be in accordance and work together with other 
governmental policies and authorities. 129 It follows that these principles proposed by 
UNCTAD conform to the hypothesis on the adoption and enforcement of competition 
law on which this thesis is based. 
130 
Another source of help in the creation of a competition law is the model law 
developed by LNCTAD, which includes elements that should be taken into account in 
the legislation as well as references to comparative law. 13 1 The model law defines the 
purpose of the law Efs the control and elimination of restrictive practices and abuse of 
126 UNCTAD, Concentration ofMarket Power through Mergers, Take-overs, Joint Ventures and Other 
Acquisitions of Control and its Effects on International Mwkets (in Particular the Markets of 
Developing Countries), TD/B/RPB/80/Rev. 2 (1993). 
127 LNCTAD, 7he Role of Competition Policy in Economic Reforms in Developing and Other 
Countries, TD/B/RPB/96/Rev. 1 (1994). 
129 see Nunez, Luis Jose Diez-Canseco, "Comment", in Faundez, Julio (ed-ý Good Government and 
Lauý Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997, p. 189. 
129 UNCTAD, Activities relating to Specific Provisions of the Set of Principles and Rules, 
TD/B/RBP/90 (1992). 
130 See Introduction, section 3. 
131 LNCTAD TD/B/RBP/8 I /Rev. 3 (2 August 1994). 
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market power that adversely affect competition and domestic and/or international 
trade, as well as economic development. It also provides definitions of 
"enterprises", 132 6r dominant position of market power"133 and "relevant market", 
134 
which are essential in the analysis of antitrust cases to be carried out by any 
competition authority. Moreover, it supplies the criteria that can be used to define 
dominant position in the relevant market. It also defines practices that are to be 
considered per se illegal, due to their highly anticompetitive effect. In relation to 
mergers, the model law establishes a test to be applied in order to asses the potential 
danger of the merger. 135 Another important issue is that the model law delimits the 
power to be given to the competition authority. 
However, it has been argued that the model law is just a guidance and 
therefore it is not possible to adopt it without taking into account the legal tradition of 
the country in question. ' 36 Accordingly, it cannot be ignored the specific necessities 
and characteristics of the country. 
UNCTAD has been developing its work of supporting the adoption of 
competition law also through the compilation of the competition legislation adopted 
world-wide, as required in The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and 
132 ý45 Enterprises' means firms, partnerships, corporations, companies, associations and other juridical 
persons, irrespective of whether created or controlled by private persons or by the state, which engage 
in commercial activities and includes their branches, subsidiaries, affiliates or other entities directly or 
indirectly controlled by them. " 
133 o Dominant position of market power' refers to a situation where an enterprise, either by itself or 
acting together with a few other enterprises, is in a position to control the relevant market for a 
particular good or service or group of goods or services. 
134 o Relevant Market' refers to the line of commerce in which competition has been reasonably 
restrained and to the geographic area involved, defined to include all reasonably substitutable products 
and services, and all nearby competitors, to which consumers could turn in the near term if the restraint 
or abuse raised prices by a not insignificant amount. " 
"' A merger will be prohibited when the market share resulting from it "%Nrill result in a dominant firm 
or in a significant reduction of competition in a market dominated by very few firms". 
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Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices. 137 This has taken the form of a 
Handbook on Restrictive Business Practices Legislation, comprising not only the 
legislation adopted but also commentaries on such laws. 138 Also, UNCTAD has 
requested States and regional groups to inform about the measures taken regarding the 
Set of Principles and Rules. Such measures have been gathered and published by 
UNCTAD. 139 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO), in its turn, has created a working 
group on competition policy, 140 which is discussing WTO's jurisdiction to adopt 
competition rules. However, there is controversy over this issue. The working group 
was the result of a blueprint proposed to the Council of Ministers by Sir Leon Brittan, 
the European Trade Commissioner, and Mr. Karel Van Miert, the Competition 
Commissioner. According to Sir Leon, it is necessary to have "an international 
agreement on competition rules and smoother co-operation between national C7 
competition jurisdictions" in order to avoid conflict between competition 
authorities. 
141 
On the other hand, the United States are not very sympathetic to the idea. 
President Clinton's assistant to international trade argued that, though convergence of 
competition rules should be sought, this should not be done through legally bindi 
mternational rules, because they would reinforce differences, and not eliminate them 
136 Nunez, supra n. 128, p. 194. 
137 supra n. 125, section F. 6 (c). 
138 see for instance TD/B/RBP/94 (1993), with the laws adopted in Italy, Jamaica and Venezuela. This 
Handbook has been issued periodically, as legislation is sent to LNCTAD by States. 
139 see for instance UNCTAD, Replies by States and Regional Groupings on Steps taken to Meet their 
Commitment to the Set of Principles and Rules, TD/B/RBP/100/Add. 1 (1994), which includes the 
replies from Australia, Cyprus, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Niger, Peru, Republic of Korea, 
Thailand, as well as from OECD. 
140 in Financial 771mes, "World Trade: WTO urged to act on competition rules", 25.07.97. 
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According to him, efforts should be made to have competition authorities working 
together and collaborating with each other. Thus, WTO's working group on 
competition should identify the business practices that are anticompetitive and prevent 
access to national markets by foreign companies, and then figure out solutions to be 
adopted by competition authorities. 142 These arguments were reinforced by the 
assistant attorney general for the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice, 
according to whom the United States supported the creation of WTO's working group 
on competition so that a "competition culture" could be developed. 143 
5. Conclusion 
The discussion developed in this chapter allows us to establish some points in 
relation to the regulation of competition. In the first place, the economic models 
demonstrate that there are arguments in favour and against the protection of 
competition. Perfect competition does not exist in the real market, and monopoly may 
not be desirable but at the same time may not be harmful. However, there is an 
intermediate situation between these two extremes, which may be worth maintaining, 
as they reflect the imperfection of the market and thus are more feasible to be 
achieved. The importance of these models for developing countries is that they 
provide a better understanding of the structure of the market, and thus allow to draw 
solutions for the problems presented. 
141 id. 
142 Tarullo, D., "A world competition court would reinforce differences, not remove them", in 
Financial Times, Comment & Analysis: Wrong lesson from Boeing: Personal View, 13.08.97. 
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Another point is that the "laissez-faire" approach to market regulation cannot 
be applied to the markets of developing countries, if a competitive market is to be 
achieved, because the main characteristics of such markets have been highly 
concentrated industries and strong intervention in the economy, which is contrary to 
competition. Without careful regulation of the market, it is not possible to achieve 
competition in a market with such features. Moreover, by letting the market solve its 
problems by itself, competition may be restored, but the costs may be high, be it in a 
developing or developed country, since consumers, competitors and the market in 
general may be affected in a harmful manner during the time needed for this self 
adjustment. 
Taking this conclusion into account, we can argue that the approach adopted 
towards competition cannot be too flexible, otherwise there will be more risks in the 
process of maximising consumer welfare, which is the main goal of competition. The 
analysis of the theoretical debate carried on subsection 3.3 demonstrated that there are 
basically three approaches to competition: the efficiency, the social and the 
competitive approaches. 
The efficiency approach does not conform to the argument that competition 
law must avoid much flexibility, since it defends a less interventionist approach to 
competition, supporting a minimum regulation of restrictive business practices, and 
efficiency as the only way to reach consumer welfare. The social approach, in its turn, 
shows a well intentioned concem with social issues, but these issues not only can be 
143 in FinanCial 7-jMeS. 'No monopoly on antitrwf', 13.02.98, p. 20. 
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regulated through other and more adequate means, but also will not necessarily result 
in consumer welfare. 
Om the other hand, the competition approach describes a model that seems to 
be more in accordance with the necessities of developing countries, by not focusing 
exclusively on efficiency, giving relative importance to socio-political values, and by 
supporting the maintenance of a competitive market as the most adequate way of 
maximising consumer welfare. By taking into account these issues, this approach 
demonstrates that it is more capable to deal with the characteristics of the markets of 
developing countries, such as highly concentrated markets, State intervention in the 
economy and price control, among others. 
The work that has been developed at UNCTAD regarding competition 
provides the necessary elements that should be taken into account by the States when 
adopting competition laws. Moreover, UNCTAD has been keen to assist States in this 
process of regulating competition. Thus, developing countries should take advantage 
not only of the model law but also of the assistance provided. However, this should be 
done bearing in mind that each country has its own needs and thus cannot adopt any 
pre-existing model of competition law but develop its own legislation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
1. Introduction 
- LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter will investigate the development of the legislation regarding 
competition in the country. This investigation will work as a background to the more 
detailed analysis of competition law that will be carried out in the following chapters. 
The basis of competition law in Brazil is in the Constitution. Thus, we will 
start the chapter with an investigation of the development of provisions related to the 
regulation of competition that have been inserted in the different Constitutions 
enacted this century, putting though more emphasis on the present Constitution. An 
overview of the former competition laws enacted in Brazil will follow, so that we will 
be able to understand how the law evolved. We will then analyse Law 8884/94, the 
present competition law. This analysis will be initiated with the legislative history of 
ý1- - 
me law, followed by an overview of its main characteristics, which will include its 
aims, the institutional framework created for its enforcement, the substantives issues 
regulated by the law, the method adopted for the control of economic concentration, 
AL .. me procedure established for enforcement, and the penalties provided for in the law. 
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We will then conclude with an assessment of the law taking into account the 
hypothesis proposed in the Introduction. " 
2. Regulation of competition 
2.1 The constitutional origins of competition law 
The Brazilian competition law finds its roots in the Constitutions that have 
U- 
been written this century. It started with the 1934 Constitution, which adopted an 
approach of defence of "popular economy". 145 According to article 115 of the 1934 
Constitution, the "economic freedom" should be ensured taking into account the 
principle of justice and the national needs, and should result in a reasonable quality of 
life to the population. At the same time that provided for economic freedom, the 
Constitution stated that the statutory law should develop the popular economy by 
nationalising all the foreign companies working in Brazil. "' Accordingly, it 
determined that the intervention on the economy should only occur in case of public 
147 
mterest. In order to become effective, the constitutional provisions should be 
submitted to regulation; as this did not happen, the provisions were ineffectual. 148 
The defence of the popular economy was provided for in the 1937 Constitution 
as well. However, it approached the subject in a more severe way, as it provided for 
144 See Introduction, section 3. 
14' The concept of "popular economy" is characteristic of Statýe intervention in the market, through the 
control of prices. 
1"Article 117, Constitution of 1934. 
147 Article 116, Constitution of 1934, which authorised the monopolisation by the State of an economic 
activity in cases of public interest. 
'48 Franceschini, Josý Inacio Gonzaga and Jos6 Luiz Vicente de Azevedo Franceschiný Poder 
Econ6mico: Exercicio eA buso, Ed. Revista dos Tribunais, Sao Paulo, 198 5, p. 7. 
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strict penalties to be applied to the crimes against the popular economy. Moreover, 
these crimes were then equivalent to the crimes against the State. 149 Article 141 stated 
that one of the objectives of the Constitution was "to prevent the obstruction of 
competition by means of concerted practices, combines and organisations that would 
result in monopoly power in certain areas of the economy or in the restriction of free 
competition, which is essential to the development of industries and trade". State 
intervention in the economy, in its turn, should occur only if necessary to co-ordinate 
the production factors and to cure deficiencies that impaired the development of the 
system of free enterprise. "0 
In contrast with the previous constitutions, which dealt only with the 
promotion and protection of the popular economy, the Constitution of 1946 had ample 
purposes and introduced the idea of control of abuse of economic power through 
article 148. It established that the statutory law would prohibit any kind of abuse of 
economic power, whichever its nature might be but including the concentration of 
companies that intended to dominate the market, eliminate competition and arbitrarily 
increase profits. 
The first part of article 148 was generic, providing for the repression of 4ny 
kind of act that would lead to restriction of competition, even if this result was not 
desired by the economic agent. At the same time, the second part of this provision, 
which dealt with the concentration of companies, was more specific in the sense that 
it required the intention to dominate the market, eliminate competition and arbitrarily 
increase profits. 
149 Article 141, Constitution of 1937. 
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In 1967 a new Constitution was written and the control of abuse of economic 
power was inserted among the principles of the economic and social order. Article 
157, VI stated that the purpose of the economic and social order was to achieve social 
justice based on detemiined principles. One of these principles was the control of 
abuse of market power, characterised by market domination, elimination of 
competition and arbitrary increase of profits. This Constitution abandoned the 
expression "any kind of abuse of economic power" adopted in the previous one, thus 
losing the generalisation character of the provision. 
In relation to the intervention in the economy, article 157, paragraph 8, 
reflected the ideology of the time, sustained by the military regime, and permitted 
intervention both in the economy and in the monopoly of an industry or activity, 
"when essential for reasons of national security, or in order to organise a sector that 
cannot be developed efficiently under the system of competition and free enterprise". 
The latest Constitution was written in 1988 and introduced important 
modifications that affected the regulation of competition. Initially, article I establishes 
the fundamental principles of the Republic, among which the principle of free 
enterprise is included. 15 1 Another innovation is that the social and economic order are 
not under the same "title" anymore. 152 The new Constitution separates them and bases 
the economic order on the respect for human labour and the promotion of free 
enterprise. Based on the social justice, its purpose is to seek a dignified existence to 
150 Article 135, Constitution of 1937. 
15 ' Article 1, IV, Constitution of 1988. 
152 These titles are: ftmdamental principles, ftmdamental rights, organisation of the State, protection of 
the State and democratic institutions, taxation and budget, economic and ftnancial order, and social 
order. 
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Moreover, article 170, sole paragraph, establishes that everyone has the right to 
engage freely in any economic activity. 
154 
One of the principles adopted to pursue the economic order is the principle of 
free competition. 155 Other principles of the economic order include private property, 
social function of property and defence of consumer, among others. 116 It is interesting 
to note that it is also a principle of the economic order the "favourable treatment for 
the national small-sized companies", 157 what may be in opposition to the principle of 
free competition. However, although a principle of the economic order, free 
competition is subordinate to the fundamental principles of the Republic that are listed 
in article I of the Constitution, as they are hierarchically more important. As 
mentioned above, among these fundamental principles free enterprise is included. 
This means that free competition is an instrument to achieve that principle. 
Free enterprise is then guaranteed by article 173, paragraph 4, which states that 
the law shall control the abuse of economic power that intends to dominate the 
market, eliminate competition and arbitrarily increase profits. The abuse of economic 
power is then a reason for the indirect intervention of the State in the economy; 
however, this intervention will be in favour of free competition, not market 
dominance. In relation to the direct exploration of an economic activity by the State, 
153 Article 170, Constitution of 1988. 
154 This right is also provided for in article 5, XHI, which is included in the title "Fundamental Rights 
and Guarantees". 
15' Article 170, IV, Constitution of 1988. 
156 The principles of the economic order are: national sovereignty; private property; social role of 
property-, free competition; consumer protection; environment protection; reduction in social and 
regional inequality-, employment, and favoured treatment for Brazi-lian owned smafl enterprises. 
157 Article 170, IX, Constitution of 1988. 
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article 173 determines that this will only be possible when it is necessary to the 
national security or relevant to the collective interest, and shall be defined by the law. 
Article 177 defines the activities that constitute a State monopoly. 158 
AA . ccordingly, article 21, XI, XII and =11, lists the activities that shall be explored by 
the State, which include postal services, telecommunication, electric energy services, 
navigation, aviation, railway services and nuclear energy. The State may explore these 
activities directly or through authorisation, concession or permission given to private 
parties. It follows that, at the same time that the Constitution defends free 
competition, it also maintains some State monopolies. 
2.2 The former system of competition law 
Brazil has been enacting laws that in some way are related to competition 
since 1938,159 due to the constitutional provisions discussed in the previous 
subsection. These laws, however, adopted a more punitive approach, and dealt more 
with the concept of "popular economy" than with competition. It was only in 1962 
that an exclusive and specific law governing and regulating competition was enacted. 
The bill of this law had been in Congress since 1948, and it underwent several 
amendments until it was approved in 1962. 
Basically, Law 4137/62 sought to protect and increase competition and dealt 
with the abuse of economic power. Article 2 of the law established and enumerated 
"a They are the exploration, refinement, import, export and transport of oil and other minerals. 
1'9 These laws are: Decree-law 869, enacted in 1938 with the purpose of protecting competition and 
the "popular economy" against economic countries; Decree 7666, enacted in 1945 and concerned less 
with each competitor and more with the rights of the population as a whole, preventing its exploitation 
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the forms of abuse which were as follows: market dominance and elimination of 
competition achieved through agreement between companies, acquisition of shares, 
mergers, suspension of activities or creation of dffficulties for the performance of 
other companies; unreasonable increase of prices that led to an arbitrary increase of 
profits; conduct leading to monopolistic conditions and abusive speculation of prices, 
such as destruction of capital or consumer goods and forestalling of goods or raw 
material; organisation of an economic group through price discrimination and tie-in 
sales; and unfair competition through exclusivity in publicity or previous arrangement 
in public biddings. 
The law thus did not establish specific types of conduct that were considered 
abuse of economic power, but it drew up the situations where it my occur or the 
consequences arising from it. As it will be seen in Chapter 4, the law did not 
specifically prohibit the imposition of exclusivity agreements, for instance, but it did 
prohibit agreements between companies that led to market dominance, where 
exclusivity agreýements may be includeýd. 160 
In order to investigate and control the abuses of economic power, the law 
created a special body with power to deal with competition matters, which was called 
Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica - CADE (Administrative Council for 
Economic Protection). 161 According to the law, CADE had jurisdiction to investigate 
types of conduct that were allegedly a violation of the economic power, commence 
administrative proceedings, pass judgments in relation to these proceedings, apply 
by companies with market dominance, and Law 1521/5 1, establishing the crimes against the economic 
order. 
160 see below, chapter, 4, subsection 2.1. 
161 Article 8, Law 4137/62. 
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penalties, ask the Judiciary to determine the intervention in companies, as weH as 
instruct the population about the various forms of abuse of economic power. 162 The 
law did not provide for any kind of appeal against CADE's decisions; however, this 
would not prevent judicial revision because, being also an administrative act, the 
decision is subject to judicial review. 
163 
An act that resulted in economic concentration could be considered legal if it 
complied with the requirements established in the law. Article 74 determined that any 
act or agreement between companies that resulted in the balance between production 
and consumption, the regulation of the market, the standardisation of production, the 
stability of prices, the specialisation of production or distribution, or the establishment 
of restrictions in the distribution of goods should be submitted to CADE in order to be 
approved. If CADE did not reach a decision in 60 days, the act or conduct would 
automatically be considered valid. 
164 
Law 4137/62, however, did not produce the intended effects. For instance, 
from 1963 to 1990, CADE dealt with 117 administrative proceedings, of which in 
only 16 a fine was applied. 165 This may be the result of an exceedingly rigorous 
control of the economy as well as a lack of confidence by the population, which 
reflected the govenunent's absence of support. 166 It has also been argued that this lack 
of enforcement is the natural consequence of a series of factors, such as the lack of a 
162 Article 17, Law 4137/62. See below, chapter 3. 
163Meirelles, H. L., Direito A&ninistrafivo Brasileiro, 22"d edition, Malheiros Editores, Sao Paulo, 
1990, p. 610. 1,64 Article 74, paragraph 3, Law 4137/62. 
10 in DNPDE - Departamento Nacional de Prote0o e Defesa Economica, AplicaVdo da Lei de Defesa 
da Concorrencia - Relat6rio de A tividades, 199 1, p. 13. 166 interview with Paulo Germano MagalhRes, in Direito Econ6mico - Revista do CADE, nova fase, n. 
1, Jan/Mar 1986, P. 14 
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competition policy consistent with economic policy; the adoption of procedure rules 
that did not provide for the rapidity required in these cases; the inadequate structure of 
CADE; the lack of training of the members of CADE; and the anachronistic concept 
of abuse of economic power adopted by Law 4137/62, which gave too much emphasis 
to the protection of competition as an end in itself. Moreover, this concept of abuse of 
economic power was considered very broad, detailed and analytical, and it conflicted 
with the jurisdiction of other governmental bodies. ' 67 
After the enactment of the Constitution of 1988, some changes were necessary 
to adapt the economic laws to the new Constitution, since competition was then 
explicitly provided for. In 1990, two laws were enacted; Law 8002/90 dealt with the 
prevention of offences against the consumers' right, and Law 8137/90 defined the 
crimes against the economic and fiscal order. This law adopted a punitive approach to 
the matter, defining the crime and determining the penalty to be imposed, which could 
be imprisonment or fine. The crimes defined by this law were subject to criminal 
168 
proceedmgs. 
Meanwhile, Decree 99244 defined the new functions of the governmental 
agencies. It decreased CADE's jurisdiction and created the Secretaria Nacional de 
Direito Economico - SNDE (Economic Law National Office), 
169 which assumed some 
of CADE's duties. 170 Therefore, CADE was supposed only to control the abuse of 
167 Carneiro, J. G. P., "Sugest6es para a nova lei de abuso econ6mico", Direito Econ6mico - Revina do 
CADE, nova fase, n. 1, Jan/Mar 1986, p. 17. 
"'8 Articles 15 and 16, Law 8137/90. 
169Four years later SNDE's name changed to SDE - Secretaria de Direito Econ6mico (Economic Law 
Office). In order to avoid misunderstanding, from now on we will refer to it as SDE 170 
see below, chapter 3. 
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economic power, 171 while SDE's jurisdiction included the protection of the consumer 
as well as the investigation, control and suppression of the abuse of economic power 
through CADE, 172 and the promotion, co-ordination and supervision of the economic 
protection. 
173 
Law 8158 was enacted in 1991 in order to alter Law 4137/62 and set the rules 
for the protection of competition. SDE would investigate the distortions of behaviour 
in the economic sectors that could affect prices, free competition, free enterprise or 
the constitutional principles of the economic order, and then propose measures to 
correct them. 174 Moreover, SDE should prevent some distortions: dumping; closure of 
the market for actual or potential competitors; and market division, among others. 175 
Unlike Law 4137/62, Law 8158/91, in its article 3 defined the offences against 
the economic order. It listed 18 types of conduct that were to be considered a violation 
of the economic order when they resulted in market domination, elimination of 
competition or arbitrary increase of profits. These included price fixing, preventing 
the access of companies to the market, market divisioi-4 refusal to sell, tie-in sales, 
sale of goods without profits. 
176 
Law 8158/91 innovated in the sense that it created new proceedings to deal 
with the abuse of economic power. The investigation should be made by SDE, which 
1 71 Administrative Rule n. 105 of 1992. 172 Article 102,111, Decree 99244/90. 
173 Article 102,1, Decree 99244/90. 
174 Article 1, Law 8158/9 1. 
171 Article 2, Law 8158/91. 
176 The types of conduct adopted by the law were not exhaustive. Tberefore, any other conduct that 
might result in the e&cts established in the law were considered violation of the economic order. 
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was given the power to start it by its own initiative. 177 However, the investigation 
could be initiated also by request of any interested part in the rnatter or by any agency 
or body of the public administration. If the investigation demonstrated the possible 
existence of an offence, the case would be submitted to judgment by CADE, which 
could not determine the production of new evidence nor allow the development of 
new arguments by the parties. 
178 
An important aspect of Law 8158/91 was that it provided for alterations to 
article 74 of Law 4137/62. As mentioned above, article 74 dealt with acts that resulted 
in economic concentration, which were allowed if they met the requirements 
established by the law. SDE was competent to examine and allow any kind of 
agreement that might impair the competition between ýcompanies, and should take into 
account the requirements provided in the article. It included the acts that, through 
mergers, incorporation of companies or any kind of organisation, resulted in any form 
of economic concentration and in a participation of the company in at least 20% of the 
relevant market. 179 It was the first time that the Brazilian law referred to the "relevant 
market"; however, it did not define it. 
Finally, Law 8158/91 gave SDE the power to order the discontinuity of the 
practice that resulted in economic concentration. 180 This power was not given to 
CADE by Law 4137/62. 
177 Article 4, Law 8158/91. 
178 Article 8, Law 8158/9 1. 
179 Article 74, paragraph 2, Law 413 7/62 with the alterations of Law 815 8/9 1. 
180 Article 74, paragraph 4, Law 4137/62, with the alterations of Law 8158/91. 
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As mentioned above, Law 8158/91 did not expressly annul the previous laws 
concerning competition. Therefore, the existence at the same time of Laws 4137/62 
and 8158/91 created a situation of lack of definition and uncertainty. The new powers 
given to CADE and SDE were undermined by the fact that Law 4137/62, which 
created CADE, was still in force, and this resulted in a difficulty in defming the 
functions of each body. Thus, there were two competition authorities whose powers 
mtertwined, which made difficult a clear identification of the jurisdiction of each of 
them. Consequently, the enforcement of competition law was deeply impaired. 
2.3 Present system 
2.3.1 Legislative history ofLaw 8884194 
The existence of contradictions between the two laws that formed the 
framework of the Brazilian competition system did not allow for appropriate 
enforcement of the law. On the other hand, competition law was fmafly understood as 
one of the instruments available to the government for achieving economic growth. It 
follows that, for the other economic measures to achieve positive results, 181 the 
government required and needed a strong framework for competition law, which was 
not the case of the competition law in force at that time. Therefore, in April of 1993 
the Minister of Justice sent to the National Congress a bill on the "control of the abuse 
of economic power". 
According to the explanatory note annexed to the bill, this bill was based on 
the presumption that the law that protects competition is not in itself a fundamental 
'8' these were economic liberalisation measures - see Introduction, subsection 2.1. 
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instrument for the efficient performance of the market economy, especially in 
developing countries. "' The main purpose of the bill was to improve the existing laws 
on competition and abuse of economic power, by creating a new procedure as well as 
a new institutional model for the enforcement of the law. 
The explanatory note pointed out the crucial problems that the new law on 
competition would have to solve. One of them was the lack of personnel with 
expertise in this issue, because it considered essential to have technical knowledge 
and professional experience in order to detect illicit conduct in that are& Another 
problem was the tradition in Brazil of challenging in the courts every attempt of the 
administration to control economic power; in order to solve it, it was necessary to 
create an adequate administrative procedure. Other issues to be solved included the 
lack of means to alert the economic agents to their abusive conduct; the fact that some 
kinds of abusive conduct, such as arbitrary increase of prices, were not well 
characterised by the laws in force; and the lack of a clear division of jurisdiction 
between CADE and SDE. 
This bill presented by the Minister of Justice would transform CADE into an 
autarquia, 183 which would give it more freedom of action, as well as an infrastructure 
that would allow CADE to go to the courts by itself and not represented by the 
Federal Goverment. Another improvement was that the jurisdiction of CADE and 
SDE was clearly defined. SDE would have the power to monitor concentrated 
markets as well as to examine acts of economic concentration, though the final 
approval would be given by CADE. This agency would act as an administrative 
182 see Diario do Congresso Nacional (SeqAo 1), 13.05.93, p. 9628/9629. 
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tribunaL and its four commissioners and the president would be appointed by the 
Minister of Justice, examined by the Senate and nominated by the President of the 
Republic. 
The bill maintained the provisions of Laws 4137/62 and 8158/91 on the types 
of conduct that are considered abuse of economic power, only including the abusive 
increase of price as one of them The deadlines on the procedure were shortened, so 
that the proceedings would not take long to be decided. CADE's decisions were not 
subject to review by the Executive, which also would help for the rapidity of the 
proceeding. The bill introduced the "cease and desist commitment", which would 
allow the economic agent to abandon the illicit conduct without incurring the 
penalties stipulated by the taW. 184 
These were the major modifications proposed by the bill. The House of 
Representatives, however, presented several amendments to the bill. Some of them 
were quite simple, adding criteria that should be taken into account when deciding 
about the fine, or changing the formation of CADE, or suggesting a new division of 
jurisdiction between CADE and SDE. 
On the other hand, three representatives proposed new laws to replace the bill. 
One of them would extinguish SDE and concentrate the jurisdiction to deal with 
competition matters in the hands of CADE. The other amendment was very detailed, 
defining enterprise, violation and dominant position. It revoked Laws 4137/62 and 
8158/91, and established 19 types of conduct that would be considered illegal. It 
113 fbr the concept of autarquia, see below, Chapter 3, subsection 3.2.2. 
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increased the value of the fines and created other penalties, providing detailed criteria 
for the application of penalties. It also extinguished SDE and transferred its power to 
CADE. CADE would comprise a president and six commissioners, who would be 
representatives of associations of consumer protection, the Bar Association and the 
Federal Council of Economics. 
The substitute bill provided for the control of acts of economic concentration, 
which would be carried out by CADE. It also established that the bodies of the public 
administration should inform CADE about the adoption of measures that could 
restrict competition, thus allowing for concurrence of policies in relation to 
competition. The substitute bill established a new procedure, which would bring more 
rapidity to the proceeding. The explanatory note of this substitute bill argued that the 
increase in CADE's power was necessary in order to transform it into a specialised 
body for dealing with competition, since the Judiciary does not have the jurisdiction 
to control economic concentration, nor has the capacity to investigate the abuse of 
economic power. 
The third substitute bill also transferred all of SDE's power to CADE. And 
SDE was transformed into an independent Consumer Office, without any connection 
with CADE. It created a new office subordinated to CADE, which would do the 
preliminary investigations and answer the consultations about acts of economic 
concentration. The bill did not revoke the other competition laws. 
184 see below, subsection 2.3.6, for the treatment given by the law to cease and desist commitments. 
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The bill of the Minister of Justice, together with the amendments presented by 
the representatives, and after the opinions of the commissions of the House of 
Representatives, was submitted to two representatives, who wrote a final bill taking 
into consideration the original bill and the amendments. The bill was voted in the 
House of Representatives and approved, then sent to the Senate, where it was also 
approved. However, this approval was achieved due to an agreement made by the 
leaders of the parties. The bill had been in the National Congress for more than one 
year, and the goverm-nent wanted it approved before the measures of the new 
economic plan, the Plano Real, were adopted. 185 It follows that the representatives 
and senators agreed not to present amendments for this last version of the bill and 
approve it as it was. 
2.3.2 Aims of the law 
The debates in the House of Representatives on competition law provide an 
mterestmg insight on the perception the representatives have in relation to what 
competition law is trying to achieve. Most of the time this perception does not 
coincide with the purpose established in the law. One party saw the bill as a way to 
protect the domestic industry against the foreign enterprises that were to enter the 
country after trade liberalisation, as well as a way to monitor the price of products. ' 86 
The representative of another party considered competition law as an instrument for 
the combat against the abusive increase of price and the exploitation of small business 
and consumers. 1 
87 
185 see supra, Introduction, subsection 2.1. 
1M speech of Mr. Nelson Marquezelli, of the Brazifian Labour Party - PTB, in DiArio do Congresso 
Nacional (Seglo 1), 08.06.94, p. 9006. 
197 speech of Mr. Luiz SalomAo, of the Labour Democratic Party - PDT, in DiArio do Congresso, 
Nacional (SeqAo 1), 08.06.94, p. 8993. 
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It has also been argued by yet another representative that the law was an 
instrument not only to establish the State as the mediator in economic relations, but 
also to fix the limits to the performance of the market, which should be done because 
the market cannot be allowed to guide society and, though it is a fundamental part of 
the economy, the market is not the final judge of the public actions. 188 The only party 
that was against the approval of the bill understood that this law gave the government 
powers that belong exclusively to the Judiciary, as well as that the purpose of the law 
was to prevent the abusive increase of prices, which could be done through other 
instruments not being competition law. 
189 
If we look at the law itself we will see that the representatives do not have a 
clear notion of competition law. Article I establishes that the purpose of the law is to 
prevent and control "the violations against the economic order, guided by the 
constitutional principles of free enterprise, free competition, the social role of 
property, consumer protection and restraint of abuse of economic power". In the first 
place, it is necessary to define "violations against the economic order", which is done 
in article 20 of the law. An act is considered a violation against the economic order if 
the purpose or effect of the act are the following: 
a) to limit, restrain or in any way injure free competition or free enterprise; 
b) to supervise a relevant market for a product or service; 
c) to increase profits on a discretionary basis; and 
d) to abuse one's dominant position. 
In speech of Mr. Artur da Tavola, of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party - PSDB, in Diario do Congresso Nacional (Sei, -Ao 1), 08.06.94, p. 8990. 
189 speech of Mr. Marcelino Romano Machado, of the Renewal Progressive Party - PPR, in Diario do Congresso Nacional (SecAo 1), 08.06.94, p. 8990/899 1. 
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It follows that the law is concerned with the maintenance of competition in the 
market, giving particular attention to the behaviour of those who have a dominant 
position in the market. In this way, the conduct adopted by the economic agents that 
may affect competition is to be prevented. 
If compared to UNCTAD's model law, 190 the aims of the present Brazilian 
competition law are not so ample. The model law aims to control restrictive business 
practices and economic concentration that adversely affect not only competition but 
also the domestic and international trade as well as economic development. By 
linking the regulation of competition to trade and development, the enforcement of 
the law has to take into consideration other governniental Policies in order to achieve 
its goals. This would allow the existence of a bunch of economic policies that are co- 
ordinated among themselves, and thus facilitate the achievement of their common 
objective, that is, economic development. 
This is not the case of Law 8884/94. However, as indicated in article 1, the 
prevention and control of violations of the economic order have to be in accordance 
with the principles of free enterprise, free competition, the social role of property, 
consumer protection and restraint of abuse of economic power, which are established 
in the Constitution. As discussed above, 191 the economic order is based on the respect 
for human labour and the promotion of free enterprise. The pursuit of the economic 
order has to observe a series of principles, including the principle of free competition. 
The Constitution thus sees the maintenance of competition as one of the conditions 
necessary to support the economic order. Thus, by construing the constitutional 
1 "0 UNCTAD TD/RBP/8 I /Rev. 3 (2 August 1994). See supra, Chapter 1, section 4. 
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provisions, it is possible to argue that, as a principle of the economic order, the 
maintenance of free competition through Law 8884/94 has as its goal the achievement 
of economic development and thus should be in accordance with other constitutional 
principles in order to achieve that goal. X- - 
2.3.3 Institutionalframework 
The previous competition laws had already created an institutional framework 
for the implementation of the law. As seen above, there was a clash of jurisdiction 
between these bodies, brought by the concurrent existence of two laws and one decree 
determining their functions. 192 Law 8884/94 solved this problem by revoking the 
previous laws and clearly defming the jurisdiction of the bodies that formed the 
framework for implementation of competition law. 
There are two administrative bodies that are responsible for the enforcement of 
competition law, Secretaria de Direito Economico - SDE (Economic Law Office) and 
Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica - CADE (Administrative Council for 
Economic Protection). A detailed analysis of these two administrative bodies will be 
carried out in chapter 3. For the purposes of this chapter it is enough only to outline 
their structure and jurisdiction. 
SDE is part of the structure of the Ministry of Justice, and therefore 
subordinated to it. It is directed by one person, the Secretary of SDE, who is 
appointed by the Minister of Justice and can be dismissed at any time. SDE is formed 
191 See subsection 2.1. 
192 Law 4137/62, Law 8158/91 and Decree 99244. 
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by three departments, the Department of Consumer Protection and Defence, the 
Department of Trade Register, and the Department of Economic Protection and 
Defence. It is this last department, DPDE, that is responsible for enforcement of 
competition law. 
According to Law 8884/94, SDE's main duty is to start and conduct 
investigations in order to determine the existence of anticompetitive practices, and 
then refer them to CADE for the final decision on the legality of the practice. 193 In 
order to do so, SDE is able to request information from the parties involved or from 
anyone that may bring relevant elements to the investigation. SDE's duties also 
include the monitoring of the market's activities; the adoption of "cease and desist 
commitments", 194 which have to be approved by CADE; the supervision of the 
compliance with these commitments; the adoption of preventive measures that result 
in the cessation of an anticompetitive conduct; the supervision of the compliance with 
CADE's decisions. 195 
CADE, in its turn, is linked to the Ministry of Justice but is not subordinated to 
it. CADE is an autonomous entity, and the role of the Ministry of Justice is just to 
make sure that CADE complies with the duties it was given by the law. CADE is 
formed by a president and six commissioners. They are appointed by the President of 
the Republic and have to be approved by the Senate, '96 after an oral examination. It is 
193 It has been argued that "in many respects, the SDE has a role similar to the United Kingdom's 
Director General of Fair Trading/Office of Fair Trading (DGFT/OFT): it acts as investigator and 
adviser". See Stevens, D., "Framing competition law in an emerging economy- the case of Brazil", The 
.4 ntitrust Bulletin, vol. 40, p. 929.97 1. '94For 
a discussion on "cease and desist commitments", see below, subsection 2.3.6. 44ý 
Article 14, Law 8884/94. 
196 Article 4. 
75 
then that they are officially nominated by the President of the Republic. Their term of 
office is two years, and may be renewed for a further term of two years. ' 97 
CADE's president and commissioners can only be removed from office by the 
Senate or after being condemned at the criminal courts for any kind of crime 
established in the Penal Code. They can also loose their office if they are submitted to 
disciplinary hearings at the administration level, related to illicit enrichment while in 
office, 198 or if they accept any kind of fee, take part in the management of companies, 
work as consultants to companies, among other practices. '99 
Law 8884/94 gives CADE the power to decide the cases investigated by SDE, 
applying fines and determining the cessation of the conduct. CADE also has 
jurisdiction to decide on the legality of acts of economic concentration that may 
impair competition, as well as to review the decisions reached by SDE and decide 
200 
appeals against SDE's decisions. In order to comply with these duties, CADE is 
allowed to require information from the parties involved, whenever it considers 
neceSSary. 201 
It follows that CADE and SDE have the power to enforce competition law. 
However, Law 8884/94 makes reference to another governmental body, Secretaria de 
Acompanhamento Economico - SEAE (Economic Monitoring Office). SEAE is part 
of the structure of the Ministry of Finance and therefore subordinated to it. It was 
197 Article 4, paragraph 1. 198 
as established by Laws 8112/90 and 8429/92. 199 Article 6, Law 8884/94. 
200 If SDE has a role similar to that of the DGFT, CADE's function is equivalent to that of the United 
Kingdom's Monopolies and Mergers' Commission. Stevens, supra n. 193. 
20' Article 7, IX. This article comprises a list of 22 items that constitute CADE's duties. 
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created in order to monitor the economic situation of the country, especially in 
relation to prices, giving more attention to the sectors with higher econon-& 
concentration. The head of SEAE is appointed by the Minister of Finance and can be 
dismissed at any time. Law 8884/94 establishes that SEAE must be informed of the 
administrative proceeding commenced at SDE in order to present an opinion in 
relation to matters of its expertise. 202 This is also applied to acts of economic 
concentration. A copy of the acts that are submitted to examination must be sent to 
SEAE, which has 30 days to give its opinion. 'O' 
The law then has created an institutional framework to enforce competition 
law where each body has its function clearly defined. Whether this system is 
performing satisfactorily will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
2.3.4 Substantive issues 
As seen above, 204 Law 8884/94 considers a violation of the economic order 
every act that causes or has the intention to cause the following effects: a) to limit, 
restrain or in any way injure free competition or free enterprise; b) to supervise a 
relevant market for a product or service; c) to increase profits in a discretionary basis; 
and d) to abuse one's dominant position. 
205 
The law does not establish whether these effects have to be concurrent or 
whether the existence of only one of them is enough to characterise the violation. This 
202 Article 28. 
20.1 Article 54, paragraphs 4 and 6. 
204 subsection 2.2.2 
205 
Article 20, Law 8884/94. 
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has been left for CADE to determine, but until March of 1996 206 CADE had not 
decided any administrative proceeding based on Law 8884/94. However, it does seem 
that each of the effects is part of or complement each other. For instance, an act that is 
an abuse of a dominant position is very likely to restrain competition. Moreover, to 
supervise a relevant market for a product or service is not in itself a violation of the 
economic order, as paragraph 1 of this same article admits the existence of market 
domination when it is the result of the efficiency of the economic agent. Based on 
this, it can be concluded that it is necessary the occurrence of all the effects 
established by the law for an act to be considered a violation of the economic order. 
One positive aspect of the law is that it defines dominant position and 
establishes when it occurs. There is dominant position when a company or a group of 
companies controls a substantial part of the relevant market, which is defined as 20% 
of the relevant market. 207 By establishing the percentage of the relevant market, the 
law is clearly defining when the dominant position occurs, which is not the case of 
UNCTAD's model law's definition of dominant position. 
208 
The Brazilian law however does not state what is the relevant market, while 
the model law doeS. 209 Once again it has been left for CADE to deal with this lack of 
definition. As it will be seen in the analysis of the cases submitted to CADE, 210 
CADE acknowledges the importance of the relevant market, always establishing what 
206 As explained in the Introduction, section 5, this research covers the period between 1991 and 
March of 1996. 
'0' Article 20, paragraphs 2 and 3. 208 See Chapter 1, section 4, n. 133 209 1 n. 13 4. 210 See Chapters 4 to 7. 
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constitutes the market in each case, but it rarely explains how this conclusion is 
reached or what factors are to be taken into account. 
There is one exception, though. In the Belgo Mineira case, 211 CADE ruled 
that, in order to define what constitutes the market in question, it is necessary to take 
into account both the demand for the product and the supply, because then companies 
that do not manufacture the product but may do so if the market becomes attractive 
will be included. This case, however, deals with an act of economic concentration, 
and not with instances of anticompetitive behaviour. 
The law also did not define the expression "to increase profits in a 
discretionary basis", which is one of the effects necessary for the characterisation of a 
violation of the economic order. This issue was discussed in the House of 
Representatives, when one of the representatives argued that it is not possible to 
increase profits in a discretionary basis, but to increase prices. Therefore, he 
understood that there should have been two effects: to increase prices in a 
discretionary basis, and to obtain profits above the reasonable. 
One of the representatives responsible for the final version of the bill answered 
that they had excluded that expression from the bill because they understood it not to 
be a conduct easily characterised. However, at the meeting of the leaders of the parties 
held to discuss that bill, it was agreed that the expression should be included in the 
law, because the law had to observe the Constitution, which determines in its article 
173, paragraph 4. that "the law shall prevent the abuse of econornic power that airns at 
211 AC 14/94, required by Cia. Sida-6ýca Relgo Mineira and Dedini S. A. Sider&gica. 
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market domination, elimination of competition and increase of profits in a 
discretionary basis". 212 So the expression was retained, but the legislators themselves 
were not certain about the validity of its inclusion in the law. It may be argued then 
that CADE, when analysing cases of violation of the economic order, will not be very 
strict in the application of this expression, as the spirit of the law does not allow it to 
be otherwise. 
After establishing in article 20 that a violation of the economic order occurs 
when a conduct results in impairment of competition, control of the relevant market, 
increase of profits in a discretionary basis, and abuse of dominant position, the law 
proceeds to exemplify in article 21 the types of conduct that may be considered a 
violation. It follows that a violation is characterised only when there is an 
infringement of both articles 20 and 21. 
UNCTAD's model law, in its turn, opted for determining that certain types of 
practices are per se illegal, that is, they are automatically prohibited. These Practices 
include price-fixing agreements, refusal do seH, bid-rigging and market division. 213 
One may argue that LTNCTAD's approach is more reasonable, since it would bring 
more certainty to the economic agents in relation to what is prohibited. Moreover, a 
per se approach to certain practices may be more cost-effective and less time- 
consuming. 
21" see the speeches of Mr. Vivaldo Barbosa and Mr. Fabio Feldman, in DiAho do Congresso Nacional 
(SeqAo 1), 08.06.94, p. 8996. 
2'3 UNCTADTD/B/RBP/81/Rev. 3, p. 21. 
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Article 21 presents a list of 24 anticompetitive acts. 214 This list is not 
exhaustive, and it includes conduct found in most of the competition laws enacted in 
other countries, as well as the types of conduct that are not related to competition law. 
One example of the latter is "to abandon or cause abandonment or destruction of 
crops or harvest, without good cause". 215 This conduct was included in Law 8158/91, 
though it linked the conduct to the intent of harming competition or obtafiiing profits 
in a discretionary basis. 216 The inclusion in the law of these types of conduct that are 
not related to competition may be explained by the fact that they are seen as unfair 
conduct that in some way affect the population. The case of destruction of crops and 
214 The types of conduct of article 21 are: i) to set or offer in any way - in collusion with competitors - 
prices and conditions for the sale of a certain product of service; ii) to obtain or otherwise procure the 
adoption of uniform or concerted business practices among competitors; iii) to apportion markets for 
finished or semi-finished products or services, or for supply sources of raw materials or intermediary 
products; iv) to limit or restrain market access by new companies; v) to pose difficulties for the 
establishment, operation or development of a competitor company or supplier, purchaser or financier of 
a certain product or service; vi) to bar access of competitors to input, raw material, equipment or 
technology sources, as well as to their distribution channels; vii) to require or grant exclusivity in mass 
media advertisements; viii) to agree in advance on prices or advantages in public or administrative 
biddings; ix) to affect third-party prices by deceitful means; x) to regulate markets of a certain product 
or service by way of agreements devised to limit or control technological research and development, 
the production of products or services, or to dampen investments for the production of products and 
services or distribution thereof, xi) to impose on distributors, retailers and representatives of a certain 
product or service retail process, discounts, payment conditions, minimum or maximum volumes, 
profit margins, or any other marketing conditions related to their business with third parties; xii) to 
discriminate against purchasers or supphers of a certain product or service by establishing price 
differentials or discriminatory operating conditions for the sale or performance of services; xii) to deny 
the sale of a certain product or service within the payment conditions usually applying to regular 
business practices and policies; xiv) to hamper the development of or terminate business relations for 
an indeterminate period, in view of the terminated party's reftisal to comply with unreasonable or non 
competitive clauses or business conditions; xv) to destroy, render unfit for use or take possession of 
raw materials, intermediary or finished products, as well as destroy, render unfit for use or constrain the 
operation of any equipment intended to manufacture, distribute or transport them; xvi) to take 
possession of or to bar the use of industrial or inteHectual property rights or technology; xvii) to 
abandon or cause abandonment or destruction of crops or harvests, without good cause; xviii) to 
unreasonable sell products below cost; xix) to import any assets below cost from an exporting country 
other than those signatories of the GATT Antidumping and Subsidies Codes; xx) to discontinue or 
greatly reduce production, without good cause; xxi) to partially or fully discontinue the company5s 
activities, without good cause; xxii) to retain production or consumer goods, except for ensuring 
recovery of production costs; xxiii) to condition the sale of a product to acquisition of another or 
contracting of a service, or to condition performance of a service to contracting of another or purchase 
of a product; and xxiv) to impose abusive prices, or unreasonably increase the price of a product or 
service. 
2 "' Article 21, XVII. 
216 
Article 3, XI,, Law 8158/91. 
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harvest, for instance, is a reflection of the strategy adopted by &mers to have the 
price of their products increased. 
Another conduct that is not to be found in competition laws but that has been 
included in the Brazilian law is "to impose excessive prices or increase prices without 
good cause". 217 Obviously this is a disguised way to provide for price control, which 
has been abandoned by the policies adopted by the government. This conduct was not 
included in the original bill, which maintained the types of conduct of Law 8158/91. It 
was probably the result of the negotiations with the leaders of the parties to have the 
bill approved. 
The law, however, provides for the criteria that shall be taken into account 
when establishing the occurrence of imposition of excessive price or the unjustifiable 
increase of prices. These criteria include the relation between price and costs of the 
product or service; the price of the original product, when it is a case of substitution of 
products; the price of similar products or services in other markets; and the existence 
of any kind of arrangement or agreement that results in an increase of price or cost. 
Notwithstanding the inclusion of these criteria, it is not easy to determine when an 
increase of price is excessive or not. Moreover, this is an issue that should be left for 
the Economic Monitoring Office - SEAE, of the Ministry of Finance, to deal with, 
2.3.5 Control of economic concentration 
Law 8884/94 gave CADE the power to examine and approve or disapprove 
any merger between companies that may result in economic concentration. Article 54 
82 
establishes that the acts that may restrict or harm free competition, or result in the 
218 
dominance of the relevant market, must be submitted to CADE for approval . These 
acts include mergers with or into other companies, organisation of companies to 
control third companies or any other form of corporate grouping that result in a 
participation of 20% of the relevant market, or where any of the participants in the 
merger had an annual gross revenue of approximately US$ 400 million in the 
previous financial year .2 
19 The merger proposal has to be submitted in advance, or 
within 15 days of its implementation, otherwise the companies involved will be 
subject to fines that may vary from US$ 30,000 to US$ 3 million . 
220 After receiving 
the opinions of SEAE and SDE, CADE has 60 days to decide. If it fails to reach a 
decision in that time, the merger will be automatically approved. 221 
The law establishes conditions for the approval of mergers that result in 
economic concentration. This means that it will be approved mergers that, though 
controlling more than 20% of the market, bring efficiencies with them. On this 
rationale mergers will be approved which: 
a) aim to increase productivity, improve quality or increase efficiency as well as 
economic or technological development; 
b) result in benefits that are shared between consumers and the parties to the merger; 
c) do not result in elimination of competition in a substantial part of the relevant 
market; and 
217 Article 2 1, XXIV, Law 88 84/94. 
218 See Chapter 6, note 373, for the quotation of article 54. 21Q 
Article 54, paragraph 3. 2") Article 54, paragraphs 4 and 5. 22 ' Article 54, paragraphs 6 and 7. 
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use only the means necessary to achieve its objectives 222 
The occurrence of the four conditions is a prerequisite to have the merger 
approved. However, in the instance of the merger being in the public interest or 
necessary for the Brazilian economy, the existence of only three of these conditions 
223 
will be enough . 
These provisions constitute the framework for the control of economic 
concentration. They are much more precise than those of UNCTAD's model law, 
which establishes only that a merger will be prohibited when the market share 
resulting from it "will result in a dominant firm or in a significant reduction of 
competition in a market dominated by very few firms. 224 A more detailed analysis, 
which will include the acts actually examined by CADE, will be made in chapters 6 
and 7. 
2.3.6 Procedure adopted in the law 
One of the positive aspects of Law 8884/94 is that it brought more rapidity to 
the proceedings, by clearly establishing the procedure to be followed and setting time 
limits. A critical discussion of the issue, however, will be carried out below, in 
chapter 3. The purpose of this section is only to present an overview of the procedure 
adopted in Law 8884/94 in relation to administrative proceedings discussing 
restrictive business practices and the analysis of acts of economic concentration. 
22, Article 54, paragraph 1. 
223 Article 54, paragraph 2. 
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SDE may start a preliminary investigation on its own initiative or by request 
r- 225 from anyone interested in the case. After this investigation, where the party accused 
of the practice will be requested to fin-nish information, SDE may either dismiss the 
case, if it understands that there is no violation of the economic order, or commence 
the administrative proceedingS. 226 During this phase, the company will be given a fair 
hearing and allowed to defend itself from the accusation. SDE will then decide 
whether the proceedings are to be dismissed, in case it concludes for the non existence 
of the violation, or sent to CADE for decision. 227 When dismissing the case, both in 
the preliminary investigation and the administrative proceeding, SDE will send the 
case to CADE for review. 228 The decisions of SDE are not subject to appeal to its 
hierarchical superior, the Minister of Justice, because it is already subject to review by 
CADE. 229 
After receiving the administrative proceedings, CADE may require further 
action and evidence if it thinks necessary. 230 It is only after all the evidence has been 
gathered that the case will be submitted to judgment. CADE's decisions are also not 
subject to appeal, and they shall be carried out immediately after the judgment by the 
commissioners. 231 Compliance with the decision must be supervised by SDE. 
A preventive measure may be adopted by SDE or CADE at any phase of the 
proceedings, whenever there are signs or a wefl-grounded suspicion that the practice 
224 Supra n. 213, p. 9. 221 Article 30. 
226 Article 3 1. 
227 Article 39. 
228 Articles 31 and 39. 221) Article 4 1. 
231) Article 43. 
231 Article 50. 
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may cause or is directly or indirectly causing damages to the market. 
232 The 
preventive measure, which is an administrative act, will order the cessation of the 
practice and, when possible, reversion to the previous situation, imposing a daily fine 
in case of non compliance. 233 It is essential that the damages to the market are 
unrecoverable or difficult to remedy, or may vitiate the final result of the 
administrative proceeding. 
I, CADE or SDE may allow, at any phase of the administrative proceedings, a 
"cease and desist commitment", which will establish the terms for the discontinuity of 
the conduct. 234 The cease and desist commitment is not deemed a confession nor an 
acknowledgement of an illicit conduct, and it suspends the proceedings, which will be 
shelved after the party has complied with terms of the commitment. 235 
CADE's decisions may be executed at the federal courts in the event of non- 
compliance, 236 where the intervention in the company may be determined, in order to 
ensure the compliance with the decision. 
237 
Apart from the administrative proceedings, anyone who feels injured by an act 
or conduct that may be a violation against the economic order can go to the judiciary 
to request the discontinuity of the act or conduct, or to ask for compensatior4238 
212 Article 52. 
233 Article 52, par. 1. 234 Article 53. 
2-11 Article 53, par. 2. 236 Article 6A. 
237 Article 69. 
238 Article 29. 
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In relation to the acts of economic concentration, the procedure is quite simple. 
The documents related to these acts have to be sent to SDE in advance or within 15 
days of its implementation. A copy of the documents will be sent to SEAE, which has 
30 days to write its opinion. After rýeceiving SEAE's opinion, SDE wifl write its own 
opinion in 30 days, and then send the case to CADE, which has 60 days to decide. If 
CADE does not reach a decision during that period, the merger will be automatically 
approved. CADE, SDE and SEAE may require the parties involved in the merger to 
present more information and documents, which will then suspend the deadlines 
established in the law. 
2.3.7 Penalties 
Law 8884/94 provides for substantial penalties in cases of offence. Companies 
may be fined from one to thirty percent of the gross pre-tax revenue of the latest 
financial year, while managers that are directly or indirectly linked to the 
anticompetitive practice may pay a fine from tem to fifty percent of the fine imposed 
on the company. 239 The incidence of penalties on managers is a novelty of Law 
8884/94, since the previous laws provided only for penalties on the companieS. 240 
Non pecuniary penalties may also be applied together with the fines. It 
includes publication of the sentence in newspapers, ineligibility for official financing, 
granting of compulsory licences in the case of patent holders, the company's spin-ofý 
among other penaltieS. 241 
239 Article 23,1 and 11, 
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The law also establishes that the application of penalties shall take into 
account the severity of the violation, the violator's good faith, the advantages obtained 
or envisaged by the violator, actual or threatened occurrence of violation, the extent of 
ý1- - damages to competition, the Brazilian economy, consumers or third parties , -Ehe 
adverse effects on the market, the violatoes economic status, and recurrenceS. 242 
Notwithstanding these already heavy penalties, Law 8884/94 has also 
amended the Code of Criminal Procedure in order to provide for imprisonment when 
necessary to safeguard public or economic order. 243 CADE, however, has never 
requested any criminal court to order the arrest of violators. The only time that this 
provision was invoked was just after the enactment of the law, when a consumer 
protection council asked a criminal court to order the irnprisorument of the president, a 
manager and two shareholders of a supermarket chain because the increase of price of 
certain prices was allegedly abusive. The arrest orders were given, but later they were 
suspended by a federal judge. 
244 
3. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the legislation regarding competition. It has been 
established that the enactment of a new competition law in Brazil - Law 8884/94 - 
reflected a concern in the government in relation to competition, which was in a state 
240 As it will see below, Chapters 4 and 5, CADE has been applying heavy fines on companies when 
the practice adopted is considered a violafion of the economic order. 241 Article 24. 
242 Article 27. 
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of almost anarchy, due to the existence of various laws regulating the matter. On the 
other hand, the legislative debate demonstrates that there was no proper agreement 
among the legislators in relation to the goals of competition law. This is an issue that 
may hinder the enforcement of the law, as it does not give CADE a clear path to 
follow. Another drawback of the law is the insertion of practices that are not directly 
related to competition, which may only result in CADE wasting time in cases that do 
not pose any danger to competition. As proposed in one of the hypothesis in the 
Introduction, the legislation on competition has to clearly define the approach towards 
competition as well as the issues inherent to the regulation of competition. 245 
Notwithstanding these critiques, it can be argued that Law 8884/94 presents a 
series of positive aspects such as acceptable procedure rules as well as a coherent 
institutional framework. It is incontestable that the new law improved the situation of 
competition in the country; yet, its proper application is on the hands of the 
enforcement agencies. 
Another characteristic of Law 8884/94 that must be taken into account is that 
it was enacted as part of the Plano Real, an economic plan adopted by the government 
to combat inflation and resume economic growth. Competition law was thus seen as 
one of the instruments to make the market work properly. This assumption is correct 
and confirms the hypothesis that competition law and policy must be inserted into a 
coherent economic policy framework . 
246 It follows that it is not right to assume that 
the existence of competition law will automatically solve all the problems. The 
243 Article 86. 
'4' Stevens, supra n. 193. 245 
see Introduction, section 3. 246 iCL 
89 
existence of an infrastructure to enforce the law is necessary. In a way, this 
infrastructure was created with SDE and CADE, but the issue should not be narrowed 
to this aspect alone. This infrastructure should include a close integration with the 
other bodies of the administration that are in some way linked to competition law. 
Thus, in order to be properly enforced, as well as to bring more certainty to the 
economic agents, the legislation regulating competition has to clearly state its goals, 
the types of conduct that are to be considered an offence, the approach towards 
competition, the role of the enforcement agencies, the treatment to control of 
economic concentration, the procedure to be followed and the penalties to be applied. 
It is only when the legislation defines with rigour these issues that the law will be 
effective. Law 8884/94 already demonstrates an improvement from the previous laws, 
but nevertheless does not develop completely these issues that are necessary for its 
enforcement. 
As shown by the comparison with UNCTAD's model law, Law 8884/94 has 
developed more detailed provisions in relation to mergers and dominant position. 
However, the Brazilian law could have been more specific regarding the aims of the 
law, the definition of the relevant market, as well as the per se/rule of reason approach 
to the substantive issues. 
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CHAPTER3 
1. Introduction 
- IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW 
A system for the implementation of competition law in Brazil existed since the 
1960s, but it has seldom been used. With the necessity of competition law being 
recognised over the years, the government has been introducing modifications and 
amendments to the existing system. 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the effectiveness of competition law in 
relation to its implementation, and to find out the possible reasons for the lack of a 
complete commitment to this implementation. It follows that we will have to 
investigate the motives behind the frequent changing in the system and how this has 
been affecting competition, as well as the drawbacks that can be found in all the 
aspects related to the implementation. 
As the system adopted for the protection of competition is the administrative 
system, we will have to analyse it in the context of the public administration as a 
whole. This context also includes the judicial system, since every administrative act is 
subject to judicial review and control. Accordingly, the administrative system is not 
complete if taken apart from the procedural rules that it has to comply with in order to 
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have the law enforced. It follows that, in order to assess the effectiveness of the 
competition law, it is necessary to examine the public administration and the judiciary 
on one hand, and the institutional framework and procedure on the other. 
2. Institutions for the enforcement of laws in Brazil 
2.1 Judiciary in Brazil 
The Brazilian judiciary is structured on various different levels. Brazil is a 
federation of 26 states, and each state has its own courts of Justice, the state courts, as 
well as a federal court. The jurisdiction of the state court is territorial, that is, cases 
occurring within the borders of each state, as well as in other states but where the 
residence of the defendant is in that state, may be submitted to a state court. Appeals 
against decisions of the state courts are addressed to the state courts of appeal which 
exist in ýeach state. 
The federal courts, on the other hand, deal only with cases where the federal 
govenunent, its agencies and the public enterprises are parties to the dispute. The state 
courts have the jurisdiction to decide on all other cases which do not involve the 
government, its agencies and the public enterprises as one of the parties. The 
jurisdiction of the federal courts supplants the territorial jurisdiction of the state courts 
when the government, its agencies and the public enterprises are a party in the case. 
The federal court of each state will decide the govermnent-related cases of that 
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247 Weral I state. The decisions of the federal courts can be appealed against at the f 
courts of appeals. There are five federal courts of appeals in the country, and each of 
them is responsible for the appeals of defined federal courts. For instance, the 5th 
Federal Court of Appeal (Tribunal Regional Federal da 5a. Regido) has jurisdiction 
over the federal courts of the states of Sergipe, Alagoas, Pernambuco, Paraiba, Rio 
Grande do Norte and Ceara. 
The decisions of both the state and the federal courts of appeal are subject to 
appeal to the Superior Court of Justice. The Supreme Court, in its turn, is able to, 
among other issues, review decisions that go against the Constitution or that establish 
the unconstitutionality of a treaty or a federal law. 
This is the basic structure of the judiciary. However, other courts were created 
in order to deal with specific matters. Hence there are the courts that decide 
exclusively cases on labour (Labour Courts, Labour Court of Appeals and Superior 
Labour Court), elections (Electoral Courts and Electoral Court of Appeals) and armed 
forces (Superior Nfilitary Court). 
The structure of the judiciary in Brazil is not simple and at first may give the 
impression of a chaotic system where conflict of jurisdiction between the various 
courts occurs frequently. However, this is not the case. The jurisdiction of the courts 
is well defined by the Constitution, 24' and when a case of conflict does happen, it is 
247 For example, if the Union contracts with a building company to build the headquarters of the federal 
police somewhere in the state of Silo Paulo, and does not pay the company as established in the 
contract, the company will then seek redress at the federal court located at the state of SIo Paulo. 248 Federal Constitution, articles 101 to 126. 
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settled by a superior court, which decides which court has jurisdiction over that 
matter. Thus, conflict ofjurisdiction does not pose a problem. 
However, negative aspects can be found in the Brazilian judiciary, such as lack 
of personnel, great amount of cases and lengthy processes, and they are obviously 
inter-related. The judiciary does not have enough personnel, be it judges, clerks or 
administrative support. In addition to it there is a great number of cases that are 
submitted to the courts, especially those challenging the economic measures adopted 
by the goverment. 
249To 
make things worse, the procedural rules to be applied to the 
cases are extremely time-consuming. Putting all these three factors together we will 
find a judiciary that is not efficient, where a suit - and it does not matter how simple it 
is - will inevitably take a long time to be concluded. 
2.2 Public administration in Brazil 
The administrative system is complex in any country, and Brazil is not an 
exception, with its complicated structure of bodies, linked among themselves or 
independent from each other, and placed in different levels of hierarchy. Basically, 
there are two kinds of administration: the direct administration and the indirect 
administration. The former includes the bodies integrated in the structure of the 
Presidency of the Republic and the Ministries, while the latter is constituted by other 
legal entities that are not the federal goverment, like autarquias, public enterprises 
and private and public joint stock companies, linked to a Ministry but administratively 
249 For instance, after being elected, Collor de Mello determined that withdrawal above a certain value 
could not be made from saving accounts. The majority of the population with saving accounts went to 
the federal courts to have the right to dispose of their money recognised. It resulted in a remarkable 
number of cases to be decided by the federal courts. Though in a lesser degree, the a similar situation 
occurred in relation to compulsory taxes on gas and travels to foreign countries. 
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and financially autonomous. 210 In this Way, the direct public administration is 
performed by the government, through its own bodies, and the indirect administration 
is performed by entities linked to the government. 
Summarising, the Presidency of the Republic and the 20 Ministries with their 
bodies are the direct administration. These bodies constitute the structure of each 
Ministry, 251 are subordinated to it and therefore are not autonomous. They are 
responsible for the fimctioning of the Ministry, as well as for the performance of its 
duties. 
The entities that constitute the indirect administration are autonomous, which 
means that they have freedom of action to accomplish their aims. They are linked to a 
Ministry, but this connection has only a supervision aspect, as opposed to 
subordination, in the sense that the Ministry has the power to check on the results 
obtained by the entity, the harmonisation of its activities with the goverrunent's 
policies, the efficiency of the entity as well as its administrative, operational and 
financial autonomy, but not the power to determine what the entity should do. 
Examples of indirect administration are the Brazilian Central Bank, the National Fund 
for Development, and the National Bank of Social and Economic Development, all 
linked to the Ministry of Finance; the Brazilian Company of Transport Planning, 
250 Meirelles, H. L.,, Direito Administrativo Brasileiro, 22d edition, Malheiros Editores, Silo Paulo, 
1990, p. 637/638. For a discussion on autarquias, see below, subsection 3.2.2. 
25 1 For instance, the Ministry of Justice is composed by the following bodies: Council for the Protection 
of Human Rights, National Council of Prison and Criminal Policy, National Council of Traffic, Federal 
Council of Drugs,, Superior Council for Protection of Freedom of Creation, National Council of 
Women Rights, National Council of Public Security, Legislative Studies Office, Civil Rights Office, 
National Council of Children Rights, Economic Law Office, Federal Police Office, Traffic Office, 
National Archives, and National Press. 
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linked to the Ministry of Transport; the Administrative Council for Economic 
Protection, linked to the Ministry of Justice, among others. 
The Brazilian system of public administration is based on the American 
system, and adopts the rule of judicial control, which means that the administration is 
supervised by the judiciary. The administration has the power to decide its own 
matters, but these decisions are always subject to judicial review. This is the way 
found to avoid the abuse of power by the administration. 
It has to be stressed that the role of the public administration increases in the 
same proportion as the role of the State. The more the State intervenes in the 
economic process, the more the public administration has to deal with. It has been 
argued that in developing countries the State has been present in all areas, expanding 
its functions, increasing regulations and therefore augmenting the bureaucratic 
apparatus. 252 Brazil is not an exception. The State has been acting in various sectors of 
the economy, enacting regulations in relation to a great number of issues, supervising 
the behaviour of the economic agents, adopting policies, investing and so forth. The 
obvious consequence of this heavy presence of the State is an overwhehning 
expansion of bureaucracy. 
The Weberian concept of bureaucracy as an efficient system of organisation of 
the modem society, through the "exercise of control on the basis of knowledge", has 
been loosing ground to a more popular and practical notion, which associates 
bureaucracy with an incompetent and inefficient public administration that does not 
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perform well. This present meaning given to bureaucracy only reflects the reality, 
where the almost omnipresence of the State has transformed the public administration 
into an enormous orgamsation that is out of control. 
Bureaucracy then is one of the problems found in the public administration 
that contributes to hampering the adequate performance of the administrative bodies. 
There are too many of these administrative bodies, and the processes they have to 
follow are complicated. Moreover, their personnel usually does not have autonomy to 
take decisions, which means that the power is in the hands of few people. 
Accordingly, they usually do not have expertise to deal with the specific issues of 
each administrative body. These factors are just a few of those that make the 
bureaucratic apparatus slow and inefficient. 
From this discussion we can conclude that, as the administrative system in 
Brazil is complex and slow, and presents problems such as an inefficient bureaucracy, 
the implementation of the governmental policies is impaired. It is only where there is 
political will that the policy is more adequately implemented, because the government 
exert pressure on the administrative bodies. It follows that the administrative system 
in Brazil does not achieve its goal of acting in the public interest, and therefore cannot 
be considered a reliable institution. 
232 Gould, D. J. and Amaro-Reyes, J. A., The Effects of Corruption on Administration Performance - Illustrations from Developing Countries, World Bank Staff Working Papers, n. 580, Management and 
development subseriesý n. 7,1983, p. 16. 
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I Administrative system created for the implementation of 
competition law and policy 
3.1 Reasons for the adoption of an administrative system 
Since the creation of the first competition law in 1962, we have been 
witnessing an attempt from the government to find out the most adequate framework 
to deal with competition matters. During more than 30 years changes have constantly 
been made in the system originally adopted. However, one aspect of this system has 
never changed: competition issues have always been left in the hands of the 
administration rather than the judiciary. 
There are several reasons for this, the most obvious one would be that an 
administrative body with expertise in this subject would be more capable of 
efficiently dealing with the problems arisen from competition than the courts. Judges, 
with a general knowledge of the law, do not have the necessary experience or 
expertise in competition matters. The administration, in its turn, is able to employ 
experts in the subject, which facilitates the enforcement of the law and make it fairer 
and quicker. 
Though this reason is the most logical one, there are other factors that explain 
the adoption of an administrative enforcement. One of them is that competition law, 
as a governmental policy, is characterised by being of public interest, which means 
that it should be better enforced by the executive than the judiciary, because since the 
implementation of policies is one of the functions of the executive, it should be more 
prepared to it. Moreover, as one of its policies, the goverment would be interested to 
follow its development closely. It is obvious that, once the policy is transformed into a 
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law, the government cannot directly influence its enforcement. However, by 
maintaining it on the executive level, it can at least exert some pressure on relation to 
the interpretation of the law by the administrative agency responsible for the 
enforcement of the law. However, if the enforcement was under the preview of the 
judiciary, the government could not have exerted any influence on the same. 
A way to balance expertise and safety is by dividing the implementation of 
competition law between both the administration and the judiciary. This mixed system 
is adopted in the USA, where the enforcement of competition law is in the hands of 
the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. The latter is 
responsible for the criminal offences and proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain 
violations of the Sherman Act, as well as for filing civil proceedings under the 
Clayton Act. The Federal Trade Commission, in its turn, has also jurisdiction to 
institute the civil proceedings under the Clayton Act and to prevent the occurrence of 
unfair methods of competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
However, one has to bear in mind that this kind of division of jurisdiction 
between the administration and the judiciary may work well in the US, where 
competition has been regulated for more than 100 years, time enough to develop the 
system. In countries like Brazil, where regulation of competition is quite a recent 
phenomenon and where market economy is starting to develop, it may be safer to 
stick to either the administrative or the judicial enforcement, and then develop it to 
perform efficiently. 
99 
To illustrate this point, we can refer to the systems adopted by Latin American 
countries, which will reveal that not one of them adopts a judicial system. The 
following table helps to understand the enforcement systems of these countries: 253 
Table 1- ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA 
Argentina EJ, C, Cr Guatemala 
Bolivia A, E, Cr, Le Haiti 
Brazil AJ, E, C, Cr Honduras 
Chile AJ, E, Cr Mexico 
Colombia A Nicaragua 
Costa Rica A, C, Le Panama 
Cuba F Paraguay 
Dominican F, Cr Peru 
Republic 
Ecuador A, C Uruguay 
El Salvador F Venezuela 
A, C, Cr 
Le 
F 
E, A, Cr 
A 
A, C 
F 
A, Cr 
Le 
AJ, C 
A= administrative enforcement; AJ = administrative with 
judicial review; J= judicial enforcement; C= civil suits; Cr = 
criminal liability; Le = legislative; E= executive; EJ = executive 
with judicial review; F= federal action 
Summing up, in Brazil the system adopted for the enforcement of competition 
law is the administrative system; however, the acts and decisions of the administrative 
bodies are subject to judicial review. In certain instances private parties injured or 
harmed by anticompetitive acts of companies are allowed to file civil suits in the 
251 in Coate, M. B., Bustamante, R. and Rodriguez, A. E., "Antitrust in Latin America: regulating 
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courts, which may award them compensations. The filing of the suit however does not 
affect the administrative enforcement. There is also a possibility of criminal sanctions, 
as Law 8,884/94 modified a provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure in order to 
include imprisonment to safeguard public or economic order. 254 
3.2 Administrative framework 
Having established that competition is implemented in Brazil by the 
administrative bodies, we will proceed to examine the processes involved in the 
implementation. Basically, the jurisdiction on competition matters is divided between 
two administrative bodies, CADE and SDE. SDE is an investigative agency, while 
CADE is a dispute settlement body. There is also the Secretaria de Acompanhamento 
Economico - SEAE (Economic Monitoring Office), which is responsible for providing 
technical opinion in the competition cases. 
3.2.1 SDE 
Law 8884/94 gives SDE the jurisdiction to commence and conduct 
investigations in relation to practices that may be anticompetitive, as well as to 
monitor the market's activities, adopt "cease and desist commitments", supervise the 
compliance with these commitments, adopt preventive measures that result in the 
cessation of an anticompetitive conduct, and supervise the compliance with CADE's 
decisions. SDE is formed by three departments, the Department of Consumer 
Protection and Defence, the Department of Trade Register, and the Department of 
ovemment and business", Inter-American Law Review, vol. 24,1992, p. 50. 4 Article 86, Law 8884/94. 
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Economic Protection and Defence. It is this last department, DPDE, that is 
responsible for the enforcement of competition law. 
SDE fonns part of the structure of the Ministry of Justice, that is to say that 
SDE is a body of the direct administration, subordinated to that Ministry. SDE is 
directed by one person only, who is appointed by the Minister of Justice for an 
undefined period, and can be dismissed at any time by the Minister. It should be 
important that this person has at least a basic knowledge of the issues related to 
competition. 
However, the former head of SDE, Mr. Aurelio Wander Bastos, was a lawyer 
with no previous experience in competition law. Mr. Bastos had had an eclectic 
career, which involved working in various bodies of the public administration, such as 
the National Institute of Intellectual Property and the Ministry of Communication. His 
time at SDE was characterised by a close contact with the media, in order to publicise 
the work carried out at SDE, as well as by a power struggle with CADE. He was very 
keen to investigate allegedly anticompetitive practices that had an immediate effect on 
in 255 ad the population, such as increases in the price of petrol after its liberalisat 0 1, n 
abusive increase of prices in health insurance. 
256 
He had been in office for almost three years when his "political godfather", the 
Minister of Justice, lost his post in the government. Soon afterwards, in June of 1997, 
Mr. Bastos was asked to leave the direction of SDE. His removal from office had 
obviously a political character, but this was not the only reason. The relationship 
255 'ýGovemo quer 'tabeiar' margem de posto", Folha de Sao Paulo, 13.04.1996, p. 2-3 
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between CADE and SDE, while Mr. Bastos had been in office, was not an easy one. 
Besides, it has been argued that his ideas were not in conformity with the economic 
team of the Ministry of Finance. 
257 
Mr. Ruy Coutinho, a fonner president of CADE (1992-1996), was then 
appointed as the new head of SDE. For the government, the appointment of Mr. 
Coutinho was very convenient. His previous experience at CADE not only gave him 
the necessary qualification to direct SDE but also shall facilitate the relationship 
I- - between CADE and SDE, especially if we take into consideration that he was 
recommended for the post by the present CADE's president, Dr. Gesner de 
Oliveira . 
258Moreover, the appointment of Mr. Coutinho was approved by the team of 
the Ministry of Finance, whose economic policies he is in accordance with. 259 
One consequence of this change in the direction of SDE is that the approach 
towards the role of SDE in the competition framework wiU not be the same. During 
the time that SDE was under the direction of Mr. Bastos and its predecessors, it acted 
as a kind of police of the market directed to the control of prices. According to the 
new head of SDE, this administrative body will concentrate its power in the protection 
of competition, by stimulating the mechanisms of consumer protection and punishing 
companies that act in an abusive manner, especially in relation to the quality of 
products and the harm they may cause to smaller companieS. 260 This is not the only 
consequence worth mentioning. Above all, this change results in a harmonisation of 
256 "SDE quer explicagAo dos planos de safide", Folha de Sdo Paulo, 09.05.1996, p. 2-7. 257 "Fim da Sunab deflagra disputa no governo", Folha de SJo Paulo, 10.06.1997. 
2,8 "Novo titular da SDE val avaliar risco da nova Vale virar truste", Folha de Sdo Paulo, 11.06.1997. 
2, Q "Coutinho quer fundir orglos de defesa econ6mica", 0 Estado de Sdo Paulo, 22.06.97, p. B3 260 supra n. 255, and "Rui Coutinho: acabou a fiise policialesca para evitar abuso de pregos", Correjo 
Braziliense. 11.06.97. 
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ideas between CADE, SDE and the Ministry of Finance, making possible a more 
coherent enforcement of the economic policies of the government. 
3.2.2 CADE 
SDE is responsible for monitoring the performance of the economic agents in 
the market, as well as for conducting investigations of allegedly anticompetitive 
practices. Once these investigations are completed, the case is sent to CADE for a 
final decision. ýCADE is an autarquia, that is, a legal entity of the public law, created 
I-- - by a specific law (Law 8884/94) in order to perform a specific activity (control the 
-'-use of economic power). Autarquias are an option the government has to av 
decentralise the public service, which makes them part of the indirect administration. 
It follows that they are autonomous, have their own budgetand administer themselves 
according to the law that created them. They are not hierarchically subordinated to 
their "mother entity", but they are under their control. This control is directed only 
towards the purpose of the autarquia, to ensure that it complies with the duties 
established by the law. 
As it was seen in Chapter 2, CADE is formed by one president and six 
commissioners, who constitute its board. According to Law 8884/94, members of 
CADE have to be appointed by the President of the Republic, approved by the Senate 
after an examination, and then officially nominated by the President of the Republic 
for their posts. The law establishes that they have to be "reputed for their legal or 
economic knowledge and unblemished reputation 55 - 
261 
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It would naturally be expected that the persons appointed to be commissioners 
at CADE should be the experts of competition law in the country. However, this is not 
always the case. In part, this is because there are not many persons with such 
expertise in Brazil. Moreover, those who have the necessary qualification for the Post 
are already employed in the private sector, and the salary paid to a commissioner is 
not that attractive to make desirable a change in someone's career. 262 Besides, the post 
is temporary and lasts at most four years. Another negative aspect is a geographical 
one: CADE is situated in Brasilia, the capital of the country, a city that is isolated 
from the rest of the country. 
On the other hand, to be a commissioner at CADE means to have a certain 
power over the development of the enterprises in Brazil. Obviously this is not an 
absolute power, as competition law is just one of the economic regulations that affect 
these economic agents. Nevertheless, CADE's commissioners have in their hands the 
'C - ruture of managerial policies adopted by these enterprises, which puts them in close 
contact with the most powerful businessmen in the country. Besides, in this 
relationship the commissioners are in a position of superiority in relation to the 
businessmen, because the latter have to convince the former of the competitiveness of 
their conduct. This power may be considered an attractive feature of the post. 
The present composition of CADE includes 5 economists (4 commissioners 
and the president) and 2 lawyers. The commissioners in general have a good 
curriculum, but are not necessarily experts in competition. Only one of them has had 
previous experience in the area. However, as already pointed out, this was to be 
261 
Article 4, Law 8884/94. 
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expected, since competition law is an issue relatively new in Brazil and the number of 
persons who has worked in this field is small. It is noteworthy that there has been a 
tendency to look for scholars to fill the post at CADE, since the majority of its 
members are either lecturers at universities and/or have post-graduate degrees. This 
positive aspect may counterbalance the fact that some of CADE's members have a 
career that does not fulffl the basic requirements expected for this kind of post. 
The term of office of the commissioners and the president of CADE is two 
years, which may be renewed for fijrther two years. 263 It may be argued that four 
years is not enough for the commissioners to develop their knowledge in this field, 
especially if we take into consideration that the majority of the commissioners do not 
have previous experience in competition when they assume their post. It would then 
take some time for the commissioners not only to be familiarised with the subject but 
also, and more important, to acquire the necessary knowledge required for a good 
performance at that post. By the time they would reach their peak, their term in office 
would be ending. 
Looking at the experience of other countries, we will find that in Mexico, for 
instance, the members of the Federal Competition Commission are appointed for a 
tenn of 10 years, which may be renewed. Argentina, on the contrary, foRows the 
example of Brazil, and the president and the members of the National Commission in 
Defence of Competition can stay in office for four years at most. The American 
systern, in its turn, presents a very interesting option, providing the Federal Trade 
Commission with "administrative law judges", who are judges that act in those 
262 A commissioner earns about US$ 5 thousand per month, while the salary of a partner in a law firm 
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complaints made by the Bureau of Competition. " It could be suggested that an 
adaptation of this system would be a reasonable alternative for the implementation of 
the Brazilian competition law, as the existence of specialised judges, not subject to a 
fixed term in office but nevertheless subject to dismissal at any time, would possibly 
solve the problems of lack of expertise and reduced term of office. 
CADE's president and commissioners can only be removed from office by the 
Senate or after being condemned at the criminal courts for any kind of crime 
established in the Criminal Code. The conviction has to be final, that is, not subject to 
appeal. The proceedings are not different from those adopted in all crimes. Any 
person can request a criminal investigation, by submitting an accusation to the 
authority with jurisdiction in that matter. After the investigation is concluded, the 
Department of Justice sends the information to the criminal courts, where the criminal 
case commences. The commissioners can also lose their position if they are submitted 
to disciplinary hearings at the administration level, related to illicit enrichment while 
in office, 265 or if they accept any kind of fee, take part in the management of 
companies, work as consultant to companies, among other actS. 
266 
3.2.3 SEAE 
Apart from CADE and SDE, there is another body of the public administration 
that is also involved with competition matters. It is the Secretaria de 
Acompanhamento Econ6mico - SE4E (Economic Monitoring Office), which is part of 
goes from US$ 10 to 12 thousand per month. 
'63 Article 4, paragraph 1 
264 Neale, A. D., The Antitrust Laws of the M, Yd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, 
Fý5 383 
Laws 8112/90 and 8429/92 
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the structure of the Ministry of Finance. SEAE is responsible for monitoring the 
economic situation of the country, especially in relation to prices and in sectors with 
higher economic concentration. In this way, SEAE's role is to investigate 
disproportionate increase of prices, referring the case to SDE when it considers to be a 
situation of abuse of economic power. 
267 
The head of SEAE is appointed by the Minister of Finance and can be 
dismissed at any time. SEAE is composed by five departments, which deal with the 
following issues: a) agricultural products; b) tariffs, public prices and services; c) 
industrial products; d) market monitoring; e) protection of the economic order. 
The importance of SEAE regarding competition law lies in the fact that Law 
8884/94 gives this governmental body the power to present its opinion in cases 
involving competition. This shall be done while the investigation is being conducted. 
Article 38 establishes that SEAE must be informed of the administrative proceeding 
in order to present an opinion in relation to matters of its expertise. The same occurs 
in relation to acts of economic concentration. A copy of the mergers that are 
submitted to examination must be sent to SEAE, which has 30 days to give its 
opinion. 268 SEAE's opinion will include the definition of the relevant market and all 
the information available about it, such as the level of concentration, the enterprises 
acting in this market and their performance, the prices of the products of the market, 
and so forth. SEAE's opinion is then the economic basis for the decision to be 
adopted by CADE. 
2t)b Article 6, Law 8884/94. 
2tý7 This, however, is not an exclusive privilege given to SEAE, as any person can refer to SIDE a case 
of abuse of economic power, as we shall see below, section 4. However, it does show that a framework 
for the analysis of competition issues is being createcL 
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3.3 Evolution of the administrative system for protection of competition 
This system of protecting competition through CADE, SDE and SEAE was 
created with the enactment of Law 8884/94. Before that, other institutional 
frameworks had been adopted. When it was created, in 1962, CADE was not an 
autonomous body. It was first subordinated to the Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers, 269 then to the Presidency of the Republic '270 and finally it was transferred to 
the Ministry of Justice. 
271 
CADE remained as a body of the direct administration for 32 years. However, 
during this period CADE suffered several changes, most of them related to its 
jurisdiction and composition. For instance, during the time that Law 4137/62 was in 
force, CADE was composed of a president and four commissioners, all of them 
appomted by the President of the Republic, 272 for a period of four years, renewable for 
other four years, the exception being the post of president, whose term of office was 
not defined. CADE's jurisdiction included the investigation of types of conduct that 
were allegedly a violation of the economic power, commencement of administrative 
proceedings, judgment of these proceedings, application of penalties, request to the 
judiciary for determining the intervention in companies, as weH as the instruction of 
the population about the various forms of abuse of economic power. 273 
In 1984 CADE's composition was modified by the first time. Decree 20283/84 
determined that CADE should be composed of two representatives of the Ministry of 
269 Article 54, paragraph 4 and 6. 
2og At that time, Brazil was under the parliamentary system, which was short-lived. 
2 70 Decree 52025/63, article 12. 
271 Decree 60901/67, article 1,11 
212 Article 9, Law 4137/62. 
213 Article 17. 
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Justice - one of them would be CADE's president -, one representative of the 
Presidency of Republic's Phinning Office, and one representative of each of the 
following Ministries: Agriculture, Finance, Industry and Commerce, and Health. Then 
in 1986 a new decree changed again CADE's composition, making it return to its 
original forrn. 
However, it was in 1990 that radical changes were adopted, this time in 
relation to CADE's jurisdiction, not its composition. Decree 99244/90, which 
provided for the reorganisation of governmental bodies and agencies, created SDE 
and transferred to it most of CADE's duties. A year later a new competition law was 
enacted, without revoking Law 4137/62, which made the enforcement of competition 
law more confusing than it used to be, as there were two laws and one decree 
regulating the same issue. What was worse, the provisions of this legislation are at 
cross points and in several instances contradictory and do not conform. It follows that 
it was not certain whether CADE or SDE had jurisdiction to investigate cases of abuse 
of economic power. 
274 
An analysis of the cases decided in that period shows that, in practice, SDE 
was responsible for the investigation of cases, gathering all the information and 
starting an administrative proceeding, if there were enough elements to prove the 
illegality of the conduct. CADE's duty was only to decide the administrative 
proceeding, based on the information provided by SDE, without requiring more 
investigation nor asking the parties for more information. Moreover, SDE was also 
274 On one hand, Law 4137/62 gave this power to CADE (article 8); on the other, Law 8158/91 
determined that SDE was to investigate abuses of economic power (article 1). At the same time, the 
law maintained CADE's jurisdiction established by Law 4137/62 (article 14, Law 8158/91). Moreover, 
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able to examine and authorise any kind of agreement that might limit or diminish 
competition between companies, and this included the acts that, through mergers, 
incorporation or any kind of organisation of companies, resulted in any form of 
economic concentration. 275 In this case, SDE had the power to order the suspension of 
the practice if there was evidence that it resulted in economic concentration. 
As seen above, Law 8884/94 introduced a new institutional framework, where 
CADE is an autonomous agency with jurisdiction to decide cases of anticompetitive 
practices and economic concentration, SDE has power to conduct investigation in 
relation to these cases, and SEAE presents opinions in relation to the economic 
features of the market involved. 
This continuous modification in the administrative framework shows that the 
regulations pertaining to competition in Brazil are still in a state of flux. 276 As it has 
been argued before, during the first 25 years competition was not considered an 
important issue in the country, especially because there was not a complete market 
economy in Brazil and the State intervention in the economy was a common feature at 
that time. As there was not much work to do, CADE did not have to exercise much of 
the powers vested in it by the law. The lack of work and CADE not actively 
participating in the economic regulations reduced its role in the administration. Thus, 
the agency did not have power enough to make it object of struggle within the 
government. It was only in the second half of the 1980s that CADE became more 
Law 8158/91 subordinated CADE to SDE, and transferred to SDE all the offices that constituted 
CADE's structure. 2'5 Article 13, Law 8158/91. 
276 Other reasons for this state of flux of the legislation include lack of political will to enforce it, lack 
of a market environment for the proper application of the law, complex procedure, State intervention in 
the economy, lack of knowledge regarding competition, among others. 
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important, though not exactly for the right reasons: CADE was seen as an 
administrative body that could be used to control prices, and not as an enforcer of 
competition law. 
277 
Competition law had its relevance recognised only in the beginning of the 
1990s, which was when CADE was able to start to develop a steadier and more 
coherent work, especially because State intervention in the economy began to lessen. 
This allowed CADE to act as it was supposed to, showing then the extension of power 
brought with the regulation of competition. 
What followed was a struggle for CADE's power, in one side, and the 
necessity to improve the existing system of enforcement, on the other. The result was 
Law 8884/94. This does not mean, however, that the best system has been found, or 
that the one adopted now is final. Competition law in Brazil is in its infancy, and will 
probably take some time until this system is firmed. For instance, not even three years 
after the adoption of this system, there was a movement in the Ministry of Justice to 
change it, where SDE, instead of CADE, would be responsible for the control of acts 
of economic concentration. 
278 
More recently, discussions have been taking place between CADE's president 
and the heads of SDE and SEAE, in order to study the possibility of transforming the 
three bodies in one autonomous agency responsible for all stages in the enforcement 
of competition law, where its members would have longer term in office and its 
277 see Chapter 5 for the analysis of the cases submitted to CADE involving control of pfices. 
279 "FHC quer superpoder com lei antit: ruste", Folha de S& Paido, 05.03.1996, p. 2-8 
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budget would allow the payment of personnel with expertise in the area . 
279 This 
discussion, however, has not produced any practical result so far. It is interesting to 
note that the same discussion has been taking place in the United Kingdom, where a 
former Director General of Fair Trade argued that it would be more efficient to have 
one single authority to deal with competition issues. 
280 
4. Attempts to facilitate the enforcement of the law - changes in the 
procedure 
The main feature of the procedures adopted by the Brazilian competition law 
is that they are usually complex. The degree of this complexity, however, varies from 
law to law. Law 8158/91 stipulates and provides for a highly complex structure, while 
Law 8884/94 is more straightforward. One of the reasons for the enactment of Law 
8884/94 was to make the whole process of enforcement of the law easier and simpler. 
As we shall see below, this was achieved in part. Brazilian law in general has the 
tradition of regulating all issues in their minimal details, including detailed aspects of 
procedure. 281 If the enforcer of the law does not comply with one of the procedural 
rules, the whole process may be annulled. It follows that the procedure in any law will 
never be simple, and competition law is not an exception. We will examine here how 
this complexity was dealt with by Law 8884/94, as opposed to Law 8158/91 (see 
figures n. I and 2). 
"9 "Coutinho quer fundir orgAos de defesa econ6mica", 0 Estado de Sdo Paulo, 22.06.97, p. B3. 280 Stevens, D., "Framing Competition Law in an Emerging Economy: the Case of Brazil", The 
.4 ntitrust Bulletin, vol. 40, p. 929/97 1. 
113 
Figure 1- PROCEDURE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS - LAW 
8158/91 
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281 This is due to the civil law system, where the courts are not supposed to make law but to apply the 
statutory laws enacted by the legislative. 
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Figure 2- PROCEDURE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS - LAW 
8884/94 
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One of the issues that makes the procedure more complicated and lengthier is 
related to the start of the case. Both laws establish that any person - which includes 
SDE or any governmental body - can require SDE to commence an investigation of a 
conduct that may be anticompetitive. However, Law 8884/94 determines that this 
requirement has to be weH based. 
This provision puts an end to the anonymous denunciations that were sent to 
SDE before the enactment of Law 8884/94. They usually took the form of a typed 
letter, where in only a few lines the anonymous plaintiff would affirm that one or 
more companies were adopting types of conduct that caused anticompetitive effects in 
the market, but without sending any evidence or document proving it. SDE never paid 
much attention to these anonymous denunciations anyway, and usuaUy dismissed the 
case on the basis that there was no proof and that it was not possible to contact the 
plaintiff to request more information. Nevertheless, this kind of denunciation usually 
took some time that could have been employed in a more productive activity. On the 
other hand, in the event of the anonymous denunciation being from a person who is 
involved in the activities of the company, the anonymity bestows protection from 
retaliation and is therefore useful in certain circumstances. 
However, by establishing that any person can complain to CADE about 
restrictive practices, the law is extending the enforcement of competition law to third 
parties. Thus, the role of enforcer of the law is not circumscribed to the administrative 
agencies only. 
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Another characteristic of Law 8884/94 that brought flexibility to the procedure 
is that it establishes the limits and defines what must be done in the preliminary 
investigations. Preliminary investigations are the investigation conducted by SDE 
where all the documents, evidence and information related to the alleged 
anticompetitive practice are to be gathered. Law 8158/91 was very confusing about 
the preliminary investigations, making SDE decide about the legality of the conduct 
three times during the investigation, which only complicated the procedure. 
Law 8884/94, on the other hand, eliminated it. It establishes that the purpose 
of the preliminary investigation is to find out whether there is an actual reason for the 
commencement of an administrative proceeding. It follows that the investigation has 
just a fact finding nature. It is only after SDE has gathered all the elements that the 
head of SDE will decide if the case will be dismissed or transformed into an 
administrative proceeding. 
Law 8158/91 never established when an administrative proceeding should 
start, which brought uncertainty to the parties that were involved in the cases. If the 
law did not give a clear guidance in this matter, the same happens in relation to the 
analysis of the cases. SDE did not tollow the same pattern always. For instance, it is 
not possible to affirm how the preliminary investigation should be conducted. In the 
AMB case, 282 SDE skipped the preliminary investigation and commenced the case as 
283 
an administrative proceeding. It did not even request the opinion of SNE, though 
there were reports from DPDE. 
182 PA 61/92 - Federaqdo Nacional das Empresas de Seguros Privados e Capitalizaqdo v. AAM - AssociWdo Mgdica Brasileira 
21-' SNE - Secretaria Nacional de Economia (National Office of Economy) was a body of the Ministry 
of Economy that had a similar role to that of SEAE. 
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In the Coldex case, 284 on the other hand, the preliminary investigation was 
conducted in a more careful way. DPDE requested extra information from the 
company that complained of the act in question, and required the company under 
investigation to present its estimate of costs as weU as invoices. DPDE made an 
analysis of all the information gathered before it concluded that the administrative 
proceeding should be commenced. However, SNE's opinion, with information about 
the companies, their sales and annual turnover, as well as with a survey with their 
clients, arrived at DPDE only after the administrative proceeding had commenced. 
In yet another case, the Private Schools case, 285 the complaint was made by 
the Department of Justice of the State of SAo Paulo, after which DPDE required 
information from those under investigation and then in a technical opinion concluded 
that the conduct was an offence and determined the commencement of the 
administrative proceeding. This shows that the procedure of both the preliminary 
investigation and the administrative proceeding overlapped. 
In other investigations, SDE did not know what to do with the case. For 
instance, in a preliminary investigation where the Minister of the Economy accused 
Autolatina (a joint venture between Ford and Volkswagen) of increasing prices above 
inflation, one has the impression that SDE lost control of the case, because it passed 
from hand to hand in the Ministry of Economy and in the Ministry of Justice. At the 
end the Legal Adviser to the Minister of Justice, who had no jurisdiction in this 
284 PA 40/92 - Ind e Con de Evaporadores Refrio Ltda v. Coldex Frigor Equipamentos S. A. 285 pA 121/91 - Minist&io Ptiblico do E-stado de Sdo Paulo v. Sin&cato dos Estabelecimentos de 
Ensino no Estado de Sdo Paulo e outro. 
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matter, ordered that the case should be dismissed and shelved, which was done by 
SDE. 286 
Law 8884/94, in its turn, is clearer. The administrative proceeding starts with 
the decision of the head of SDE, when the preliminary investigation shows that there 
is an indication that the conduct may be anticompetitive. During the administrative 
proceeding, SDE will write its own opinion about the case, gather more documents, 
information and evidence if it thinks it is necessary, and ask the party to present its 
final defence. 
Based on all these elements, SDE will write its final report, deciding on the 
legality or illegality of the conduct. If illegal, the administrative proceeding goes to 
CADE for a final decision. This is a point where the two laws diverge. According to 
Law 8158/91, once the administrative proceeding went to CADE, the only thing to do 
was to submit it to the board for the final decision, which should be based only on 
what SDE had found out. CADE had no power to adopt measures to clarify issues that 
it understood SDE had left unclear. 
Law 8884/94, in its turn, establishes that CADE may request more information 
and documents if it understands necessary. In a way, this new provision stretched 
even more the procedure; however, it prevents CADE from having to decide based on 
partial information only, which gives the whole procedure a fairness that is necessary 
in any proceeding, be it administrative or judicial. According to Law 8884/94, CADE 
2 gib Representaoo 183/90 - Ministra da Economia v. Aufolatina 
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also has to request its attorney to write an opinion, and it is only then that the case 
shall be finally decided. 
The comparison made so far between the two laws shows that there was an 
improvement from the previous to the present law. Though the procedure is still rigid, 
the new law made it more flexible. This rigidity is not a negative aspect, if we take 
'Oeyz'ý 
e, 
into account that it provides a ertainty in relation to the steps of the proceedings, 
leaving the parties to worry only about the merits of the case. The flexibility in itself 
is an achievement that will probably make the proceedings speedier. 
These positive aspects, however, are still on the theoretical ground; until 
March of 1996 CADE had not decided any case of restrictive business practices that 
had started after the enactment of Law 8884/94. The reason is that CADE still has a 
great number of proceedings that are waiting to be decided, so it will take some time 
until the outcome of the new cases are known. For instance, as for March of 1996, 
when the term of office of the members that formed CADE's previous composition 
finished, there were 244 cases (not including acts of economic concentration) at 
CADE that had not yet been decided. 
287 
One drawback in the flexibility of the proceedings is related to the appeals 
provided by the laws against CADE's and SDE's decisions. Also in relation to this 
issue the two laws diverge. Law 8158/91 allowed appeals to the Minister of Justice on 
every decision that CADE or SDE adopted, which made the process very slow. 
However, these cases show that the parties appealed to the Minister almost only 
2" in Relat6rio Mensal de Andapwnto de Processos, CADE, 0 1.03.96. 
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against CADE's decisions. On the other hand, Law 8884/94 does not permit any kind 0 
of administrative appeal against the decisions of both CADE and SDE. It only 
provides for a review, to be carried out by CADE, of SDE's decisions to dismiss the 
cases. It follows that the proceedings are likely to speed up in the future. 
However, CADE's decisions are subject to review by the courts. As it was seen 
in subsection 2.2, the Brazilian administrative system adopts the rule of judicial 
control, according to which every act adopted by the administration can be reviewed 
by the courts. As CADE's decisions are administrative acts, they are subject to review 
by the judiciary. 288 Though this is necessary to avoid abuse of power by the 
administration, it certainly holds back the progress of the case. In Mexico, for 
instance, the judicial review of competition cases is limited, as only CFC - Comision 
Tederal de Competencia (Federal Competition Commission) has jurisdiction to 
review its own acts - the courts are left only to detennine if this review shall occur or 
not. However, there is a procedure in Mexico caUed juicio de amparo (writ of 
protection), which may be used to chaRenge CFC's decisions, as it is a protection of 
individual guarantees provided under the Constitution against acts or laws adopted by 
goveniment authoritieS. 289 
Changes also occurred in relation to the procedure in acts of economic 
concentration. Under Law 8158/91, these acts should be submitted to SDE at most 30 
days after they were formalised. This is as far as the law went - it did not provide for 
any procedural rule in that matter. This means that there was no rule to be followed by 
2" on a discussion about the role of the judiciary in competition matters, see below, section 5. 
289 Garcia- Rodrigues, S., "Mexicos new institutional framework for antitrust enforcement, De Paul 
Law Review, vol. 44, Summer 1995, p. 1175. 
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SDE. As SDE itself was not very well organised, the control of acts of economic 
concentration was ýchaotic. 
A clear picture of what used to happen with these cases at SDE is given by the 
Gillette case. 290 In 1992 Gillette do Brasil submitted to SDE a consultation where it 
inquired about the possibility of acquiring Wilkinson Sword da, Amazonia, as part of 
an international transaction. Negotiations between Gillette and SDE were carried out 
and, before the transaction was approved at SDE, Gillette started the process of 
acquisition. As a matter of fact, SDE did not reach a decision at any time in this 
consultation. At a certain point, when replying an inquiry made by the Minister of 
Justice, the head of SDE wrote that the approval of the transaction was conditional to 
the compliance with a commitment undertaken by Gillette. However, there is no 
document, order or decision that says so. It was only six months after the acquisition 
was formalised that SDE wrote a statement saying that there was no reason to prevent 
the transaction. 
With the enactment of Law 8884/94, an attempt was made to transform the 
control of acts of economic concentration into an efficient system (see figure n. 3). 
The jurisdiction to approve these acts was then transferred to CADE, while SDE's 
duties included only gathering documents and information related to the merger in 
question, requesting an opinion from SEAE, and writing its own opinion. When this is 
done, the case goes to CADE, and is distributed to one of the commissioners, who 
shall ask for more documents and information, carry out a hearing, request an opinion 
. C- - Ixom CADE's attorney, and write a report on the case. The case is then submitted to 
290 Consulta 03/92 - Gillette do Brasil e Cia. Ltda. 
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CADE's board of commissioners for approval or rejection of the act. In case of 
rejection, the company may ask CADE to review its own decision, but no other 
administrative appeal is allowed. However, as an administrative act, this decision is 
subject to judicial review as well. 
A positive feature of this procedure is that the deadlines established by the law 
, 
P, 12"e 
are quite strict, which allows for a rapid Wý6ýs of the case and therefore a prompt 
decision. When a merger case arrives at SDE, SDE first asks SEAE to write its 
opinion. SEAE has 30 days to do so. Then SDE has other 30 days to write its own 
opinion. The case goes to CADE, which has 60 days to decide about the act. This 
deadline, however, is suspended while CADE waits for the parties to send the 
documents and information required. This procedure is very speedy. In average, a 
case dealing with an act of economic concentration takes 10 months to be decided. 
The quickest case was the Brasilit case, 291 spending only 3 months at SDE and 
CADE; the longest was the Gerdau case, 292 which took CADE 18 months to reach a 
decision. 
Deadlines have also improved in relation to the administrative proceedings. A 
feature of Law 8158/91 was that deadlines were imposed only on the parties and on 
CADE, not on SDE. It follows that SDE could take as long as it wanted to carry out 
its duties. Once the administrative proceeding arrived at CADE, a decision should be 
given in 120 days, but this period could be extended for more 90 days. 1n this way, it 
would take on average about two years and a half between the complaint of the 
ailegedly anticompetitive conduct and its final judgment at CADE. 
291 AC 06/94 - Brasilit S. A. and Etemit S. A. 
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Figure 3- ACTS OF ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION UNDER LAW 8884/94 
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292 AC 16/9 - Sider&gica Laisa SA and Grupo Korf GmbH.. 
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The minimum amount of time it has ever taken for a case to be decided was 
one year, in the Ache case; 
293 
this case, however, was one of a series of similar cases 
where the President of the Republic accused the pharmaceutical industry of retaining 
medicines in order to push for price liberalisation. 294 As they were similar, once one 
of them was decided, the others just had to follow suit, this being the reason for such a 
speedy case. The maximum period of time a case has spent between SDE and CADE 
was four years and nine months, in the Purina case, 295 another case of disorganisation 
nt 
... SDE, which was not able to make up its mind about the right procedure to be 
followed. 
These long periods of time to reach a decision about the legality of a conduct 
are likely to decrease with the present competition law, because it establishes 
deadlines not only for the parties but also to CADE and SDE. Moreover, these 
deadlines are not long. SDE has 60 days to make the preliminary investigation. 
During the administrative proceeding, the parties have the right to defend themselves 
only twice, first in the beginning and then in the end. Between these two defences, 
SDE has 45 days to gather more information and documents, but this period may be 
extended for more 45 days. Once at CADE, the commissioner has 20 days to write its 
opinion, but the law does not impose any deadline for CADE to reach a decision on 
the case. 
293 PA 12/91 - Presidente da Republica v. Laborat6rio Achj. 2144 see below, Chapter 5, for an analysis of these cases. 
2"' PA 08/91 - Tsunehiko Higuchi v. Purina Nutrimentos Ltda. wid Sul Mineira Alimenlos S. A. 
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5. Role of the courts in the implementation of competition law 
Law 4137/62 established that CADE's decisions should be executed at the 
federal courts when they were not complied with voluntarily. Under that law CADE 
had the authority or discretion to require the courts to appoint an interve4IM the 
company, in order to make sure that the company complied with the decision. Law 
8884/94 retained these provisions. Compliance with the decisions has to be sought at 
the federal courts. Hence the system created by competition law is bipartite, where 
investigation and judgment of abuse of economic power are made in the 
administrative sphere, while execution of the decision is made in the judicial sphere if 
the company does not voluntarily comply with CADE's decision. 
As it was seen above, 296 the system adopted in Brazil is that of judicial control, 
according to which every one is subject to the jurisdiction of the judiciary. This is 
established in the Constitution, which determines that it is not possible to exclude 
from judicial control any kind of injury or threat of injUry. 
297 This implies that every 
act of the administration, be it the direct or the indirect administration, is under the 
control of the judiciary, and the hierarchy of the administrative body that performed 
the act does not matter. In this way, the judiciary has the power to review every act of 
A- 
- ine administration, determining if the administration acts in accordance with the law 
(control of legality) and within its jurisdiction (control of legitimacy). 298 
Consequently, any person who believes that harm or injury has been caused by 
an administrative act can go to the courts to require the annulment of the act and even 
2% 
see supra, subsection 2.2. 
297 Article 5, XXXV, Federal Constitution of 1988. 
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seek compensation. Thus, the company under investigation may go to the courts if it 
understands that the decision adopted by CADE in an administrative proceeding is 
illegal. The courts will deal with CADE's decision as the administrative act that it is. 
Therefore, the judiciary will only be able to annul the decision when it is not legal. 
The illegality occurs when the decision is not in accordance with the law, or 
when it is the result of abuse of power. The courts cannot pass a judgment on the 
administrative ground of action, that is, on the convenience, efficiency or fairness of 
the decision; on the contrary, they have to circumscribe themselves to the pertinence 
and formality of the decision. In that way, the courts can only examine the existence 
of the facts, the veracity of the motives, and the submission of the basis of the 
decision to the law . 
299This 
means that the courts cannot examine the merits of the 
case. 
One example of this review by the courts is the appeal in an execution of a 
decision where CADE had imposed a fine. The party did not voluntarily pay the fine, 
I 
so CADE serl the decision to the judiciary in order to be executed. The federal court 
of appeal reasoned that the decision did not define what was the violation committed 
by the party. Accordingly, there was no proof that a violation had occurred. 
Therefore, the federal court of appeal annulled the fine imposed by CADE . 
300 This 
case shows that the lack of definition in relation to the allegedly illegal conduct in the 
administrative proceeding is enough to annul the decision, since it is not possible to 
condemn something that one does not know what it is. The court did not state whether 
298 Meirelles, supra n. 250, p. 610/612. 
2QQ Meirelles, H. L., "Parecer", in Franceschini, JIG. and Franceschini, J. L. V. A. Poder Econ6mico: 
Exercicio eAbusp, Ed. Revista dos Tribunais, SAo Paulo, 1985, p. 552/561. 
300 AC 418929/89, TRF 40 RegiAo 
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the conduct was fair or not, it just ruled that CADE did not define the conduct and 
therefore it was not possible to determine if it was legal or not. 
However, the majority of the cases submitted to the federal courts that involve 
CADE are not about execution of CADE's decisions but about procedural matters. In 
one of these cases, the court ruled that CADE has jurisdiction to investigate the 
existence of abuse of economic power and therefore that the judiciary cannot prevent 
the exercise of this activity but only restrain any illegal act that CADE imy adopt. 301 
In another case, the federal court of appeal ruled that injunction is not the appropriate 
way to suspend an administrative proceeding. 302 Also, it has been decided that SDE 
could not impose a preventive measure on the party under investigation, as the 
application of fines was under CADE's duties; SDE had power only to investigate the 
case. 
303 
It follows that the federal courts have not been asked to execute the decisions 
adopted by CADE, but only to decide matters related to procedural rules. There are 
two reasons for it. On one hand, the parties may have been voluntarily complying 
with CADE's decisions, which makes recourse to the judiciary unnecessary. On the 
other, the parties may not comply with the decisions, but the number of attorneys 
allocated to CADE was so limited - usually only one - that they were not able to carry 
out their duties, which includes sending to the judiciary the decisions that have not 
been complied with. These two factors together explain the lack of competition 
related cases in the Judiciary. However, the number of attomeys allocated to CADE 
has been increasing, and nowadays CADE has about 20 attorneys, which means that 
301 AMS 98627, TFR 
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the federal courts are likely to receive more requirements to execute CADE's 
decisions. 
This situation poses one question: how wiH this interference of the courts 
affect the implementation of competition law? Up to now very few cases have been 
submitted to the courts, which makes difficult to answer it based on past cases. 
However, it is possible to make some considerations in that respect taking into 
account the behaviour of the judiciary in general. A more obvious consequence would 
be that the cases would be lengthier, making the enforcement of competition law not 
quite effective. If a case takes in average two years to be decided at the administrative 
level, with the submission to the courts two years more would be needed, though the 
law establishes that the execution of CADE's decision has priority over the other 
cases, except habeas corpus and injunction. 
304 
The enforcement of competition law would be even more ineffective if we 
take into consideration that the decisions adopted at the administrative level have been 
frequently challenged at the judiciary. This has happened in relation to execution of 
fines imposed by SUNAB, the administrative agency responsible for price control, as 
well as to different kinds of taxes created by the goverment, among other issues. The 
reason for this challenge being usually successful lies in the fact that the 
administration is not very careful in relation to the legalities of its actions, which 
makes possible the annulment of the action based on a non compliance with the 
requirements established in the law governing that matter. 
`02 MS 3461/94, STJ 
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It is obvious that, if the administrative act respects all the provisions of the 
law, the courts are not able to annul or modify it. It follows that, by being cautions 
and giving attention to every aspect of the case, that is, by establishing the conduct 
adopted by the economic agent, determining the provision of the law that is being 
violated, giving the party the chance to defend itself, and complying with all the 
provisions of the law, including especially the procedural rules, the chances of CADE 
having its decision annulled will be small. 
6. Conclusion 
From what has been discussed in this chapter we can draw some conclusions 
in relation to how competition law has been implemented and the problems derived 
from it. One of the issues is concerned with the administrative system created for this 
purpose. Though CADE exists for more than 30 years, the system is not firmly 
established. The option for an administrative system, as opposed to the judiciary, 
seems to be definitive, but the way this system is to work is stiR uncertain. A proof of 
this lack of definition is the present proposition of transforming CADE, SDE and 
SEAE in one single autonomous agency to deal with competition. If this does not 
work out, it is very likely that new changes shall be made, because up to now the 
government has not shown the ability to create one system and support it for some 
time, until results can be seen. 
303 AMS 106732/90, TRIF I* RegiAo 
'0' Article 68, Law 8884/94. 
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This instability is a negative aspect in the implementation of the law, because 
it leads to uncertainty among the economic agents. What is necessary to do is to 
decide for one system and provide it with the means to perform weR, without 
constantly trying to implement changes. 
Still in relation to the administrative system, we can reason that the rivalry that 
exists between CADE and SDE is another aspect that contributes to the 
ineffectiveness of the law. These two agencies were created with the purpose of 
working together in order to avoid that anticompetitive conduct be adopted, so that 
abuse of economic power does not occur in the market. In this way, CADE and SDE 
should complement each other in order to achieve the objective they have in common. 
This rivalry, as well as the instability of the administrative system, is the result 
of a lack of political will to implement the law. For almost 30 years CADE had only a 
pro forma role in the enforcement of the law, as it existed but did not have frequent 
chances to act. By recognising the importance of competition in the market, the 
government would give the administrative system for the protection of competition 
the necessary strength to efficiently carry out its duties, which would thus make 
unnecessary these constant changes in the institutions that are part of the systern. It is 
imperative that CADE be given the chance to develop its work and thus create a case 
law on competition. Only after this will the law be properly enforced. 
The implementation of the law is not affected only by the inefficiency of the 
system created for the protection of competition. As part of the administration, this 
system can suffer from the drawbacks inherent to the public administration, such as 
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bureaucracy, as discussed in subsection 2.2. Another drawback in the implementation 
of competition law is related to the lack of expertise of the personnel of the agencies. 
This lack of expertise contributes to the inefficiency of the systern, because it holds 
back the development of the cases, as well as makes the outcome of these cases 
uncertain. 
The factors discussed here - lack of political will, inefficient public 
administration, instability of the systený4 rivalry between the agencies, and lack of 
expertise - show that the system adopted to implement competition law is far from 
being ideal. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is not likely to succeed in the 
. C- future, as the problems found in there can be solved, as long as there is support from 
the government. We have to bear in mind that protection of competition is a relatively 
new issue in Brazil, which means that the development of competition is still in its 
infancy and therefore is supposed to make mistakes in order to find the best solutions 
for its problems. 
However, CADE cannot forget that it has a role to perform in the 
implementation of the law, which has to be done notwithstanding these drawbacks of 
the public administration. Accordingly, being created as a board of commissioners to 
decide cases on competition, CADE has been given the opportunity to foster 
impartiality in the decision-making process, which must be pursued without 
hesitation. 
An improvement has already occurred in relation to the procedure. As seen in 
section 4, there was an evolution from Law 8158/91 to Law 8884/94, as the latter not 
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only simplified but also clearly defined the procedural rules, as well as decreased the 
deadlines in both administrative proceedings and acts of economic concentration. As 
already pointed out, it is still not possible to see the results of these changes in relation 
to the administrative proceedings, as during the period Of this research CADE had not 
yet decided any of the cases submitted after the enactment of Law 8884/94. However, 
the changes can be felt regarding acts of economic concentration, which are now dealt 
with in a more organised manner, resulting in less time consuming cases. 
A doubt remains in relation to the role of the judiciary in the decisions adopted 
by CADE. As discussed above, few competition related cases have been submitted to 
the courts, which makes difficult an analysis of the approach adopted in these cases. It 
follows that it is not possible to assess the effect the judiciary may have on the 
implementation of competition law. However, it is not unlikely that the judiciary 
revert the decisions adopted by CADE. 
On the whole, notwithstanding the drawbacks discussed here, the frarnework. 
created for the implementation of competition law, be it in relation to the institutions 
or to the proceýdure, is 
VLLaHhe 
administrative system for the protection of 
competition can work in an efficient manner if there is support from the government. 
The procedure may give the impression of being complex, but it has already been 
simplified and is likely to be effective. Regarding the implementation of competition 
law, it is possible to argue that the legislation has created an institutional framework 
that is well structured and may perform well as long as there is political will to do so. 
The only problem is how the judiciary will affect competition law, and this is a 
serious problem, because the courts have the power to revert the decisions adopted by 
134 
CADE, and therefore are capable of rendering ineffective all the work developed by 
the administrative agencies. However, it is not possible to exclude the judiciary from 
this process, since Brazil adopts the system ofludicial control of administrative acts 
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CHAPTER 4 - RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES: CADE'S 
APPROACH 
1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4, according to Brazilian competition law there are 
two kinds of business activities that are likely to affect competition and therefore 
should be submitted to the administrative agency with jurisdiction in these matters, 
CADE. One of them are acts of economic concentration, which comprise any kind of 
merger or acquisition that results in an increase in the economic power of a company. 
How CADE deals with acts of economic concentration is the subject of Chapters 6 
and 7. 
This chapter will deal with restrictive business practices, the other type of 
business activity that may impair competition. A restrictive, or anticompetitive, 
practice "refers to a wide range of business practices in which a firm or group of firm 
may engage in order to restrict inter-firm competition to maintain or increase their 
relative market position and profits without necessarily providing goods and services 
at a lower cost or of higher quality". 
305 
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The purpose of this chapter is, by investigating the application of competition 
law in practice, to contribute to the identification of the approach towards competition 
developed by CADE. This will be done through the analysis of cases on restrictive 
business practices, which have never been done before in Brazil. 306 The question to be 
answered in this chapter is: what does CADE seek to achieve when deciding cases 
concerning anticompetitive practices? In order to answer this question, it is necessary 
to define the main approaches developed in the debate on how competition can 
achieve consumer welfare. 
307 
On one hand there is the efficiency approach, according to which competition 
law should seek efficiency, both allocative and productive . 
308Thus, when examining 
restrictive practices, competition authorities should have in mind that, even if it 
impairs competition, a restrictive practice should be allowed, as long as it results in 
efficiency. On the other hand, the social approach understands that competition 
should be used to achieve social goals, such as the protection of small companies, 
maintenance of employment, and income distribution . 
309 In the middle of these two 
approaches we can find the competitive approach, according to which competition 
law should protect the competitive proceSS. 3 10 There is a concern with efficiency, but 
305 in Khemani, K S., and Shapiro, D. M., Glosswy of Industrial Organization Economics, 
Competition Law and Policy Terms, OECD, Paris, 199 1. 
306 as mentioned in the Introduction, section 5, there are no studies, commentaries or systematic 
analysis of the cases decided by CADE, which means that references cannot be made to such studies 
throughout the development of the next two chapters. 307 
see Chapter 1, subsection 3.3. 
308 see Posner, R. A., Antitrust Law - an Economic Perspective, Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1976; Bork, R. H., The Antitrust Paradox, New York, Basic Books, 1978; Shepherd, W. G., 
"Three 'efficiency school' hypotheses about market power", The Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 33, Summer 
1988, Posner, R-A., "The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis", University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, vol. 127,1979, p. 925/928 
309 Baker, D. and Blumenthal, W., "Ideological cycles and unstable antitrust rules", The Antitrust 
Bulleti4 vol. 3 1, Summer 1986, p. 324. 
110 Fox, E., "The modernization of antitrust: a new equilibrium", Cornell Law Review, vol. 66,198 1, p. 
1140/1192 
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not as an end in itself. Efficiency, as well as social goals, are considered positive only 
when they do not disturb the competitive process. 
Having this debate in mind, this chapter will attempt to establish whether 
CADE has been developing a coherent approach towards restrictive practices, and, if 
the answer is positive, which is this approach. In the case of a negative answer, we 
will try to delineate CADE's main concerns in this issue, in order to determine a 
possible future development in relation to CADE's approach. This chapter will be 
based on the analysis of five cases concerning four types of restrictive practices: 
price-fixing, exclusivity agreement, tie-in sale and predatory pricing, which were 
decided between March of 1993 and March of 1996 . 
31 ' Thus, section 2 will provide 
an overview of the legal provisions regarding restrictive practices, while section 3 will 
show the context within which the application of competition law is applied. Section 4 
will be directed to the analysis of the cases themselves. 
The analysis of anticompetitive practices in Brazil requires the inclusion of 
cases dealing with the issue of price control, even though they are not usually 
regulated by competition law. The reason lies in the fact that price control cases were 
submitted to CADE during the period investigated here. However, for the sake of 
clarity, this analysis will be carried out in the next chapter. 
311 PA 53/92 - Ministerio Nblico do Estado de Sergipe v. AssociaVao dos Hospitais do Estado de 
Sergipe: PA 32/92 - SNDE V. Valer Alimentagdo e Serviqos Lida; PA 23/91 - Repro Materiais e 
Equipamentos de Aerografta e outros v. Xerox do Brasil S. A-, PA 0 1/91 - Interchemical Ind e Com 
Internacional Lida v. Sharp Ind e Com Lida, and PA 40/92 - InAstria e Comircio de Evaporadores 
Refiaio Lida v. Coldex Frigor Equipamentos SA 
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2. Abuse of economic power - overview of the legal provisions 
Before starting the discussion on the legal provisions, it is necessary to recall 
that the development of competition law in Brazil evolved around three laws: Law 
4137/62, Law 8158/91, and Law 8884/94. The first one covered the period between 
1962 and 1994, while the second was in force between 1991 and 1994. In June of 
1994, the first two laws were abrogated by Law 8884/94, which is the competition 
law in force now. 
From 1962 to 1991, the period when only Law 4137/62 was in force, 81 
administrative proceedings (PA) were submitted to CADE. It was only after the 
enactment of Law 8158/91 that the number of cases increased. From 1991 to 1994, 
123 PAs were submitted to CADE. However, until March of 1996 only 25 of these 
123 cases were decided. The law applied to these 25 cases were Laws 4137/62 and 
8158/91, because by the time that the conduct under analysis occurred, Law 8884/94 
was not yet in force (Table 2). 
Accordingly, until March of 1996 none of the types of conduct that occurred X'X%. # 
under Law 8884/94 had yet been analysed by CADE, since the investigations are 
quite time consuming. It follows that this chapter will have to focus on the approach 
towards restrictive practices adopted by both Laws 4137/62 and 8158/91. Overall the 
substantives issues are very much the same in all the laws. Therefore the analysis of 
the cases is not hindered. The main characteristics of Law 8884/94 have already been 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Table 2- CASES SUBMITTED AND DECIDED BY CADE UNDER LAWS 
4137/62 AND 8158/91 
Law 4137/62 81 
Laws 4137/62 123 
and 8158/91 
(1991/03.1996) 
TOTAL 204 
79 
25* 
104 
Source: author's research at CADE 
2.1 Law 4137/62 - Article 2 
Law 4137/62 established five main types of abuse of economic power 312 
(Figure 4). According to the first type, any conduct that created any kind of difficulty 
to one company could be considered an abuse of economic power, as long as it 
resulted in market domination or partial or total elimination of competition. The same 
would happen with any kind of agreement between companies that achieved the same 
result. For instance, an agreement between competitors to fix prices could be inserted 
in that type. 
The second type considered an abuse to increase prices without a sound 
justification in cases of monopoly, with the purpose of increasing profits in an 
arbitrary manner, without increasing production. This means that any increase of price 
that was not based on costs would be considered an abuse of economic power, 
provided that it was in the context of a monopoly. 
312 Article 2, Law 4137/62. 
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The third type of abuse was also related to prices: creation of "monopolistic 
conditions"' 13 or abusive speculation which had as its purpose the temporary increase 
of price through the destruction or retention of production or consumer goods, or the 
use of artificial ways to make prices oscillate. The difference between the second and 
the third type was that, in the former the act had to be exercised by a company that 
had monopoly power, while in the latter the company did not necessarily have to be a 
monopolist. 
Another type of abuse established in the law was the creation of an economic 
group through aggregation of companies. The law established two ways through 
which this could be achieved. Whilýe the first way involved price and service 
discrimination, the second involved the subordination of a good or service to the 
acquisition of another good or service. However, these two practices would only be 
considered an abuse if as a result an economic group was formed. It follows that price 
discrimination and tie-in sales imposed by a monopolist would not be considered an 
abuse of economic power. As it is, this provision is practically redundant, because the 
possibility of a tie-in sale resulting in an economic group is highly improbable, since 
this kind of conduct is usually performed by one single company alone. The same 
happens in relation to price discrimination, which is a way to yield or protect the 
monopoly power of a company. Both price discrimination and tie-in sales are a kind 
of vertical restraint, that is, a restrictive conduct imposed not at the same level of 
production but by the seller on the buyer or vice versa. It follows that the effects of 
vertical restraints may be impairing competition, but not necessarily forming 
economic groups. 
313 Law 4137/62 defined "monopolistic conditions" as those circumstances where a company or a 
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Finally, the last type of abuse was unfair competition through exclusivity in 
publicity and previous arrangement of prices or advantages in public bidding. This 
provision in an antitrust law is quite peculiar. It is obvious that legislators see unfair 
competition as anticompetitive, but it is not so clear why it is an abuse only unfair 
competition imposed through exclusivity in publicity and price fixing in public 
bidding. 
The only conclusion to be drawn from this brief examination of Law 4137/62 
is that it mixed general practices with specific practices and misunderstood several 
concepts, thus making difficult its application in practice. 314 
group of companies controls production, distribution and sales of a product or service in such a way 
that it preponderantly influences prices (article 5). 
314 The legislative history of Law 4137/62 provides an explanation for this mishmash of antitrust 
issues. The bill of the law spent 14 years in Congress, and thus was submitted to several amendments. 
One of them referred to the types of conduct that were considered abuse of economic power, which 
were more coherent in the original bill. For instance, the bifl defined as abuse of economic power any 
kind of agreement between companies or persons linked to these companies that has as effects, among 
others, the elimination of competition, obstruction of distribution or production, and exclusivity of 
production or distribution. Another illicit conduct was the acquisition of assets or stocks of companies 
when it resulted in elimination of competition or exclusivity of production or distribution. Mergers 
would also be illegal if it had those same effects. 
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Figure 4- TYPES OF ABUSE OF ECONOMIC POWER - LAW 4137/62 
MARKET DOMINATION 
ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION 
ARBITRARY INCREASE 
OF PROFITS 
TEMPORARY INCREASE 
OF PRICES 
CREATION OF 
ECONOMIC GROUP 
UNFAIR 
COMPEITION 
2.2 Law 8158/91 
" AGREEMENT BETWEEN COMPANIES 
" ACQUISITION OF ASSETS 
" CONCENTRATION OF 
COMMPANIES/STOCKS 
" ACCUMULATION OF MANAGEMENT 
" SUSPENSION OF ACTIVITIES 
" CREATION OF DIFFICULTIES TO THE 
PERFOMANCE OF COMPANIES 
THROUýý - PRICE INCREASE IN MONOPOLY 
WITHOUT JUSTFICATION 
" DESTRUCTION OF PRODUCTION/ 
CONSUMER GOODS 
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CONSUMER GOODS 
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THROU - PRICE AND SERVICE DISCRIMINATION 
- TJE-IN SALES 
- EXCLUSIVITY IN PUBLICITY 
THROUGH - ARRANGEMENT OF PRICE/ADVANTAGE 
IN PUBLIC BIDDING 
As seen in chapter 2, a new competition law was enacted in 1991. One of the 
reasons for the creation of a new law was that the 1988 Constitution required that the 
law should prevent the abuse of economic power whose purpose was market 
domination, elimination of competition and arbitrary increase of profits. "' Moreover, 
3 '5 Article 143, paragraph 4,1988 Constitution. 
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a new law was necessary to follow the transition from a controlled and regulated 
economy to a hberal economy. 316 So Law 8158/91 was enacted. However, as Law 
8158/91 did not abrogate Law 4137/62, both laws were in force at the same time. In 
relation to the substantive issues, this did not constitute a problen-4 because Law 
8158/91 did not conflict with Law 4137/62.317 
It is possible to argue that Law 8158/91 was clearer in relation to restrictive 
practices. Basically, there were two provisions that dealt with the issue. First, it 
established that SDE should prevent the occurrence of six distortions in the market: 
a) prices fixed below cost, as well as sales and production fixed in an artificial 
manner; 
b) barriers to entry; 
c) obstruction of access to raw materials, technology, or distribution; 
d) market division; 
e) supervision of net of distribution or supply; and 
f) formation of economic groups. 318 
This provision determined that SDE's role had also a preventive nature, in the 
sense that the agency had to be attentive to what was occurring in the market, in order 
to prevent those distortions from happening. 
Salgado, L. H., "Politica da concorrencia: ten&ncias recentes eo estado da arte no Brasil", Te-xto 
para discussao a 135, IPEA, October 1995, p. IT 
317 As it was seen in Chapter 2, conflicts arose in relation to jurisdiction to implement the law, 
procedure and acts of economic concentration. 
'18 Article 2, Law 8158/91. 
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On the other hand, article 3 of the law defined what constituted a violation of 
the economic order: any agreement of companies, act, conduct or practice whose 
purpose or effect was to dominate the market, harm competition, or increase profits in 
an arbitrary manner, even if the aims were not achieved. The article then hsted 18 
practices that could be a violation. This list, however, was not exhaustive, but was 
constituted of examples of practices, which means that any practice that produced or 
intended to produce the effects above could be considered a violation. Among the 
practices of article 3, it was included price fixing, creation of barriers to entry, market 
division, refusal to sell, tie-in sales, sales without profits, dumping. 319 
The comparison of the two laws shows that Law 8158/91 was more 
unambiguous and clearer. Any conduct that intended to produce the effects described 
in article 3 was a violation of the economic order. Law 4137/62, on the other hand, 
created a more complex system which in some cases conditioned vertical restraints to 
effects of horizontal restraints and vice versa. The positive aspect was that, as the two 
laws were in force at the same time, they complemented each other. For instance, 
even if a tie-in sale did not create an economic group, as required by Law 4137/62, it 
would still be a violation, provided that it resulted in market domination, elimination 
of competition or arbitrary increase of profits, because Law 8158/91 established so. 
319 The 18 types of conduct of article 18 are: imposition of prices or condition of sales; limiting the 
access of new companies to the market; market division; price fixing; market regulation viewing to 
supervise research and technological development; creation of obstacles to investments in production 
of goods or services; refusal to sell, tie-in sales; interruption of business aiming to dominate the market 
or to create difficulties to the fimctioning of another company; obstructing the exploitation of industrial 
or intellectual property rights; abandorunent or destruction of plantation in order to harm competition 
or obtain arbitrary profits; destruction of raw material and consumer goods as well as machinery-, sale 
of goods without profit; dumping; concerted practices between competitors; obstructing the 
constitution, functioning and development of companies; taking part in associations that aimed at 
practices forbidden by the law; and performing or avoiding to perform acts, in agreement with 
competitors, that could be considered one of the practices provided for in the law. 
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If Law 4137/62 looked for inspiration in the Sherman Act, it seems that Law 
320 8158/91 is based in article 85(l) of the EEC Treaty, in the sense that the latter 
prohibits practices that result or intend to result in the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition. If we look at the competition laws of Latin American 
countries, we will find out that they all sought inspiration from foreign competition 
laws. The Mexican law, for instance, is clearly based on the American law, especially 
in relation to the distinction between absolute and relative monopolistic practices, 
which are equivalent to the American "per se" prohibition and rule of reason analysis, 
respectively. 321 The Argentine antitrust law, however, is influenced by the EEC law, 
and not by the American law, because, according to Cabanellas, the latter is based in 
court decisions, which is incompatible with the Argentine legal systeM. 
322 
3. Context for the application of competition law - an overview 
As already presented in the beginning of this thesis, 323 in order to assess 
Brazilian competition law it is necessary to have in mind four hypothesis on the 
320 Article 85(l): The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and 
shall hereby be prohibited any agreement; between enterprises, any decisions by associations of 
enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the Member State and 
which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
Common Market, in particular those consisting in: 
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other trading conditions; 
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development or investment; 
(c) market sharing or the sharing of sources of supply; 
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent supplies, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or 
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of additional supplies 
which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of 
such contract. 
1 321 Garcia-Rodriguez, S., "Institutional framework for antitrust enforcement", De Paul Law Review, 
Summer 1995, p. H 66/67. 
ý22 see Cabanellas, G. and Etzrodt, W., "7be new Argentine antitrust law - competition as an economic 
policy instrument", Journal of World Trade Law, vol. 17,1983, p. 36/37. 
123 Introduction, section 3. 
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adoption and enforcement of the law. According to the first hypothesis, developing 
countries cannot adopt models of competition law that already exist in other countries; 
on the contrary, it is necessary to take into account the especial needs of the country 
when regulating competition. The second hypothesis is that the legislation has to 
clearly define the approach towards competition as well as the anticompetitive 
practices, the acts of economic concentration and the procedure. A third hypothesis 
concerns the system for enforcement of the law: a institutional framework that is well 
structured and effective has to be created. Finally, the last hypothesis is that 
competition law must be inserted into a coherent economic framework. 
Chapter 3 has demonstrated that all the antitrust laws ever enacted in Brazil 
did not adopt a particular approach towards competition. They reflected the different 
points of view of Congressmen representing different parties and ideologies. 
Accordingly, the government has not been issuing policies regarding competition. The 
only reason to regulate competition, from the government point of view, would then 
be to complement to the trade liberalisation measures, 324 which are necessary to 
attract foreign investment to the country. To have a competitive market would not be 
a goal in itself, but just an instrument to reach another aim. Moreover, the Brazilian 
competition laws have been including several issues that are not necessarily related to 
competition. 
It follows that there has not been a clear guidance towards the application of 
the law. Though an administrative system was created to enforce the law, the 
competition authorities were not given a clear legal framework in which to base the 
324 Introduction, subsection 2.1. 
147 
an lication of the law, which means that CADE has had to face this enormous and K' p 
difficult task of developing the whole process of implementing competition law in 
Brazil. 
The alternatives faced by CADE in relation to the approach to be adopted are 
various. The main goal of competition is consumer welfare, and it is possible to divide 
in three main approaches the several theories on how this should be achieved. The 
efficiency approach argues that the only way to reach consumer welfare is through 
practices that result in efficiency; therefore, practices that may be anticompetitive but 
nevertheless are efficient should be allowed. The social approach, in its turn, supports 
the theory that competition should include social goals, such as protection of small 
firms, income distribution and maintenance of employment. The third approach can 
be called the "competitive" approach, and it understands that consumer welfare can be 
achieved through the maintenance of a competitive market, which may include 
efficiency concerns and social goals, but only as part of the competition process. 
The existence of these approaches does not necessarily mean that competition 
authorities should opt for one of them only and adhere to it forever. In the majority of 
the cases, the approach adopted reflects the political, economic and ideological 
situation of the country in that specific time. 
The identification of the Brazilian approach to restrictive business practices 
necessarily includes the background to the period where the cases were decided. This 
period goes from March of 1993 to March of 1996. However, it is beyond the purpose 
of this thesis to make a deep analysis of the period in question. It will suffice to 
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narrow this analysis to a brief outline of the main events that occurred in the political 
and economic areas. 
This was a time of transition in Brazil. In the political sphere, the transition 
was from a military dictatorship that lasted more than 20 years to a democracy. It was 
a gradual process that started in the mid-1980s and culminated with the presidential 
elections in 1989, the impeachment of the president in 1992 due to accusations of 
corruption, and the peaceful transfer of office to the vice-president. Since then, 
democracy seems to be established in the country. 
In the economy, however, the situation is not so stable. In the beginning of the 
1990s, as the interventionist model had proved to be ineffective, the government 
started to adopt measures towards the liberalisation of the economy. Thus, 
privatisation of State enterprises began to take place, imports were liberated, control 
of prices was being relaxed. The country was moving from a State controlled 
economy to a liberal economy. One of the major concerns of the government was 
inflation, which was very high at the tiMe. 325 In July of 1994 a new economic plan, 
the Plano Real, was adopted, which sought to combat inflation and put the country 
again in the process of economic growth. By controlling the interests and linking the 
national currency to the dollar, among other measures, the government succeeded in 
reducing inflation. On the other hand, social problems such as poverty and 
unemployment have not been controlled. 
325Fo, r instance, the 1993 inflation was 2708.3% (source: IGP-DI) 
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Based on this background, one can argue that competition law was also facing 
a period of transition, as the changes in politics and economy were reflected in 
competition as well. The process of liberalisation in the economy expanded the field 
of action of competition law, since State intervention in the economy had not left 
much space for the existence of a competitive market. With the adoption of trade 
liberalisation measures, and the withdrawal of the State from direct interference in the 
market, the role of competition law becomes more important because there are now 
conditions for the proper application of the law, since the economic agents have more 
freedom of action. It is with this background in mind that the analysis of cases of 
restrictive business practices should be made. 
4. CADE's approach to four restrictive practices 
As mentioned above, during the period that both Laws 4137/62 and 8158/91 
were in force, that is, from 1991 to 1994,123 administrative proceedings were 
submitted to CADE. Between 1991 and March of 1996, the period to which this 
research is circumscribed, only 25 of these 123 cases were decided. The restrictive 
practices that were most often found in the cases already decided were exclusivity 
agreements, tie-in sales, price fixing, predatory pricing and price control. This section 
will analyse CADE's approach to the first four practices. Price control, as mentioned 
in the introduction, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Table 3- CASES DECIDED UNDER LAWS 4137/62 AND 8158/91 UNTIL 
MARCH OF 1996 
EXCLUSIVITY 02 02 
TIE-IN SALES - 02 02 
PRICE FIXING 02 03 05 
PREDATORY 02 - 02 
PRICING 
PRICE CONTROL 04 08 12 
OTHERS 02 - 02 
T0TAL 12 13 25 
Source: author "s research at CADE 
4.1 Price fixing 
Since it was created, CADE has not seen many cases related to price fixing. 
One reason can be found in the policy of price control adopted by the government 
until recently. 326 Tables with maximum prices were issued by the price control 
agency, and each economic sector had to comply with it. In a situation of price 
control, there is little space for market rules, because the economy has to follow the 
rules imposed by the government. Consequently, it was not really necessary for the 
companies to make agreements among themselves in relation to the prices of their 
products or services. 
From the point of view of the consumer, there would be no reason to complain 
of price fixing because, if the agreement existed, it would either adopt the same price 
of the government, which was not a rational strategy for the companies, or fix the 
326 as seen in the Introduction, section 2.1. 
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price below that of the government, which could be beneficial to the consumer. What 
consumers were keen to complain of was those increases of price that were above 
inflation or that did not comply with the price tables imposed by the government. 
However, with the end of price control in the beginning of the 1990s, five 
327 
cases on price fhxing agreements were submitted to CADE . These agreements were 
usually proposed by unions or associations of a determined sector, as a way not only 
to protect their affiliates from the hazards of the economic crisis but also to gain from 
it. 
328 This was the situation in the Sergipe Hospitals case. The Association of 
Hospitals of the State of Sergipe prepared price tables which fixed the prices of the 
services rendered by the hospitals, as well as of the materials used by them. These 
tables were then approved and adopted by the hospitals. Because of this conduct, the 
Association was accused by the Department of Justice of the State of Sergipe of 
eliminating competition. 
The defence put forth by the Association was mostly factual. It argued that the 
prices were not imposed, since they were adopted after discussion with the hospitals. 
Another argument was that the associates were not compelled to charge the exact 
price fixed by the Association, because, as the price fixed was only the maximum 
price the hospitals could charge, they were free to adopt prices below that. The 
327 PA 109/89 - Elmo Seguranqa e Preservaqdo de Valores SA. v. Sindicato das Empresas de 
Seguranqa e Vigildncia do Estado de Sdo Paulo e outros, - PA 53/92 - MinisMrio Ptiblico do Estado de 
Sergipe v. Associaqdo dos Hospitais do Estado de Sergipe; PA 61/92 - FederWdo Nacional das 
Empresas de Seguros Privados e Capitaliza(do v. Associaýdo M9dica Brasiteira; PA 62/92 - DNPDE 
v. AssociaVdo dos Hospitais de Sjo Paulo. 
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Association also argued that the anticompetitive practice could not be proved, as there 
was no evidence that the hospitals had adhered to the tables. 
CADE based the analysis of the case on five major points. The first two points 
were related to the existence of the agreement and the necessity of proving that the 
hospitals had adopted the price tables. CADE held that the fact that the Association 
did not deny the existence of the tables proved that the agreement really occurred. 
Accordingly, CADE reasoned that there was no need to prove that the hospitals had 
adopted the tables, not only because the Association had influence enough on the 
hospitals to make sure that they would adopt the price tables, but also because the 
Association's decisions reflected the hospitals' will. The mere existence of price 
tables was an evidence of the anticompetitive conduct. 
In order to emphasise the per se illegality of price fixing, CADE quoted the 
Maricapa case, 329 where the American Supreme Court ruled that the anticompetitive 
potential inherent to all price fming agreements justifies its per se invalidity, even if 
pro-competitive reasons are presented. 
The third point developed by CADE was the effects caused by the conduct. 
CADE found out that, by establishing the prices to be charged by the hospitals, the 
Association was intending to eliminate competition. There were two reasonings that 
led CADE to that conclusion. In the first place, the price tables removed the 
possibility of the hospitals negotiating prices and conditions of their services and 
materials with their clients, which means that there was no competition between the 
'28 PA 53/92 - Ministgrio Nblico do Estado 
de Sergipe v, Associaqdo dos Hospitais do Estado de 
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hospitals. Secondly, the price tables made available for all hospitals the information 
about the prices of each other, which, according to CADE, was harmful to 
competition, because the uncertainty about the price of competitors is necessary to 
maintain competition. 
CADE then proceeded to the fourth point of the analysis, the Association's 
argument that the prices established by the tables were maximum prices, and therefore 
the hospitals were free to adopt prices below that of the table. CADE held that it did 
not matter if the prices fixed were minimum or maximum, because the effect would 
always be anticompetitive, since prices would not be determined by the rules of the 
market. CADE used the decision of the American Supreme Court in US v. Trenton 
Potteries, 330 to point out that prices that are reasonable in the present may not be so in 
the future. Moreover, the Commission held that minimum prices may discourage the 
entry of new competitors in the market, while maximum prices may be transformed 
into mmimum prices later. 
Finally, CADE investigated whether the price tables would eventually bring 
I- - benefits for consumers. It found out that the prices adopted in the tables did not 
correspond to the real costs of each hospitaL which meant that the users of the 
hospitals would have access to different services but would pay the same price. 
Accordingly, the medical assistance companies would not benefit from the practice, 
as they were not able to individually negotiate prices, ten-ns and conditions of 
payment with the hospitals. Price tables would then bring benefits only to the 
Sergipe, distributed to Commissioner Carlos Eduardo Vieira de Carvallio and decided on 30-06.93. 
321) Arizona v. Maricapa Cotinty Medical Society, 457 US 332,102 S-Ct. 2466,73 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1982). 
3N 273 US 392 (1927) 
154 
hospitals, as they did not have to compete among themselves. Therefore, there were 
no reasonable justifications for the practice. 
Based on this analysis, CADE considered the conduct anticompetitive and 
imposed a fine of approximately US$ 130,000.00. 
The analysis of the case demonstrates that CADE develops a tendency to 
consider price fixing as illegal per se. At a certain point in the decision, CADE held 
that "price fudng results in anticompetitive effects, as it prevents the prices ftom 
being formed according to the rules of the market, which is one of the most important 
331 
purpose of competition" . Moreover, by quoting the Maricapa case, CADE is 
Uý 
strengthening that view. This shows that CADE has been seeking inspiration in the 
approach towards price fixing adopted in the US, where price fixing has been 
generally regarded as illegal per se. 
332 
However, in Brazil price fixing cannot be considered illegal per se because the 
law adopts a rule of reason approach to competition in general. 333 It follows that price 
fming would be considered an offence against the economic order by article 3 of Law 
8158/91 only when it had as its purpose or effect market domination, elimination of 
331 opinion of Commissioner Carlos Eduardo Vieira de Carvalho, p. 10. 
332 See, for instance, the Trenton Pottery case, supra n. 330, where the American Supreme Court 
established that price fixing is illegal per se and therefore "no evidence of the reasonableness of the 
prices fixed need be heard by courts or submitted to juries" (Neale, A. D., The Antitrust Laws of the 
USA, 3 rd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, p. 3 7); the Socony- Vacumm case [3 10 US 
150 (1940)], where court went fin-ther and ruled that the argument that a price fixing agreement was 
adopted to defend a group of companies from others cannot be used as a justification for that practice, 
as well as that it did not matter if the parties involved in the price fixing agreement did not have the 
power to control the market because they would directly interfere with market forces; and the 
Marica, pa case, supra n. 329, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed the adoption of the per se rule in 
relation to agreements fixing maximum prices. 
333 A practice is illegal only when it results (or has the intention of resulting) in market domination, 
elimination of competition or increase of profits in an arbitrary manner. Article 3, Law 8158/91. 
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competition or increase of profits in an arbitrary manner. Law 4137/62, on the other 
hand, did not specifically prohibit price fixing, though the conduct could be seen as an 
agreement between companies to dominate the market or eliminate competition, 
which is prohibited by article 2,1, a. It follows that both laws required the occurrence 
of certain conditions in order to characterise the illegality of the practice., which 
means that price fixing cannot be considered illegal per se. 
The investigation carried out by CADE covered the main aspects involved in 
price fixing, but nevertheless it was made in a quite theoretical fashion, as it took into 
consideration the effects that price tables in general have on competition, but not the 
specific elements of that particular case. 334 This does not necessarily mean that CADE 
was not willing to do a thorough analysis of the case. It may have been that the 
preliminary investigation carried out by SDE did not gather enough elements. As it 
was seen in Chapter 3, Law 8158/91 did not allow CADE to request more inforrnation 
either from SDE or from the parties. It follows that CADE was compelled to reach a 
decision based only on the data SDE had gathered. 
Finally, in relation to the question of evidence, CADE was right to conclude 
that the decisions adopted by the Association reflected what the hospitals themselves 
wanted, because the Association was an entity created by the hospitals to represent 
them. However, it might have been necessary to prove that the tables were actually 
adopted and applied by the hospitals. By not doing so, CADE was showing it 
favoured a per se approach to price fixing, which is not dlowed by the law. 
3" For instance, there is no data or information about how the conduct affected the relations with the 
medical assistance companies. The decision said that the clients of one of these companies were not 
accepted in a hospital because they paid prices below that of the tables, but CADE did not explore this 
issue. 
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As mentioned above, the three cases of price fixing were considered illegal by 
CADE. However, in a similar case to the Sergipe Hospitals case, the decision was not 
unanimous. 
335The dissident opinion argued that, since the preliminary investigations, 
the practice was seen as illegal per se, and therefore the elements of the case were not 
taken into consideration, which could not happen, because Law 8158/91 adopted the 
rule of reason approach to restrictive practices. Therefore, the opinion continued, it 
was necessary to investigate if the adoption of the price tables resulted or had the 
purpose of resulting in elimination of competition, market dominance or arbitrary 
increase of profits. As the Association decided to give up the adoption of the price 
tables, the Commissioner argued that it did not aim at any anticompetitive purpose, 
which only proved that the practice was not iUegal. This approach, however, did not 
prevail, and the practice was considered illegal. 
The analysis carried out by CADE demonstrates that CADE understands the 
concept of price fixing and knows that it is a highly anticompetitive practice that does 
require strong justification in order to be cleared. It follows that CADE would be 
willing to consider price fixing as illegal per se; it however does not do it because it is 
not permitted by the law. However, CADE seems to be less stringent as regards the 
evidence required for the analysis of the case, in the sense that it does not require 
material evidence of the practice, and takes the effects of price fixing for granted. This 
approach, on the other hand, may not be desirable, because the decision rnay be 
annulled by the courts on the grounds that CADE did not comply with the 
requirements of the law. 
336 
335 PA 67/92 - DNPDE v. Associaýdb dos Hospitais de Sdo Paulo, distributed to Commissioner Neide 
Teresinha Malard and decided on 09.11.94. 
336 As seen in Chapter 3, subsection 2.2, Brazil adopts the system of judicial controL where the acts of 
the administration are subject to review by the Judiciary. 
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4.2 Exclusivity agreements 
From 1962 to 1996, CADE decided seven cases related to exclusivity 
337 
agreements, of which five were subject only to Law 4137/62, and two to both Laws 
4137/62 and 8158/91 . 
338The 
peculiarity in this practice is that neither laws made any 
specific reference to exclusivity agreements. The only mention can be found in Law 
4137/62, which considered as unfair competition exclusivity arrangements in 
publicity. This means that, for instance, a company could not sponsor with exclusivity 
a show to be broadcast on TV. Apart from that, both laws were silent. 
However, exclusivity agreements are agreements made between companies. It 
follows tbat, as Law 4137/62 considered an abuse of economic power the agreement 
between companies that seeks to dominate the market or eliminate competition, 
exclusivity agreements could be included in this provision. In relation to Law 
8158/91 , the list of conduct that may be considered an offence against the economic 
order does not specifically include exclusivity agreements; however, the practices 
included in this list do not exhaust themselves. They are only examples, thus 
exclusivity agreements can be included here. 
CADE understands that exclusivity agreements have a restrictive nature but 
nevertheless cannot be considered anticompetitive per se, thus an analysis of the 
339 
practice is always necessary. In the Valer case, for instance, CADE's analysis was 
337 PA 12/73 - Cia. A Iterosa de Cervejas v. Distribuidora de Bebidas Mineira Ltda e outra; PA 17/75 - 
. 
4guas Minerais Vontobel S. A. e outra v. Reftigerantes Sul-Riograndense S. A. Ind e Com., PA 18/75 - 
Cwy e Cury Lida v. Shell do Brasil S A., PA 40/77 - Marchesan Implementos v. Ford do Brasil S. A., 
PA 71/83 - Dispave SA. v. Volkswagen do Brasil S. A. e outros. 338 PA 30/92 - Seara Agricola Comercial e Industrial Ltda v. ICI do Brasil S. A, and PA 32/92 - SNDE 
v. Paler Alimentaqdo e Serviqos Ltda- 
33Q PA 32/92 - SIVDE v. Paler Alimenfacdo e Servips Ltda, distributed to Commissioner Neide 
Teresinha Malard and decided on 22-04.93. 
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based on two aspects: the intention of the company when adopting the conduct and 
the effects of the practice on competition. 
Valer was the only luncheon voucher company that accepted a proposal from 
the Association of Supermarkets of the State of Santa Catarina of reducing the period 
of time in the exchange of vouchers for money. A contract was then written, and it 
included a clause according to which the supermarkets agreed to accept only Valer's 
vouchers. Only seven supermarkets signed for the contracts. Soon after the contracts 
became effective, the exclusivity clause was withdrawn, and just three months later 
the contracts were cancelled. 
In relation to the intention of the company, CADE understood that the 
exclusivity clause inserted in the contract was just a concession given by the 
supermarkets to Valer for having agreed to decrease the period of time for payment of 
its luncheon vouchers. Valer did not impose the conduct on the supermarkets, nor 
refused to deal with supermarkets that did not accept Valer's proposal. This was 
enough to make CADE conclude that Valer was only trying to increase its small share 
in the market, and not to dominate the market or harm competition. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the company did not intend to dominate the 
market, CADE considered necessary to analyse the effects that the conduct caused in 
the market. However, CADE found that the investigation made by SDE had not 
159 
gathered enough elements to assess the impact of the conduct, which made impossible 
the analysis. 
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In order to overcome that deficiency, CADE sought help in economic theory, 
according to which a company must have market power if its conduct are to cause any 
effect in the market. Companies that have a small participation in the market are not 
likely to affect that market, even if they have that intention. Data concerning the 
market of luncheon vouchers demonstrated that only six companies held 95% of the 
market. Valer,, however, was not one of them. On the contrary, it was among the small 
companies that divided the remaining 5% of the market. By applying the economic 
theory to the case, CADE concluded that Valer did not have power enough to affect 
the market, so the case was dismissed. 
In this case, CADE demonstrated that it has a clear understanding of the 
rudiments involved in exclusivity agreements. Exclusivity agreements occur where a 
manufacturer does not allow his/her distributors to use or deal in the goods of the 
manufacturer's competitors. Thus, the distributors can only sell the products 
manufactured by this producer. The most immediate effect is that the manufacturer is 
foreclosing the opportunity for his/her competitors to sell to those distributors. This 
means that other producers are excluded from the geographic market represented by 
the distributors. By excluding his/her competitors, the manufacturer will then obtain a 
monopoly in that market, and therefore will be able to impose monopoly prices. 
4 3,0 As seen in Chapter 3, the procedural rules did not allow CADE to send the case back to CADE for 
more investigation nor permit CADE to gather data by itself 
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On the other hand, exclusivity agreements may bring benefits to all the parties 
involved. Through an exclusivity agreement, the distributor has an assured source of 
supply, while the manufacturer is sure that his/her products have a market. The 
Producer may offer some advantages to the distributor, such as training of personnel, 
and in exchange the distributor wiH concentrate his/her energy in promoting only the 
manufacturer's goods. An exclusivity agreement may also result in cost saving for 
both parties, as the producer will be able to eliminate selling expenses, and the 
distributor will gain from having a stable stock. It follows that exclusivity agreements 
are not necessarily a way to achieve monopoly. 
CADE saw the practice as a conduct that is not necessarily harmful to 
competition, and that only a case-by-case analysis can detern-ýine the legality of the 
conduct. Thus, CADE proceeded to analyse the intention of the party and the effects 
of the conduct, not only because the law determined that this should be done but also 
because this was the only possible way of finding out whether the practice was 
anticompetitive or not. 
341 
CADE proved that it is prepared to accept reasonable justifications for a 
conduct that may be anticompetitive. CADE applied the economic theory to establish 
the effects of the conduct, as the case provided no other elements to allow such 
341 Commenting on the treatment given to exclusivity agreements by the EEC Treaty, Whish argues 
that it is not possible to affirm if an agreement infringes article 85(l) without an economic analysis of 
the market, in order to establish the effects of such agreement on the market. This analysis must include 
"the structure of the market, alternative sources of supply, the legal and economic context in which the 
agreement operates", to then "speculate upon its possible effects" (see Whish, R., Compeiition Law, Yd 
edition, Butterworths, 1993, p. 607). 
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analysis. It understood that only exclusivity agreements adopted by a company with 
market power are capable of producing a harmful effect in the market. 342 
In a case decided a few months before, the ICI case, 343 CADE had to analyse a 
case that involved refusal to sell as well as an exclusivity clause inserted in a contract 
of distribution. Regarding the exclusivity, CADE held that, though the practice by 
itself presents elements of anticompetitivity, such as the obligation of one of the 
parties to buy and sell goods of only one producer, which eliminates competition and 
restricts consumption, it is not possible to consider it illegal per se. On the contrary, 
CADE understands that a rule of reason analysis has to be made in order to find out if 
the practice corresponds to an authentic interest and does not harm the market. 
Moreover, CADE pointed out that exclusivity clause cannot be understood as 
an instrument to reach monopoly, as it may be an attempt to harmonise the parties 
involved as well as the consumers. CADE concluded that, in this case, the exclusivity 
clause was adopted as a way to rationalise the conunercialisation of products and 
services of the company, and dismissed the case. 
342 In the US, the question discussed in the analysis of exclusivity agreements is the share of the market 
that is affected by the practice. Tbus, the courts consider exclusivity agreements illegal if competition 
is foreclosed in a substantial share in the line of commerce affected [Standard Oil Co. of California v. 
US, 337 US 293 (1949)]. In the Tampa case [Tampa Electric Co. V Nashville Coal Co., 365 US 320 
(1961)] Mr Justice Clark set the rules for establishing this "substantiality" requirement, and this case 
has been the basis for more recent decisions, which take into consideration three criteria when 
assessing the reasonableness of the exclusivity agreement: extent of market foreclosure; duration of the 
exclusivity agreement; and height of entry barriers (see Gellhorn, E. and Kovacic, W. Antitrust Law 
and Economics, 4' ed., West Publishing, St. Paul, 1994, p. 344/345). 
s43 PA 30/92 - Seara Agricola Comercial e Industrial Ltda. v. ICI do Brasil SA, distributed to 
Commissioner Jos6 Matias Pereira and decided on 01.03.93. 
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4.3 Tie-in sales 
Tie-in sale was prohibited in Brazil by Laws 4137/62 and 8158/91, as long as 
it resulted in the creation of an economic group, 344 or in market domination, 
elimination of competition or arbitrary increase of profits. 345From its creation in 1962 
until March of 1996, CADE decided five cases of tie-in sales. Three cases were under 
346 347 Law 4137/62, while the other two were under both Laws 4137/62 and 8158/91 . 
Tie-in sales occur when the seller of a product conditions the sale of its 
product to the purchase of a second product. By tying the purchase of a product to 
another, the manufacturer will be impairing competition in the market of the tied 
product, as other manufacturers of the product will not be able to sell their goods. 
However, this restriction of competition will depend on the market power of the 
manufacturer in the market of the tying product. If the manufacturer has a monopoly 
in that market, he/she may be using the tie-in sale to extend this monopoly power to 
the market of the tied product. 
CADE has developed a contradictory approach to tie-in sales. Though CADE 
has demonstrated that market power is a necessary requirement to render the practice 
illegal, it has also ruled that a company without market power can harm competition 
in the market of the tied product. An analysis of two cases will illustrate this point. 
344 Law 4137/62, article 2, IV, b. 
345 Law 8158/91, article 3, VIII. 
346 PA 05/67 - Sindicato dos Hotjis e similares de Belo Horizonte e outro v. Cia. Antdrtica Paulista e 
outras, PA 16/74 - Duarte Rot*igues Lida. e outra v. Procosa - Produtos Cosm6ticos Lida. e outra, PA 
28/76 - Hece M6quinas e Acessorios Ind e 
Com. Lida v. Miquinas Sheldahl e outra. 
347 PA 0 1/91 - Interchemical Ind e Com. Infernacional Lida v. Sharp Ind e Com Lida., and PA 23/91 
- Repro Materiais e Equipamentos 
de Aerografla e outros v. Xerox do Brasil &, 4, 
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In the Xerox case, "' Xerox rented the photocopying machines it manufactured 
to its chents. The maintenance of these photocopying machines could only be made 
by Xerox, which conditioned the maintenance services to the use of other materials it 
produced. This meant that customers who rented Xerox's photocopying machines 
were only entitled to maintenance services if they purchased toner, developer, 
photoreceiver and other materials from Xerox. 
Xerox's argument was that it was trying to protect its own property, because 
products of other companies might impair the performance of the photocopying 
machines. Xerox also argued that the maintenance of the machines was part of the 
rental deal, and not an independent contract that resulted in the tie-in sale. 
CADE's approach to the case was to establish Xerox's position in the markets 
of photocopying machines, services and material goods. In the first market, Xerox had 
a share of 77%. In the market of services, Xerox was also the leader, with 91% of the 
market. Xerox's participation in the market of material goods (toner, developer and 
roller), which depended on the model of the photocopying machine, varied from 74% 
to 100% of the market. This was enough to make CADE conclude that Xerox had 
economic power in the three relevant markets. However, CADE ruled that it was not 
because Xerox had economic power that the conduct should be considered illegal, 
since it is the manner according to which a dominant company acts that determines 
the legality or illegality of the conduct. 
348 PA 23/91 - Repro Materiais c Equipamentos 
de Xerografia e outros v. Xerox do Brasil S. A, 
distributed to Commissioner Marcelo Monteiro Soares and decided in 31 -03.93. 
164 
ýwrrý- A 
In this case, CADE held that the conduct adopted by Xerox prevented its 
clients from choosing their suppliers and thus acquiring materials from other 
companies. CADE then concluded that the conduct impaired competition in the 
market of consumer goods, created barriers to entry of new competitors, and 
threatened the existence of the small and medium companies of that market. Xerox 
was penalised a sum of one million dollars approximately. 
Both legal and economic reasoning seems to be correct in the Xerox case: tie- 
in sales are not illegal per se because the law established that the purpose and effects 
of the conduct should be examined, and the analysis of the market showed that Xerox 
was a monopolist and therefore the tie-in could eliminate the little competition that 
remained in the market. 
However, the approach adopted by CADE in relation to tie-in sales was 
different in the Sharp case . 
349 This case was decided a few months after the Xerox 
case and is very similar to it. It is a tie-in sale where Sharp, also a manufacturer of 
photocopying machines, conditioned the maintenance of the machines to the 
acquisition of the material goods it also produced. The main difference, however, was 
that Sharp had a share of only 3.5% in the market of rental and maintenance of 
photocopying machines. 
In its analysis of this case, CADE established first that tie-in sales are harmful 
to competition because they do not allow the consumer to freely choose the product or 
service that suits hini/her better; consequently. competition in the market of the tied 
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product is impaired, as actual or potential competitors are eliminated due to 
difficulties created for the performance or development of companies in that market. 
Based on this assumption, CADE reasoned that, by adopting this conduct, Sharp 
would be driving its competitors out of the market because buyers would already be 
committed to Sharp products. This would give Sharp the power to fix the price of 
material goods above the competitive level, which would result in arbitrary profits to 
Sharp. Accordingly, not only would the conduct not allow the market to grow, but 
also would not bring any operational advantage to the consumers. 
The fact that Sharp did not have market power did not prevent CADE from 
concluding that the conduct was anticompetitive. This conclusion was based on the 
existence of a highly concentrated market, the effects of tie-in sales in that market, as 
well as on the fact that, in the Xerox case, the conduct was considered 
anticompetitive. CADE then imposed a fine of approximately US$ 200,000.00, 
holding that it was not as high as the fine imposed on Xerox because Sharp had a 
smaller share in that market. 
By comparing the two cases, it is obvious that the approaches are different. In 
the Xerox case, the dominant position of the firm in the market was essential for 
establishing the illegality of the conduct. In the Sharp case, on the other hand, CADE 
departed from that approach by condemning the conduct notwithstanding Sharp's 
small participation in the market. 
349 PA 0 1/91 - Interchemical Ind e Com. Internacional Ltda v. Sharp Ind e Con Ltda, distributed to 
Commissioner Carlos Eduardo Vieira de Carvalho, and decided on 28.05.93. 
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The economic reasoning in this case does not seem to be appropriate, because 
it sustained that the conduct of a firm with no market power is Rely to affect the 
market. Tie-in sale impairs competition because it restricts the options available to 
consumers and eliminates the competitors of the company that imposes the practice. 
What must be taken into consideration is the extent to which the market will be 
affected if the company in question does not have market power. In that case, only a 
small number of consumers would have their options reduced. If they were not in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement, they could turn to any other company 
that rented photocopying machine. The same would happen in relation to competitors. 
If they were not able to sell their products to the small number of consumers who 
were already dealing with the company, they could direct their sales to other 
consumers. Thus, from an efficiency point of view, it would be better not to challenge 
the practice. 
The legal reasoning is accordingly questionable, because CADE seems to 
favour a per se approach to tie-in sales, thus not taking into consideration the legal 
provision that asks for a rule of reason approach to the practice. On the whole, the 
Sharp case leaves the impression that CADE has difficulties in applying the concept 
of tie-in sale. 
On the other hand, one can argue that the Xerox and Sharp cases have one 
point in common, that is, both cases are trying to protect consumers from an 
anticompetitive conduct adopted by firms in a highly concentrated market. This 
argument explains the fact that CADE ignored Sharp's lack of market power. CADE 
opted for ruling that, in a highly concentrated market, any conduct is likely to affect 
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the market and therefore harm the consumers. Based on this reasoning, it is possible 
to affirm that CADE's approach to tie-in sales is directed towards consumer 
protection, to the detriment of an economic approach. 
4.4 Predatory pricing 
As was the case with price fixing, Law 4137/62 did not prohibit predatory 
pricing. Further, in this case the law did not even refer to the conduct. This would lead 
one to believe that predatory pricing was a commercial practice not prohibited by 
competition law until the enactment of Law 8158/91, which considered predatory 
pricing as an offence against the economic order. The list of conduct that were 
prohibited included two practices that involved predatory pricing. One of them was 
the establishment of prices through artificial ways, and the other the selling of goods 
or rendering of services without profit. However, these two types of conduct should 
have as their purpose or effect market domination, elimination of competition, or 
arbitrary increase of Profits. 
350 
During the time that Law 8158/91 was in force, CADE decided only two cases 
of predatory pricing. 351 In both cases the conduct under investigation was not 
considered anticompetitive. 
In the Coldex case, 352 Coldex was accused by one of its competitors, Refrio, of 
adopting predatory prices and thus creating difficulties for the operation and 
performance of its competitors in the sector of industrial refrigeration. 
Article 3,1 and X111. 
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Refrigeration equipments are formed by two main components: a set of 
condensation which is called "partial set", and an open compressor. These two 
components together are called "condensation unit". Refrio used to manufacture the 
partial set, which was used together with Coldex" s open compressor in refrigeration 
equipments like cold storage chambers. 70% of the refrigeration equipments were 
assembled in this way, with the components of the two companies. 
Coldex, however, also manufactured the partial set and the whole 
condensation unit. In relation to prices, the price of Reffio's partial set was lower than 
that of Coldex. On the other hand, the price of the two components manufactured by 
Coldex was inferior to the price of the whole equipment. As this was not a logical and 
rational strategy for Coldex to maintain, the company decided to adopt a new price 
strategy, where it increased in a higher degree the price of the components (partial set 
and compressor) and in a lower degree the price of the complete condensation unit. In 
that way, it would be cheaper for the customers to buy the whole unit instead of the 
separate component and assemble them themselves. This resulted in an increase in 
Coldex's sale of the whole unit and a decrease in the sale of compressors. As a 
consequencýe, the sale of Refrio's partial set also decreased. 
CADE based the analysis of the case on the examination of Coldex's intention 
when establishing the new prices for its products, and on the effects that the conduct 
caused on competition. In relation to the first part of the analysis, CADE found out 
that Coldex was the leader in the market of condensation units and compressors, with 
351 PA 10/91 - Fogw-ex Arlefatos de Camping Ltda v. Lumbc Quimica Ltda; PA 40/92 - InAstria e Com&cio de Evaporadores Refrio Ltda v. Coldex Frigor Equipamentos SA 
352 PA 40/92 - MAWria e Comercio de Evaporadores Refrio Ltda v. Coldex Frigor Equipamentos S. A, 
distributed to Commissioner Carlos Eduardo Vieira de Carvalho and decided on 15.06.94. 
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a market share of 55%. Though CADE held that this market power would enable 
Coldex to fLx prices above the market, it accepted Coldex's argument that the new 
prices were necessary to reverse an anomalous situation, where the sum of the prices 
of the components was inferior to the price of the complete condensation unit, which 
had been causing a decrease in saleS. 
353 According to CADE, this was a reasonable 
explanation for the conduct adopted by Coldex, which was not related to the adoption 
of predatory prices in order to dominate the market or eliminate competition. 
CADE then intended to examine the effects of the conduct in the market, 
because it held that a company, when adopting new policies and strategies, must take 
mto account not only the gains it will bring to the company itself but also the effect it 
will cause in the market. However, CADE found it impossible to do so because the 
preliminary investigation took into account only the effects that the conduct caused on 
Refrio, and not on the whole market. CADE reasoned that competition law is 
interested in the conduct that attempts to dominate the market, eliminate competition 
or increase profits in an arbitrary manner, and not in the difficulties faced by one 
economic agent, as these difficulties are part of the risks of any business activity. 
Moreover, in relation to the losses suffered by Refrio, CADE held that they were prior 
to the strategy adopted by Coldex. The case was then dismissed. 
The analysis of this case allows us to conclude that CADE had difficulties 
with the concept of predatory pricing. In the first place, it did not define the practice 
35' This situation was actually reverted, as three years after the adoption of these measures there was 
an increase in the sale of condensation units of 165.53%, while the sale of compressors decreased 
36.29%. - see opinion of Commissioner Carlos Eduardo Vieira de Carvalho, p. 06. 
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nor made any analysis of its possible effects, as it did in the Valer case, for 
instance. 354 
Also, CADE did not take into consideration the elements that are involved in 
the concept of predatory pricing. When establishing the price of a product, the seller 
includes all the costs involved in the production as well as the profits he/she wants to 
obtain. The price will be predatory when the seller fixes prices below costs. By doing 
so, the seller will incur losses. However, these losses may be compensated if the 
seller's intentions are to drive his/her competitors out of the market. Once he/she 
achieves this objective, he/she raises the prices above competitive level and 
consequently obtains monopoly profits. The temporary losses would then be rewarded 
by these monopoly profits. 
The only reference that CADE made to this issue was that the practice adopted 
by Coldex was an adoption of price that could have affected competition, without 
saying how this could be done. CADE did not develop the concept of predatory 
pricing, and therefore was not able to conclude whether the practice discussed in the 
case could be inserted in that concept. 
Moreover, CADE reasoned that, as Coldex had 55% of the market, it was able 
to fix price above competitive level. This conclusion is correct, but the case was 
discussing the establishment of prices below costs. CADE examined the case from the 
wrong point of view. It should have taken into consideration that Coldex had market 
power and therefore was able to fix prices below costs in order to eliminate the 
354 As seen in subsection 4.2, in its analysis of the Valer case CADE developed a theoretical 
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remaining competitors. , A,,.,.,. cordingly, it should have examined whether 
Coldex could 
afford losses for a certain time, which would have proved that Coldex had the means 
to adopt a strategy of predatory pricing. 
Nevertheless, CADE went directly to investigate the intention of Coldex when 
adopting the conduct, and it was convinced that it was just a rational business strategy 
to combat decrease in sales. However, there are no reasons that demonstrate how 
CADE reached that conclusion. The data provided do show that Coldex sales were 
decreasing, and that after the adoption of the conduct sales increased, but it does not 
mean that this was the only conduct that Coldex could have adopted, nor that Coldex 
did not intend to eliminate its competitors. It certainly is an explanation, but it is 
questionable. 
A 
., -, kccordingly, 
CADE did not establish whether the price adopted by Coldex 
reflected its costs or not. The only mention to this issue was made by DPDE in its 
report, where it argued that it was not logical that the price of the compressor was 
almost the same of the condensation unit, since the former was a part of the latter. The 
only reason for this, DPDE concluded, was that Coldex fixed prices without taking 
into consideration the costs it incurred to manufacture the product. CADE, however, 
ignored this argument and fixed its attention in the intention and the effect of the 
practice. The question of cost analysis would have been fundamental to establish the 
existence of a potentially anticompetitive conduct. 
discussion of the concept of exclusivity agreement. 
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As predatory pricing involves the establishment of prices below cost, the 
element that is inherent to this concept is how prices are formed. If prices are below 
costs, then the practice is anticompetitive, as it will drive competitors out of the 
market. This happens even if the company did not intend to do so, even when the 
practice was just a normal business activity. This approach is supported by the law, 
which defines anticompetitive practices as those that result in, or have as their 
purpose, elimination of competition, market domination and arbitrary increase of 
profits. Thus, what is necessary to examine when the analysis shows that prices are 
below costs, is the extent to which the practice affect the market. Once again, it all 
depends on the market power of the company. CADE limited its analysis to the 
intention of the company, without even establishing what was the conduct, or the 
effects it caused. It also ignored DPDE's argument that the price did not reflect the 
costs. This shows that, in relation to predatory pricing, CADE was not able to apply 
the concept in a real situation. 
In relation to the effects of the conduct, it is understandable that CADE could 
not reach any conclusion because there were no elements about the relevant market, 
and the law did not allow CADE to collect more data. 
5. Conclusion 
It was shown in section 3 of this chapter that, at the time that the cases 
examined here were decided, Brazil was going through a process of transition. It was 
also recalled the hypothesis in the adoption and enforcement of competition law. With 
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this background to competition established, and having already examined the legal 
provisions in section 2, we then proceeded to the analysis of cases concerning 
restrictive practices. The con unction of these four points enables us to draw some j 
conclusions regarding CADE's approach to restrictive practices. 
The first conclusion is that CADE carries a clear legal analysis in each case 
that it is confronted with. As the law establishes that it is illegal only the conduct that 
results in, or has as its purpose, the elimination of competition, domination of the 
market or arbitrary increase of profits, CADE examines in each case the intention of 
the companies as well as the effects of the conduct in the market. Legal reasonings are 
therefore well develoPed by CADE. 
However, there is one criticism to be made. In some situations, it does not 
seem necessary to carry out such an extensive analysis, because an economic 
reasoning is enough to demonstrate that the practice is not anticompetitive. In the 
Valer case, for instance, after a first analysis of the case, CADE found out that the 
market power of the company was too small to cause any harm to competition, but 
nevertheless it carried on with the analysis to examine the consequences of the 
conduct in the market. 
In relation to the concepts, it is possible to argue that there are circumstances 
where CADE does not demonstrate a firm control of the rudiments of the concept. 
This happened in relation to predatory pricing, for instance, where CADE examined 
the intention of the parties and the effects of the conduct, but did not take into account 
how the price was established, which is the main element to establish the legality of 
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the practice. This lack of command can be seen also in CADE's application of the 
concept of tie-in sale. Though in the Xerox case CADE conditioned the illegality of 
the conduct to the market power of the company, in the Sharp case CADE considered 
anticompetitive a tie-in sale imposed by a company with no market power. It is then 
difficult to conclude whether CADE sees the conduct as illegal per, or cannot grasp 
the elements of the concept, or whether it is just trying to protect consumers from the 
bazards of a concentrated market. 
On the other hand, CADE has shown good command of the concepts of price 
fixing and exclusivity agreement. In the first case, it understands that price fixing does 
not follow the rules of the market, may be the result of a carteL and therefore is Uely 
to be highly anticompetitive. CADE was not able to consider price fixing illegal per 
se Ibecause the law does not allow it, but nevertheless CADE was not so strict in its 
analysis, in the sense that it did not require evidence of the practice. In relation to 
exclusivity agreements, CADE considers the practice as not necessarily harmful to 
competition, and takes into account not only the intention of the parties and the effects 
of the conduct in the market but also any reasonable explanations for the adoption of 
the practice. 
It is difficult to draw conclusions in relation to the approach adopted by CADE 
towards restrictive business practices. The cases of tie-in sales and predatory pricing 
do not shed any light on the issue, as CADE itself is not sure about the concepts. The 
tie-in cases only give a hint that there is a concern with consumer protection. 
However, it may be that CADE sees the practice as illegal per. There are no elements 
on which to base any hypothesis. 
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The cases of price fting, in its turn, may be more helpful to identify CADE's 
approach, because it was here that CADE demonstrated more knowledge of 
competition. CADE's analysis of price fixing definitely does not allow for an 
efficiency approach. As mentioned, CADE shows the tendency to consider price 
fixing as anticompetitive per se. If CADE favoured an efficiency approach, it would 
have been more careful in its analysis, trying to find out possible efficiencies that 
would compensate the anticompetitive effect of the practice in the market. At the 
AD does not analyse the practice taking into account social goals that same tune, C. E 
could be achieve through the practice. It follows that the only possible conclusion is 
that CADE favours a competitive approach, since it is more interested in how the 
practice could affect competition. 
The approach adopted in CADE's analysis of the exclusivity agreements, on 
the other hand, is not so straightforward. CADE sees the practice as not necessarily 
anticompetitive, which means that CADE will always examine the case thoroughly, in 
order to gather elements that will demonstrate the effects of the practice. In the case 
discussed here, the lack of market power of the company was enough for CADE to 
dismiss the case, thus not being necessary to adopt a particular approach towards 
exclusivity. Had CADE had the chance of going further in this case, it would have 
1. 
. Deen able to follow any path it wanted. 
The problem with the implementation of competition law in relation to 
restrictive business practices is that, as the legislation does not define with rigour the 
approach towards competition nor the anticompetitive practices, it becomes difficult 
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r. 
for CADE to enforce the law with a certain coherence, even though there is support 
from the procedural rules. 
From what has been discussed until now, it is possible to conclude that CADE 
is also going through a period of transition, which has not enabled it to follow a 
coherent approach towards restrictive business practices. However, the discussion is 
not complete without examining the cases of price control, which will be done in the 
next chapter. Only after that analysis it will be appropriate to reach a final conclusion 
in that aspect. 
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CHAPTER 5- SPECLAL FEATURES OF BRAZILIAN 
COMPETITION LAW: THE CASE OF PRICE CONTROL 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have discussed the "traditional" practices regulated 
by competition laws in general that have been submitted to CADE, and attempted to 
identify CADE's approach towards these restrictive business practices. As pointed out 
in that chapter, the Brazilian competition law presents some peculiarities that are not 
usually covered by competition laws. A recurring conduct that best represents this 
aspect of the law is cases where some kind of price control is involved. It follows that 
it is not possible to identify CADE's approach towards competition without 
examining these cases of price control. 
This chapter thus complements Chapter 4. By analysing the cases of price 
control submitted to CADE, we will try to answer the same question proposed in that 
chapter: what does CADE seek to achieve when deciding cases conceming 
anticompetitive practices? We wifi also have in mind the three approaches to 
competition discussed in Chapter 4: the efficiency approach, the competitive approach 
and the social approach. 
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Section 2 of this chapter will provide a background related to the adoption of 
price control measures in Brazil, as well as examine the existence of provisions in 
competition law regarding price control. The following section will analyse two cases 
of price control that CADE has decided, while the conclusion will bring together the 
issues discussed in both chapters and attempt to identify CADE's approach to 
restrictive business practices. 
2. Price control and competition policy 
It is not unusual to use competition law to control the prices adopted by 
industries. In the LTK, for instance, the MMC deals with excessive pricing in 
monopolies under the Fair Trading Act 1973, and the Competition Act 1980 may 
catch excessive pricing by a dominant firm. Moreover, regulatory bodies have been 
created in order to deal with the problems arising from sectors that have been 
privatised, such as telecommunications. Among the powers given to these bodies the 
control of prices is included, and the technique used to fix the level of prices (the "rpi 
355 
minus x" formula) might be used in monopoly investigations. 
On the other hand, other legislations prefer to protect competition, in order to 
have a competitive market that by itself controls excessive pricing. This is the case of 
the USA, where antitrust law does not have a provision on excessive pricing. In the 
EEC, on the contrary, excessive pricing can be caught by Article 86(a) of the Treaty 
3iA See Whish, R-, Competition Law, Ped., Butter-worths, London, 1993, p. 346-348,499. 
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of Rome, which considers an abuse to impose "unfair purchase or selling prices or 
other unfair trading conditions". 
In Brazil the concern is focused mostly in the non compliance with prices 
fixed by the government, rather than with excessive prices being adopted by firms. 
The Brazilian government has a tradition of adopting policies of price control. It 
started in the 1950s, with the creation of the Federal Council for Supply and Prices - 
COFAP, which was an agency whose purpose was to establish the maximum prices 
that each industry or agriculture sector was allowed to charge for their products. There 
are several reasons for adopting this policy of price control, but usually its main 
purpose was to attempt to control inflation. 
COFAP was later substituted by the Interministerial Council of Prices - CIP. 
CIP would determine the prices and the economic sector should comply with it. 
Supervision would then be made through the National Superintendency of Supply - 
SLNAB, which was an agency linked to the Ministry of Treasury. Once SUNAB 
found out that a certain economic agent was charging prices above the established by 
CIP, SUNAB would apply a fine. During the 1990s, when price control was being 
gradually relaxed, the government dismissed CIP and created another agency, the 
Sectorial Chamber of Monitoring, which would have similar functions. Compliance 
wit te prices under control would be supervised by the Department of Supply and 
Prices, of the Ministry of Economy. 
However, though there was a proper structure to deal with control of prices - at 
the executive level, with the adoption of such policies by the federal government, as 
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well as at the administrative level, with specialised agencies to execute the policy and 
supervise the compliance - both government and the population in general sought 
other means to make sure that businessmen would follow the policy imposed by the 
government. One of these means was competition law. it was thought that, as 
competition law would regulate the relations of the economic agents in the market, 
this would obviously include the prices adopted by them, therefore competition law 
would act as a kind of control on the compliance with the prices fixed by the 
govem. ment. 
Accordingly, when Law 8884/94 was enacted, which occurred when a policy 
of price liberalisation was being adopted, the main criticism that the business 
community made was that the new law was a substitute for the price control policy 
that had recently been abandoned . 
356 CADE, it was believed, would be one of the 
competent agencies to deal with the situation. Both the goverm-nent and the 
population would try to use CADE to achieve its goal to keep business under 
surveillance in relation to prices. Whether CADE accepted this role is one of the 
issues we will discuss here. 
The competition laws enacted in Brazil never prohibited explicitly this 
increase of price above that established by the goverment. However, it was possible 
to find loopholes in the law that would allow the inclusion of the conduct among the 
prohibitions. Law 8158/91, in its article 3,1, considered a violation of the economic 
order the "imposition of prices of acquisition or reselling, discounts, conditions of 
payment, quantities and profits, as well as imposition of prices by artificial means". In 
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the cases submitted to CADE, it has been argued that these circumventions to price 
control would be "an imposition of prices by artificial means". 
During the time that Law 4137/62 was in force, no case involving price control 
was submitted to CADE. However, after the enactment of Law 8158/91, twelve cases 
of price control were examined by CADE. Four of them were dismissed, 357 while in 
the remaining eight cases a fine was applied. 358 We will examine here two cases, the 
Akzo case and the Medicine Shortage case. Both of them involved the pharmaceutical 
industry which was under price control, but different approaches were adopted. 
3. Two approaches to cases involving price control 
3.1 disregarding the effects of price control 
The Medicine Shortage case359 involved price control in pharmaceutical 
products. Merrell Lepetit was a company that produced some medicines that were of 
compulsory and continuous use in certain illnesses. These medicines - as well as all 
pharmaceutical products - were under price control by the government, and increases 
356 "Produzir Pode dar cadeia", in Folha de Sdo Paulo, 15.06.94, p. 1-3. See also the legislative debate 
in Bill 3712-C (later Law 8884/94), specially the speech of Mr. Marcelino Romano Machado, from the 
PPR, in Diario do Congresso, Nacional, Se0o 1,08.06.94, p. 899 1. 
357 PA 35/91 - Minist&io Pzibfico do Estado do Parana v. Outboard Marine Motores da Amaz6nia e 
outros, PA 73/92 - Departamento de Abasteci? nento e Preqos v. Dorsay Ind4stria Farmaceutica Ltda., 
PA 74/92 - Deparlamento de Abastecimento e Preqos v. Laborat6rios Wyeth Lida, and PA 76/92 - Departamento de A bastecimento e Preqos v. A kzo Ltda. 
'58 PA 12/91 - Presidenle da RepOlica v. Laboratorio AcM da Re I SA, PA 13/91 - Presidente ptib ica 
Prodome QuMica e FarmacOutica Lida, PA 15/91 - Presidente da Reptiblica v. Laborat6rios Silva 
. 4r"jo-Roussel S. A., PA 17/91 - Presidente da Reptiblica v. Laboralorios Pfizer Ltda, PA 18/91 Presidente da Reptiblica v. Laborat6rio Merrell Lepetit FarmacOutica Dda, PA 19/91 Presidente da 
Repalica v. Knoll S. A, Produtos Quimicos e Farmaceuticos, PA 20/91 Presidente da Repýblica v. 
Laborat6rio Glaxo do Brasil. 
IS9 PA 18/91 - Presidente da RepOlica v. Merrell Lepetit Farmaceutica Dda, distributed to 
Commissioner Josd Matias Pereira and decided on 22.07.92. 
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of prices had not been allowed for some time then. In the first half of 1991, the 
medicines produced by Merrell Lepetit could not be found in the market. It was 
argued that Merrell Lepetit decreased its output and caused a shortage of medicines in 
the market, in order to push for price liberalisation. This was the case submitted to 
CADE. 
CADE started its analysis of the case by first making some considerations 
about the market of medicines. It held that this market is a "peculiar" oligopoly, 
because medicines have specific characteristics, which allow the manufacturer to 
obtain market share through product differentiation. This means that competition is 
not usually made through price, as it happens in other markets, but through the 
characteristics of the products. Thus competitors try to attract the fidelity of the 
consumer to a specific medicine. Once this is achieved, the manufacturer has power 
over that market, and therefore is able to control it. CADE then concluded that the 
market of medicines is highly concentrated and presents a high level of profits. 
The second part of the analysis consisted in investigating whether the shortage 
of medicines really occurred. By comparing the production of the first half of 1991, 
when the medicines disappeared from the market, and the production of the first half 
of 1990, when supply was normal, CADE found out that there was a difference - that 
is, a decrease - in both production and sale of medicines. This decrease in output, 
according to CADE, was enough to prove that Merrell Lepetit intended to arbitrarily 
increase its profits - one of the effects required by the law to consider a conduct a 
violation of the economic order. 
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CADE reached this conclusion based on the assumption that it is not rational 
tn 
to adopt a strategy of reduction of production without a reasonable motive. 
Therefore, 
by decreasing its output, Merrell Lepetit was trying to influence the government to 
determine an increase of price, so that Merrell Lepetit would be able to obtain the 
profits it considered appropriate. This did happen, as in the second half of 1991 an 
increase in the price of medicines was allowed by the government. 
An aggravating factor was found by CADE, since the case had an ethical 
aspect. As a manufacturer of medicines, Merrefl Lepetit did not have the right to 
adopt a conduct. that resulted in the shortage of three irreplaceable medicines and 
therefore put in risk the health of the population. According to CADE, the case was 
even more serious if it was taken into account that the pharmaceutical industry was 
not compelled to produce medicines for disadvantageous prices, as it was possible to 
suspend production as long as the Ministry of Health was informed beforehand. 
CADE then concluded that a situation of shortage in the market of medicines 
of continuous and compulsory use was created in order to force the government to 
increase prices, which was later achieved. This conduct was an abuse of economic 
power and therefore a fine of around US$ 80,000.00 was imposed. 
The most important element of the analysis carried out by CADE in this case 
is that CADE simply ignored the effects of price control on competition. It examined 
the case as a "retention of production7, which is prohibited by art. 2,111, c, of Law 
4137/62. In fact, CADE was able to prove that such a retention did occur, by 
comparing the production in different periods. CADE could not find a reasonable 
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explanation for the decrease in production, therefore it concluded that the motive 
behind the practice was to increase profits in an arbitrary manner. 
The intention of the company (increase of profits) and the effect of the conduct 
(shortage of medicines) were thus established, and the practice was considered illegal. 
The case would be simple if the industry was not under control of prices by the 
government. This element, however, changes the perspective of the case. This will be 
discussed after the analysis of another case which occurred under price control. 
3.2 lack of competition in situations of price control 
The second case that involves price control is the Akzo case, 360 which also 
concerns the pharmaceutical industry. The facts in this case are quite simple. Akzo 
Ltda. changed the quantity of tablets in the packet of one of the medicines it 
produced. Instead of 30 tablets, the new packet contained 28. There were technical 
reasons for this alteration, which were approved by the competent agency of the 
Ministry of Health. The change in the quantity of tablets resulted in a change also in 
the price of the medicine. The Department of Supply and Prices, however, saw this 
modification of contents as a "make up" of products, that is, a way to circumvent the 
control of prices by changing the quantity of tablets and increase the price of the 
medicine, and complained of Akzo's conduct to SDE. 
The first aspect that CADE analysed in this case was the conduct itself, the 
establishment of prices by artificial means. According to CADE, this conduct is an 
160 PA 76/92 - DAP v. Akzo Ltda., distributed to Commissioner Neide Teresinha Malard and decided on 23.11.94. 
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attempt to revoke market rules as the natural way of price formation. The instrument 
used in this case was the make-up of product, that is, a slight modification in the 
product, which in this case was the reduction in the quantity of tablets in each packet. 
AvCcording to CADE, in the regime of freedom of prices, the make-up of products is 
part of the game between producer and consumer; in the regime of price controL on 
the other hand, it is a way to deceive the governmental agency. The company would 
promote small modifications in its product in order to obtain a new product, what 
would allow it to increase its price, thus being possible to recover the profits lost as a 
result of the control. 
In this case, however, CADE understood that the modification was technically 
justified and approved by the competent agency. The excessive increase of price, in 
its turn, could not be proved, because CADE understood that the criterion adopted by 
the Ministry of Treasury, which compared the price of the product before and after its 
commercialisation, was useless and artificial for the purposes of competition law, as it 
did not take into account the costs of production. 
The other aspect developed by CADE was the jurisdiction to deal with cases 
that involve price control. According to CADE, price control is contrary to the 
purposes of competition law, which needs prices reflecting costs of production and 
fluctuations resulting from the supply and demand rule. It is only logical that 
competition law is not applied to what occurs outside the competition enviromnent. 
CADE held that when policies of control of prices are adopted, the freedom given to 
the economic agent to act in the market is minimal. CADE's and SDE's jurisdiction 
applies only to this small share of freedom. This means that they do not have 
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jurisdiction to deal with the effects of the price control policy. The case was 
dismissed. 
In this case, CADE discussed the practice, establishment of prices by artificial 
means, using make-up of products, from two perspectives: a competitive market and a 
market under price control. The outcome would be different in each situation. In the 
first one, make-up of products could be accepted, while in the second it could be an 
attempt to circumvent price control. In the present case, CADE did not have to 
develop a detailed analysis of the concept, because it did not assert its jurisdiction. 
According to CADE, price control does not leave space for competition in the market, 
therefore competition law cannot be applied. Even if CADE had ascertained its 
jurisdiction, CADE would not have proceeded to an analysis of the concept, because 
it held that the modification made by Akzo was allowed by the Ministry of Health. 
It is not possible to completely agree with CADE's ruling in this case. CADE 
held that the practice discussed here, establishment of prices by artificial means, could 
not be proved because, by adopting price control measures, the government itself did 
not allow formation of prices in another manner than by artificial means. In a situation 
of price control, market rules did not apply. 
This reasoning may be correct, but it only applies to price formation. There are 
other aspects of competition that do occur even in situation of price control. For 
instance, tie-in sales may be adopted by companies in any situation, and it is not 
because the government controls the price that monopolists will not try to extend their 
power to other markets. The same applies to exclusivity agreements. Therefore, the 
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economic agents do have a share of freedom to act in the market, and this is where 
competition law applies. CADE was correct in not ascertaining its jurisdiction in this 
case only because it was related to price formation. The same reasoning could not 
have been applied to restrictive business practices that do not involve price formation. 
3.3 two approaches compared 
The analysis of the two cases shows an inconsistency in CADE's approach to 
cases involving price control. While in the Akzo case CADE held that, in situations of 
price control, competition does not exist, therefore CADE has no jurisdiction to deal 
with such cases, in the Medicine Shortage case CADE did not mention the question of 
jurisdiction and treated the case as a normal restrictive business practice. The 
discussion of the motives behind this discrepancy is necessary to help in the 
identification of ýCADE's approach to competition. 
It is undeniable that the market involved in the Medicine Shortage case was 
under price control. However, CADE did not discuss the question of its jurisdiction. 
On the contrary, it examined the case in the same way that it did in other cases where 
the issue of price control was not involved. It analysed the market in question and it 
investigated the intention of the party. This analysis made by CADE could prove the 
theory that nwket rules still apply under a situation of price control. However, though 
the theory is correct, it is not a conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of this 
case. 
Merrell Lepetit was under the same situation of Akzo, i. e., suffering the 
consequences of the control of prices. Merrell Lepetit believed that the price of its 
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medicines should increase, but the government did not allow such increase. The 
solution available to Merrell Lepetit was to withdraw these medicines from the market 
because, as there were no substitutes for thern, the goverment would be forced to 
negotiate a solution with Merrell Lepetit, which would result in the expected increase 
of prices. It is thus evident that the practice was an attempt to circumvent price 
control, in the same way that the practice in the Akzo case was. 
The explanation for CADE ascertaining its jurisdiction has to be found 
somewhere outside economic or legal reasoning. More exactly, only ethical and 
political reasons can explain the decision. The products that were kept from the 
market were medicines that could not be substituted for any other, and CADE 
understood that the pharmaceutical industry had a moral responsibility towards the 
population and should comply with it. Besides, it was not only Merrell Lepetit that 
was adopting this conduct, but most of the companies in the pharmaceutical industry, 
which means that there were not many medicines available in the market. 
Also, the press was following the case and pushing the government to find a 
solution for the shortage of medicine. And, finally, the complaint to SDE was made 
by the President of the Republic, which means that there was pressure from the 
goverment on CADE to reach a decision - and preferably a decision against the 
pharmaceutical industry, which would be a kind of retaliation imposed by the 
government on that industry, for not complying with the rules. Putting all these 
factors together, CADE had no option but to ascertain its jurisdiction and analyse the 
case. 
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However, CADE took advantage of the next case involving price control that 
it was submitted to it to establish that it would not assert jurisdiction in this situation. 
This was the Akzo case, which did not catch the attention of the media or the 
government and thus allowed CADE to demonstrate that it had nothing to do with the 
price control policy adopted by the government, and that the cases that involved price 
control were not under its jurisdiction. 
By doing this, CADE was trying to show that it did not consider itself as part 
of the framework created by the government to implement its policies, that it would 
not accept the role of a price control agency. This was to be left to the specialised 
agencies. CADE is an administrative agency that is autonomous from any other 
govenimental body, be it from the executive or the legislative power. Its members are 
checked by the Congress, but it is only in relation to the way they conduct their jobs. 
CADE's only function is to apply competition law with impartiality and neutrality, 
and the government's Policies are not of its concern. This view was confirmed in the 
Wyeth case, 361 where it was pointed out that social policies were not to be taken into 
consideration by CADE when deciding cases. 
4. Conclusion 
The analysis of the cases of price control allows us to draw some important 
conclusions. In the first place, it was shown that the government is prepared to use 
CADE for other purposes that not those related exclusively to competition, especially 
361 PA 74/92 - DAP v. Laborat6rios Wyeth Dda 
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in cases where the government's image is at stake. Moreover, it is not certain that 
CADE is able to resist these attacks. However, one has to bear in mind that these 
attempts to misuse CADE occurred in the beginning of this transitional period through 
which the country is passing, where the interventionist approach was still strong. It is 
possible that, by supporting a more liberal economy, the government will leave 
CADE to comply with its role of competition authority. 
This is especially true if we take into account that the present competition law 
was enacted as part of the trade liberalisation measures adopted by the government in 
1994. Thus, being inserted into an economic policy framework, it is more likely that 
competition law be effective. 
362 
In relation to CADE's analysis of price control cases, the contradiction found 
in those cases does not authorise a categorical assertion about its approach to the 
issue. The situation in the Medicine Shortage case was not normal, in the sense that 
CADE was being monitored by both the government and the media to reach a 
decision. The Akzo case, in its turn, demonstrated that CADE considers that policy of 
price control is against the market rules, thus impairing the maintenance of the 
competitive process. In the Wyeth case it was only mentioned that social goals were 
not to be taken into account in CADE's decision. 
It follows that CADE's analysis of the price control cases only corroborates 
the conclusion reached in the previous chapter, i. e., that until March of 1996 CADE 
had not yet adopted a coherent approach towards restrictive business practices. One 
362 As proposed by one of the hypothesis on which this thesis is based - see Introduction, section 3. 
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can speculate that during this period CADE would be willing to favour a conipetitive 
approach, especially if we take into account CADE's rejection to an efficiency 
approach in the Valer case (the exclusivity agreement case), and to a social approach 
in the Wyeth case. 
Despite the fact that this assertion is based only on speculation, it has to be 
argued that such an approach would be welcome. Being inserted in the context of a 
developing country, with a market economy that is still in its infancy, it is not possible 
for CADE to adopt a more severe approach to competition, such as that defended in 
the efficiency approach, because it relies mostly on the market's ability to solve its 
own problems, which may prove ineffective in the case of Brazil. Though efficiency 
is a significant goal to be pursued, it must not be the only one. To seek a competitive 
market is a more rational goal for a country which is only starting to learn the rules of 
the market. 
It has to be stressed that this lack of coherence in CADE's approach to 
restrictive business practices does not mean that CADE has not achieved good results 
in the implementation of the law. In the first place, one has to take into account the 
fact that the law does not provide a clear guidance to its application. Secondly, the 
effective enforcement of competition law has started only in the beginning of this 
decade. Finally, it is not possible to forget that the government has not been allowing 
CADE to find its own path, due to unjustified interference as well as to a lack of 
coherence in its policies. 
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It follows that CADE has been alone in its attempt to enforce the law. It has 
then been necessary to seek guidance in other legislations, in order to learn the 
rudiments of competition analysis. By examining the decisions of the American courts 
and the European Court of Justice in relation to competition cases, CADE has been 
able to develop an analytical framework that takes into account the major elements 
found in antitrust analysis. In this way, the examination of the cases in these two last 
chapters shows that CADE favours a rule of reason approac W63 to the analysis of the 
restrictive practices, by weighing the pro- and anticompetitive effects of these 
practices. 364 Accordingly, CADE has been basing its analysis on the intention of the 
company that adopted the practice, and the effects that such practice caused in 
competition. 365 Moreover, CADE has been giving much emphasis to the question of 
market power and its relevance to the legality of the practice, 366 which is an important 
element of antitrust analysis. 
However, it is not possible to forget that the cases decided in other 
jurisdictions have to be used only as lessons on the mechanisms of competition, which 
are to be adapted to the Brazilian reality. 
363 The rule of reason approach to restrictive practices was first developed in the US in relation to cases 
involving section I of the Sherman Actý which prohibits any contract that results in restraint of trade. 
As in its essence every contract is a restraint of trade regarding the parties involved, the American 
courts were left with the task of determining in each case whether the contract was a restraint of trade 
or not. In order to do so, the courts had to weigh the pro- and anticompetitive effects of each contract, 
and the balance would determine the legality of the contract. This is the rule of reason approach. See 
Gel Ihom, E. and Kovacic, W., Antitrust lawand economics, 4th ed., West Publishing, St. Paul, 1994, p. 165 et seq.; Whish, supra n. 355, p. 19/20, and Neale, A. D., The antitrust laws of the USA, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, p. 23 et seq. 364 See, for instance, the Paler case. 
See the Paler case, the Coldex case, and the Sergipe Hospitals case. 
See the Xerox case and the Paler case. 
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CHAPTER 6- CONTROL OF ECONOMIC 
CONCENTRATIONS: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
1. Introduction 
Competition law does not have a remedial character only, in the sense that its 
purpose is not only to prevent those types of conduct that constitute an abuse of 
economic power. Competition law has also a prophylactic nature, as it tries to prevent 
the acquisition of economic power that may harm the market and the economic 
relations resulting from it. The remedial characteristic was examined in the last two 
chapters; the prophylactic nature will be discussed in this and the next chapter. 
Before the enactment of Law 8884/94, cases of control of economic 
concentration were under the jurisdiction of SDE. 367 However, as the law was not 
very clear in that matter, and as SDE was not well structured to deal with those cases, 
not many cases concerning economic concentration can be found. From 1990 to 1994, 
17 cases on this matter were submitted to SDE (Table 4). Not one of them was 
disaUowed, though two cases were suspended because the parties did not present the 
documents they were required to. Three cases were approved because SDE failed to 
367 Article 13, Law 815 8/9 1. See supra, Chapter 3, section 4. 
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reach a decision within the deadline provided by the law. The remaining 12 cases 
were approved after a proper amlysiS. 
368 
Table 4- MERGERS CASES BEFORE LAW 8884/94 (1990/1994) 
ýrgers approved 
After analysis 
Due to SDE's 
deadline 
Cases suspended due to lack of interest of the 02 
merging companies 
Total 17 
Source: author's research at SDE 
With the enactment of Law 8884/94, the jurisdiction and the procedure related 
to the control of acts of economic concentration became clearer and CADE was given 
the power to enforce the legal provision. By transferring from SDE to CADE the 
jurisdiction to deal with acts of economic concentration, Law 8884/94 was applied 
immediately to merger cases. This means that, contrary to what happened in the cases 
of restrictive practices, CADE did not have to analyse the mergers that were 
submitted to SDE under the previous law. 
"' However, one of these cases is the Gillette case, which was discussed in chapter 3, section 4, and is 
an example of procedural misunderstandings and administrative inefficiency. 
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12 
lack of compliance with 03 
369 
approved because a decision was not reached before the deadline . Four mergers 
were disallowed, 370 though one of them was submitted again later with new facts and 
efficiencies, which allowed CADE to approve it . 
371 Of the four cases that were 
rejected, the mergers in two of them had already been formalised, and CADE 
determined they should be unscrambled. The remaining 19 cases were approved by 
CADE after an analysis of the merger. The approval of 12 mergers, however, was 
subject to a performance commitment. (Table 5) 
Table 5- MERGERS CASES AFTER LAW 8884/94 (1994/1996) 
es submitted -WAN, Number of cas 'Alf Number of cases decided 25 
Mergers not approved 04 
Mergers approved 21 
Due to CADE's lack of compliance with 02 
deadline 
After analysis 19 
Total 25 
Source: author's research at CADE 
The purpose of this chapter and the next chapter is to assess the treatment 
given by CADE to merger control. This assessment will de done through the analysis 
an example of procedural misunderstandings and administrative inefficiency. 
369 AC 46/95 - Yolat Ind. e Com. de Laticinios Ltda. e SPAM S. A. - Sociedade Produtora de Alimentos 
Manhuaqu and AC 48/95 - SKF e Dormer Tools S. A.. 3'0 AC 01/94 - Rockwell do Brasil e Albarus S. A. Ind. e Com., AC 06/94 - Brasilit S. A. e Eternit S. A., 
AC 12/94 - Rhodia S. A. e SINASA S. A. Adm., Participaq6es e Com6rcio and AC 16/94 - Sider6rgica Laisa. S. A. e Grupo Korf GmbH. 
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of nine cases decided between June of 1994 and March of 1996,372 and will allow to 
establish whether CADE has already found a coherent approach to merger control or 
whether it is still acting in a case by case basis. 
This chapter will deal with the legislation as well as with the analytical 
framework of merger control. Thus, section 2 will provide an overview of what the 
law establishes in relation to mergers, while section 3 will explain how CADE 
develops the analysis of a merger case. It will follow in section 4 an analysis of the 
two main approaches to merger control and how CADE has been applying these 
apProaches. Section 5 will discuss the criteria that CADE takes into account when 
analysing a merger case, which include market definition, market share and 
concentration, barriers to entry and the historical behaviour of the merging 
companies. 
The conclusion will summarise the main points developed in this chapter, 
which will then be taken again in the next chapter, in order to contribute to the 
definition of CADE's treatment to acts of economic concentration. As pointed out in 
the Introduction and Chapter 4, reference cannot be made to other studies and 
commentaries on the merger cases, since systematic analysis of the cases decided by 
CADE has never been developed. 
371 AC 0 1/94, supra. n. 3 70, which was not approved, was submitted again one year latter and received 
the nw-nber AC 26/95. 
372 It was in June of 1994 that Law 8884/94, which gave CADE the jurisdiction to analyse acts of 
economic concentration, was enacted. 
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2. Overview of the legal provisions 
2.1 Main aspects of Article 54 
According to Article 54 of Law 8884/94, the acts that may limit or restrain 
competition, or result in control of the relevant market, must be submitted to CADE in 
order to be approved . 
37' These acts comprise any kind of act adopted by enterprises 
373 Article 54. - Any acts that may limit or otherwise restrain open competition, or that result in the 
control of relevant markets for certain products or services, shall be submitted to CADE for review. 
Paragraph 1. - CADE may authorise any acts referred to in the main section of this article, provided 
that they meet the following requirements: 
1. - they shall be cumulatively or alternatively intended to: 
(a) increase productivity; 
(b) improve the quality of a product or service; or 
(c) cause an increased efficiency, as well as foster the technological or economic development; 
11. - the resulting benefits shall be equally distributed between their participants, on the one part, and 
consumers or end-users, on the other; 
111. - they shall not drive competition out of a substantial portion of the relevant market for a product or 
service; and IV. - only the acts strictly required to attain an envisaged objective shall be performed for 
that purpose. 
Paragraph 2. - Any action under this article may be considered lawful if at least three of the 
requirements listed in the above items are met, whenever any such action is taken in the public interest 
or otherwise required to the benefit of the Brazilian economy, provided no damages are caused end- 
consumers or -users. 
Paragraph 3. - The acts dealt with in the main section of this article also include any action intended for 
any form of economic concentration, whether through merger with or into other companies, 
organisation of companies to control third companies or any other form of corporate grouping, when 
the resulting company or group of companies accounts for twenty percent (20%) of a relevant market, 
or in which any of the participants has posted in its latest balance sheets an annual gross revenue 
equivalent to R$ 400,000,000 (four hundred million of Reais). 
Paragraph 4. - The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE--duly 
accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation--in advance or no later than 
fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly forward one such 
counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE. 
Paragraph 5. - Non-compliance with the deadlines set forth in the preceding paragraph will be 
punishable with a fine in an amount between 60,000 (sixty thousand) UFIR and 6,000,000 (six million) 
UFIR, imposed by CADE without prejudice to the opening of an administrative proceeding pursuant to 
article 32 hereof. 
Paragraph 6. - Upon receipt of the SEAE technical report issued within thirty days, SDE shall 
pronounce thereon within this same period and then send the case and evidentiary documents on to the 
CADE Board, which shall resolve thereon within sixty days. 
Paragraph 7. - The effectiveness of any acts dealt with in this article will be conditioned to approval 
thereof, which approval shall be retroactive to the date of occurrence of such acts; if not looked into by 
CADE within the sixty-day period established in the preceding paragraph, the acts referred to above 
will be deemed automatically approved. 
Paragraph 8. - The terms set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 hereof will be stayed while the clarifications 
and documents considered essential for review of the case by CADE, SDE or SEAE are not submitted 
as requested. 
Paragraph 9. - In the event the acts specified in this article are subject to suspensive conditions or have 
already caused fiscal or other effects to third parties, the CADE Board--if it elects to deny approval 
thereof--shall determine that all applicable action be taken to totally or partially revert--by way of dissolution, spin-off or sale of assets, partial cessation of activities, among others--any action or 
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that may result in an increase in the economic concentration of the relevant market. In 
this way, the law considers as "acts of economic concentration" mergers, 
organisations of companies to control third companies, or any other form of corporate 
grouping. CADE's jurisdiction over these acts are limited to the acts that res s in a 
market share of 20% or more of the relevant market, or when one of the companies 
has a gross turnover of around US$ 400 million. 
374 
A positive aspect of this definition is that it is broad, thus aRowing the 
inclusion of any kind of act or contract engaged by enterprises. By not specifying 
each act that is likely to result in economic concentration, the law facilitates its own 
enforcement by the administrative agencies, which are thus not compelled to stick to 
those established acts. This same approach was adopted by the Mexican Economic 
Competition Law which, in its article 16, defines a concentration as "a merger with or 
acquisition of control over another firm, or any other act joining together companies, 
associations, stockholders, business Partnership, trust companies or assets in general, 
which is carried out between competitors, suppliers, customers, or any other economic 
agents whose purpose or effect is to diminish, harm or impede competition with 
respect to identical or substantially similar goods and services". 
This broadness in the definition of concentration is not a characteristic of only 
the Mexican and Brazilian laws. In fact, the legislation of these countries were 
procedure damaging to the economic order, notwithstanding any civil liability for losses and damages 
caused third parties. 
Paragraph 10. - Without prejudice to the obligations of the parties involved, any change in the stock 
control of publicly-held companies or registration of amalgamations shall be reported to SDE by the 
Securities Commission - CVM and by the Brazilian Commercial Registry Department of the Ministry 
of Industry, Trade and Tourism - DNRC/MlCT, respectively, within five business days for the SDE 
review, if applicable. 
3" Article 54, paragraph 3. See below, subsection 2.2 
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inspired by foreign laws that had already been dealing with concentration issues for a 
much longer time. If we take the American law, for instance, we will find out that 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which is entitled "acquisition by one corporation of 
stock of another", prohibits any person engaged in connnerce of acquiring assets, 
stocks or other share capital from another person also engaged in commerce, when it 
results in monopoly or in a reduction of competition. 
The law does not establish the forms such acquisitions should take, which 
means that any kind of acquisition is under the jurisdiction of the law. This was the 
reason why the Clayton Act was enacted - to cover a greater range of mergers and 
reach horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers, which did not happen under the 
Sherman Act. The definition of concentration adopted in the EEC Merger 
D- 375 
Regulation is not so liberal in expression, but nevertheless it allows for the 
inclusion of mergers or any kind of acquisition of control. 376 
On the other hand, the Mexican law conditions the existence of concentration 
to the purpose behind the concentration or the negative effects it is likely to cause in 
the market, that is, "to diminish, harm or impede competition". The Brazilian law 
does not explicitly require these effects. It does, however, establish requirements for 
an act of economic concentration to be approved. 377 These requirements are related to 
the beneficial consequences of the concentration. In this way, the merger has to result 
375 Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89. 
376 Article 3(l) A concentration shall be deemed to arise where: 
(a) two or more previously independent undertakings merge, or 
(b) - one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or 
- one or more undertakings 
acquire, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings. 377 Article 54, paragraph 1. 
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in an increased efficiency, expansion of productivity, or improvement in the quahty of 
goods or services, as well as in fostering of technological or economic development. 
Also, the benefits resulting from the merger have to be equally distributed between 
the participants of the mergers and the consumers. 
Another requirement is that the merger cannot eliminate competition in a 
substantial part of a relevant market. Finally, only the acts strictly required to attain an 
envisaged objective shall be performed for that purpose (Figure 5). On the other hand, 
if the merger is in the public interest or required to the benefit of the Brazilian 
economy, then at least three of the requirements listed above must be Met. 
378 
Law 8884/94 establishes that the application for approval of the act of 
economic concentration and all the documents related to it have to be filed before 
SDE by the merging companies before it is formalised or at most 15 days after its 
formalisation . 
379Failure to apply may result in fines between UFIR 60,000 and UFIR 
6,000,000.380 SDE will then send one copy of the application to SEAE and another for 
CADE. SEAE has 30 days to write its technical opinion, after which SDE has another 
30 days to prepare its own opinion. This documentation will then be sent to CADE, 
which has 60 days to reach a decision about the merger. 381 If CADE does not reach a 
decision in that period, the merger will be automatically approved. 
378Article 54, paragraph 2. 
37Q Article 54, paragraph 4. 
"'0 Article 54, paragraph 5. 
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Figure 5- ARTICLE 54(l): REQUIREMENTS FOR MERGERS 
Requirements for the 
approval of mergers 
Goals of the merger 
Benefits have to be equally 
(at least one of these): 
distributed between merging 
firms and consumers 
The merger cannot eliminate 
competition in a substantial 
part of a relevant market 
nly the acts strictly required 
to attain an envisaged 
object shall be performed 
for that purpose 
1. Expansion of productivity 
2. Improvement in the quality 
of goods and servioes 
3. Fostering of technological 
or economic development 
In order to bring more certainty for the economic agents in relation to the 
analysis of acts of economic concentration, in August of 1996 CADE issued 
D- 
Resolution n. 5, which, among other issues, details the procedure to be followed 
regarding mergers and acquisitions. Among other procedural aspects, it provides also 
for hearings during the proceedings in order to facilitate the comprehension of the 
ternis of the transaction. 382 During these hearings, which may be requested by SDE 
and SEAE in the initial phase of the case or by CADE at any time, it will be possible 
381 See Chapter 3, section 4, figure 3, for a more detailed explanation of the procedure related to acts of 
economic concentration. 
3" Resolution n. 5, Article 17 - The Reporting Council member may, at the request of SDE or SEAE, 
attend at the initial evidentiary hearings held by such offices, whenever it may be deemed proper for a 
more comprehensive understanding of the intended transaction. 
Article 20 - The Reporting Council member may call a hearing, at any time, for the attendance of the 
applicants: the SDE and SEAE representatives shall also be invited to take part thereat. 
Sole Paragraph - The hearing may also be attended by the Attorney-General of CADE and by the 
Chairman of the quasi governmental agency, or an assistant appointed thereby 
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for the merging parties to discuss and negotiate with the administrative agencies the 
terms involved in the merger. 
Though it is not provided for in the law, the merging companies can bargain 
with CADE and change the conditions of the merger in order to have it approved. It is 
also possible to submit again a merger to CADE after it has been disallowed, as long 
as new facts have occurred and more efficiencies arise from the merger. 383 
Finally, Article 54, paragraph 9 gives CADE the power to break up a merger if 
it understands necessary. As seen in section 1, during the period of this research only 
two mergers had to be unscrambled. 
384 In the Rho&a case, 
385 CADE did not approve 
the merger and thus determined the discontinuation of the acts that had already 
occurred, which were related to the incorporation by Rhodia of the activities in the 
production of polyester and acrylic synthetic fibres. 
The companies then submitted to CADE a proposal for the discontinuation 
required in the decision. The two enterprises would create a new company, to which 
they would transfer assets for the production of polyester and acrylic fibres. This new 
company would have an independent administration until it was sold to a third party 
not related to the merging companies. The following steps would be taken: 
383 This happened in AC 01/94, Rockwell do Brasil e Albarus S. A. Ind. e Com., which one year later, 
when it was submitted again, received the number AC 26/95. 
38' AC 12/94 - Rhodia S. A e Sinasa S. A Adm., Participaom e Comdrcio; and AC 16/94 - Sider(irgica Laisa S. A e Grupo Korf GmbH. 
395 AC 12/94. See Chapter 7, subsection 3.1. 
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a) a new company in the industrialisation and commercialisation of acrylic and 
polyester fibre would be created in two months, with its capital divided between 
Rhodia (82%) and S inasa and others (18%); 
b) after four months of its creation, this new company would be put on sale; 
c) the procedure to be adopted in the sale would be similar to that of a public bidding; 
d) the two companies would transfer to the new company plants with a production 
capacity equal or superior to the effective production intended for the national market 
of one of the competitors before the transaction, so that competition is restablished 
between two companies. 
CADE accepted the proposal and the companies created the new company - 
Poliflatex - Fibras Texteis Ltda., which was later divided in two m order to be sold to 
two different companies. 
2.2 The question of thresholds 
As mentioned above, CADE has jurisdiction over mergers when the market 
" 11, share resulting from it is at least 20% of the relevant market, or when one of the 
companies has a gross turnover of around US$ 400 million. The companies involved 
in such mergers are thus compeUed to inform CADE about the transaction, so that the 
merger can be analysed and, if in accordance to the law, approved. By establishing 
these two conditions for notification, the law ensured that aU the three kinds of merger 
- horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers - are to be submitted to CADE. The 
threshold related to market share involves especially horizontal mergers, while the 
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gross turnover test includes vertical and conglomerate mergers as well. 386 Moreover, 
by fixing a threshold, the law defines the limits of its jurisdictioný which allows 
businessmen and lawyers to make a safer assessment of the possibility of a merger 
being challenged. 
Establishing thresholds for qualifying mergers for investigation is a common 
practice in competition law. What usually differ in the law of each country, however, 
are the test adopted and the quantitative limits imposed. It is this limit that establishes 
how stringent the law is. For instance, if we take the market share test into account, 387 
we will see that, the lower the established market share, the more severe is the law, in 
the sense that more mergers shall be investigated. 
The EEC Merger Regulation adopts an aggregate turnover test, where the 
world-wide turnover of the companies involved must be more than ECU 2500 
million, the turnover in each of at least three Member States must be more than ECU 
100 million (where each of at least two of the companies must have a turnover of 
more than ECU 25 million), and the Community-wide turnover of each of at least two 
of the companies must be ECU 100 MIllion. 388 This test is purely quantitative, as it 
does not take into account the market power of the companies involved. 
Just as in the USA, it is the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 
that establishes the threshold for pre-merger notification. The HSR Act adopts a 
'8614owever, as it will be seen in Chapter 7, section 3, CADE puts much more emphasis on the analysis 
of horizontal mergers, as opposed to vertical and conglomerate mergers. 
387 For a discussion on market share, see below, subsection 5.2. 
38' Article 1(3) of the Merger Regulation, as amended by Council Regulation n. 1310/97. ECU 2500 
million is equivalent to approximately US$ 2.75 billion; ECU 100 million, to US$ 110.2 million; and 
ECU 25 million, to US$ 27.55 million. 
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sale/assets test as weH as a price test. In this way, a pre-merger notification is required 
when: a) one of the parties to the transaction has annual net sales (or revenues) or total 
assets of more than US$ 100 miflion and the other party has annual net sales (or 
revenues) or total assets of more than US$ 10 million; and b) the acquisition price or 
value of the acquired assets or entity is more than US$ 15 million. This is also a 
quantitative test, as it involves the size and value of the companies, but not their 
market power. 
The adoption of thresholds and the definition of the quantitative limits by the 
law depend on the characteristics of the market of the country in question, as well as 
on what the law intends to achieve with merger control. It follows that competition 
law and policy cannot blindly adopt the quantitative limits of other legislations, 
otherwise the law could result ineffective. 
In relation to the Brazilian law, it has been argued that the figure of US$ 400 
million for the gross turnover test was established at random, and that it should have 
been left for CADE to establish a threshold in a case-by-case basis . 
389However, it is 
not possible to agree with this argument, since it would annul exactly the main reason 
for having thresholds, that is, to establish a limit for mergers to be investigated. If 
thresholds were abolished, the amount of work submitted to CADE would be 
immense and moreover unavailing, because the majority of the mergers does not 
cause any effect whatsoever in competition. The non existence of a threshold would 
result in the inefficient use of an administrative agency. 
38'9 in Fonseca, J. B. L., Lei de Proteýdo da Concorrencia, Forense, Rio de Janeiro, 1995, p. 150. 
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3. Structure of the analysis 
In order to better understand how the opinion of the Commissioner is 
structured and developed, it would be helpful to refer to an actual case already 
decided by CADE, the Ajinomoto case . 
390 The analysis started with a report of the 
case, where the merger as well as the procedural development of the case were 
described. Also, the Commissioner outlined the main points of the opinions prepared 
by SEAE, SDE and CADEs attorney. It also referred to a "preliminary analysis" 
prepared by the Commissioner before the final opinion. This preliminary analysis was 
sent to the merging companies with the request to clarify some points that the 
Commissioner understood that were not satisfactory. 
After the report, the opinion proceeded to the analysis of the case. The first 
issue to be taken into account was the relevant market, which was then defined and 
analysed, taking into account the companies that act in that market, their market share, 
ka 
behaviour, prices, demand for the product, supply, and exports. An analysis of 
barriers to entry of new competitors thus followed. It included not only the existence 
of such barriers but also the effect they had caused in the market, so that it would be 
possible to conclude whether they would prevent the entry of new competitors after 
the merger had occurred. 
The next issue to be discussed were the efficiencies involved in the merger. In 
the Ajinomoto case the merging companies argued that a series of efficiencies would 
be achieved with the merger, so the Commissioner proceeded to analyse each of these 
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efficiencies, taking into consideration the requirements established by article 54 of 
Law 8884/94 '39 
1 as well as the likelihood of occurrence of such efficiencies. The 
Commissioner then assessed the reply given by the merging firms to the preliminary 
analysis, where they clarified the points arisen by the Commissioner. 
Based on the analysis of the issues discussed, the opinion of the Commissioner 
reached a conclusion about the merger, which in the present case was approved, as 
long as the new company complied with a "performance commitment", according to 
which the company should guarantee the supply of the domestic market as well as 
transfer the productivity gains to consumers. 
4. The approach to merger control adopted by CADE 
The main purpose of merger control in general is to prevent the concentration 
resulting from the merger from affecting the market in a negative manner. As it is 
inherent to mergers the elimination of competition between the merging enterprises, 
the role of merger control is to assess the possible benefits resulting from the merger. 
`90 AC 19/94, required by Oriento Indfistria e Comdrcio S. A. on 05.10.94, distributed to Commissioner 
Carlos Eduardo Vieira de Carvalho, and decided on 13.11.95. For a detailed analysis of the case, see 
below, subsection 5.3. 
39 1 Article 54. - Any acts that may limit or otherwise restrain open competition, or that result in the 
control of relevant markets for certain products or services, shall be submitted to CADE for review. 
Paragraph 1. - CADE may authorise any acts referred to in the main section of this article, provided 
that they meet the following requirements: 
I. - they shall be cumulatively or alternatively intended to: 
(a) increase productivity; 
(b) improve the quality of a product or service; or 
(c) cause an increased efficiency, as well as foster the technological or economic development; 
IL - the resulting benefits shall be equally distributed between their participants, on the one part, and 
consumers or end-users, on the other; 
Ill. - they shall not drive competition out of a substantial portion of the relevant market for a product or 
service; and 
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If they overcome the elimination of competition, the merger may be approved, or 
conditions related to these benefits may be imposed. Merger control has thus a 
prop ý actic nature. 
It is the emphasis given to the different types of benefits that will determine 
the approach adopted by the competition authorities in relation to merger control. If 
they understand that benefits such as increase in employment or protection of small 
companies are more important, then they will be favouring a social approach to 
competition. If more weight is given to economic efficiencies, then the competition 
authorities will be adopting an efficiency approach. Finally, if competition authorities 
are concerned with mergers that lessen competition in the market, they will adopt a 
competitive approach. 
The best illustration of this discussion can-be found in the USA. Until the 
1960s, the Supreme Court adopted a more social approach to merger control. For 
instance, in US v. Von's Grocery Co . '392 the Supreme Court understood that the goal 
of antimerger law was to ensure that the market be composed of small companies. 
This approach was confirmed by other cases, such as US v. Pabst Brewing Co. j 
393 
where the allowed market share resulting from the merger was so low that only 
insignificant mergers were to be approved, thus favouring the existence of small 
companies in the market. 
However, there was a change in the composition of the Supreme Court in the 
1970s, which resulted in a change of approach as well. The existence of a market 
IV. - only the acts strictly required to attain an envisaged objective shall be performed for that purpose. 
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composed of small companies was not supported anymore, as the Supreme Court 
started to take into account qualitative factors and develop more elaborated economic 
analysis, thus favouring mergers that result in economic efficiencies. The first case to 
develop this new approach was US v. General Dynamics CO ., 
394 
where the Supreme 
Court ignored the market share of the companies (which by itself would be enough to 
consider the merger illegal under the previous approach) and took into account other 
factors related to the merger, such as the situation of the industry in the national 
economy, and the effects of the merger in the industry. 
Bringing this discussion to the Brazilian context, one question has to be asked: 
what is the approach adopted by CADE in relation to merger control? The answer to 
this question is not easy to find. The law itself is not clear. The requirements it 
establishes for the legality of mergers do not provide any solution to this problem, as 
they include both economic efficiency and consumer welfare to be taken into account 
in the analysiS. 395 In addition, unlike the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission in the USA, CADE has never issued any kind of guidelines related to its 
treatment of mergers. The legislative debates in the Congress do not bring any light to 
the question either, as the Congressmen themselves had different opinions about the 
purpose of competition law in generaL396 and none whatsoever about merger control. 
The only instrument to which we can turn in order to answer that question is 
the merger cases decided by CADE. It is necessary to point out that CADE has been 
deciding these cases for only three years, which means that the jurisprudence is not 
392 384 US 270,86 S. Ct. 1478,16 L. Ect 2d. 555 (1966). 
3Q3 384 US 546,86 S. Ct. 1665,16 L. EcL 2d. 765 (1966). 
3% 415 US 486,94 S. Ct. 1186,39 L. Ed. 2cL 530 (1974). 
3" See article 54, paragraph 1. 
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yet firm and is likely to change in the future. Nevertheless, the case law does 
constitute the best source of analysis available, as it indicates how CADE has been 
developing its approach to merger control in practice. 
4.1 Social approach 
A social approach to merger control means that mergers that bring benefits to 
consumers, increase employment, protect small firms, among other issues, are likely 
to be approved by the controlling agency. It has been argued that in Brazil importance 
is given to benefits brought to the consumers by the merger. 397 This approach can be 
found in the analysis of the Brasilit case. 398 In this case, Eternit S. A. and Brasilit S. A. 
wanted to create a new company through the merger of their two subsidiaries located 
in the states of Rio Grande do Sul (Brasilit's) and Parana (Eternit's). The two plants 
would continue to manufacture fibrocement products, maintain their own commercial 
policy and preserve their trademarks and the characteristics of their products. 
However, the new company would be given the trademarks Eternit and Brasilit and 
the know-how of the companies, and would produce for the markets of the states of 
f Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Parana. 
The reason given to justify the merger was that it would result in efficiencies 
and therefore in lower prices for consumers. CADE however did not approve the 
merger, because it understood that it would not bring benefits to consumers - only the 
two companies would gain from it. Based on the historical behaviour of the 
196For a discussion on the legislative debates, see above, Chapter 2, subsection 2.3.1. 
397 Malard, N., "The political background to the adoption of an effective competition law - the Brazilian experience" - paper given at the Competition Policy 1994 OECD Workshop with Dynamic 
Non-Member Economies, Paris. 
211 
companies, which showed that the prices of the main products of the companies had 
1-- 
been rapidly increasing in the previous four years, CADE concluded that it was hardly 
likely that prices would decrease after the merger. Another fact that allowed this 
conclusion was that the companies presented high spare capacity and incurred high 
costs. 
AX. c. cordingly, CADE found out that, though the market of fibrocement 
products was dominated by the two merging companies, it was quite competitive, due 
to the presence of small and medium enterprises in that market, which offered better 
condition of payment, lower prices, transport and discounts to consumer. By allowing 
the merger, the company would achieve such a dominant position that it would be 
likely to affect this competitive environment. CADE then opted for protecting the 
small companies of the market, as their existence benefited consumers, situation 
which would not be the case after the creation of the new company. 
This case shows that CADE takes into consideration consumer protection and 
small enterprises when analysing mergers. However, it does not prove that this is 
CADE's major concern, as the case did not present the possibility of choosing 
between two different approaches. It was not a question of deciding if it was better to 
protect consumers and small enterprises or to support the economic efficiencies 
resulting from the merger, because the merger brought about no efficiencies at all. 
AC 06/94, required by Brasilit S. A. and Eternit S. A. on 04.08.94, distributed to Commissioner 
Neide Teresinha Malard, and decided on 25.11.94. 
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4.2 Efficiency approach 
If a socially oriented analysis of mergers does not seem to find much support 
in CADE, we will have to examine what is the position in relation to an efficiency 
approach to merger control, where economic criteria are developed in order to assess 
a merger. 
An example of how CADE applies this approach can be found in the BeIgo 
Mineira case. 399 It involved the acquisition of 49% of the stock shares of Dedini 
Siderurgica, a company that operated in the sector of lamination of iron and steel, 
producing mainly heavy iron bars, by Belgo Mineira, a metallurgical company that 
operates in all the phases of the production process. 
The relevant market was highly concentrated, with only three companies 
sharing 70% of the market: Gerdau with 41.1%, Belgo Mineira with 18.8%, and 
Mendes Jr. with 13.4%. Dedini had a share of 5%, which means that after the 
transaction Belgo Mineira would have 23% of the market. However, there was a 
chance of concentration increasing even more, because Mendes Jr., one of the top 
three companies on the market, was facing a series of problems and therefore entered 
into a one-year contract of leasing with Belgo Mineira. This contract included an 
option to buy after the contract temiinated. If Belgo Mineira decided to buy Mendes 
Jr., there would be a situation of duopoly in the market of regular long steel, where 
Gerdau would have 41 % and Belgo Mineira 3 7.2%. 
3" AC 14/94, required by Cia. Siderurgica Belgo Mineira and Dedini S. A. Siderfirgica in September of 
1994, distributed to Commissioner Marcelo Monteiro Soares, and decided on 16.02.96. 
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Notwithstanding this concentration, CADE decided to approve the merger, 
because the trarisaction aimed at an increase in the competitive level of the two 
companies by the complementation in their fine of products, which would improve 
their performance and increase the supply of the market. Another reason for the 
approval of the merger was that the efficiencies resulting from the merger outweighed 
the anticompetitive effects of the transaction. These efficiencies included increase of 
production and the consequent increase of supply to the domestic market, reduction of 
costs, rationalisation of distribution, increase in the quality of goods and services, and 
investments in technology. 
In order to reach this conclusion, CADE defined the relevant market, 
established the level of concentration in that market, examined the companies acting 
in the market, analysed the metallurgical industry in general and the Brazilian 
metallurgical sector in particular, assessed the existence of barriers to entry the 
market, and analysed the efficiencies involved in the merger. 
CADE's reasoning in this case favoured the creation of a competitive 
company even if it meant the existence of a highly concentrated market. This 
reasoning was reached through a complete economic analysis of the case, which 
involved not only quantitative criteria such as market share but also qualitative factors 
like the performance of the companies and their post-merger behaviour. 
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Analysis of other cases shows that CADE does favour the efficiency 
approach, 400 but at the same time it does not disregard completely the social criteria. 
Accordingly, none of the cases developed a competitive approach. Above all, it is 
important to notice that, in these first three years, CADE was not faced with choosing 
I- - between the social and the efficiency approach. Most of the time CADE has been able 
to find a compromise between the two approaches, by taking into consideration the 
economic factors but also putting some weight on the social effects of the merger. It 
follows that CADE has not yet decided which path it has to follow in merger control. 
More weight is given to economic issues, but it is not possible to affirm with certainty 
that this trend will be developed in the future. It is obvious that, at such an early stage, 
CADE should not be expected to have defined its approach to merger control. 
5. Criteria for evaluation of mergers 
5.1 Market definition 
Law 8884/94 establishes in its article 54 that "any act that may limit or 
otherwise restrain free competition, or that result in the control of the relevant market 
for certain products and services, shall be submitted to CADE for review". It follows 
that, in every case of merger to be analysed by CADE, the relevant market has to be 
defined. The necessity of this definition lies in the fact that it is the relevant market 
that will be the basis for all the analysis of the merger. 
'00 See, for instance, the Melitta case (below, subsection 5.1, and chapter 7, subsection 2.1), the 
-ijinomoto case (below, subsection 5.3, and chapter 7, subsection 2.4), and the Hoebras case (below, 
subsection 5.1, and chapter 7, subsection 2.3). 
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As properly stated in a report about market defmition required by the UK 
Office of Fair Trading, market definition "sets the scene for the analysis of 
competition, and tells the competition authority where it must focus its main 
attention". 401 As Posner pointed out, "... given enough flexibility in market definition a 
surprising number of innocuous mergers can be made to appear dangerously 
402 
monopolistic" . The outcome of the case will thus vary according to what 
constitutes the relevant market. For instance, the bigger the relevant market, the 
greater the number of companies acting on it, and therefore the less concentrated the 
market will be. In a less concentrated market, the chances of collusion and of a 
merger limiting competition are not high, which means that the merger is likely to be 
approved. On the other hand, if the relevant market is defined in a narrower manner, 
than the possibility of the merger being challenged is higher. 
Despite the importance of the concept of relevant market, the Brazilian law 
does not define what is a relevant market nor establish the elements CADE should 
take into consideration when analysing the nwket. It follows that CADE has to define 
the market according to its own understanding of the issue. 
CADE developed some theoretical aspects of the relevant market in the 
Melitta case. 403 It established that the definition of the relevant market is necessary to 
determine the level of economic concentration and the potential harm that an act of 
concentration may cause. In order to determine the relevant product market, CADE 
'0' National Economic Research Associates (NERA), Mar*et definition in UK Competition Policy, 
Office of Fair Trading, February 1992, p. 6. 
402 Posner, R. A., Antitrust law - an economic perspective, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1976, p. 125. 
403AC 46/95, required by Jovita Ind4stria e Comdrcio Ltda. and Melitta do Brasil Ind4stria e Comercio 
Ltda. on 11.11.94, distributed to Commissioner Marcelo Monteiro Soares, and decided on 19.12.95. 
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held that it is necessary to take into consideration the characteristics of the product, 
which include its uniqueness or interchangeability, its use, its price and its level of 
technology development, as well as its geographical dimension and temporal aspect. 
In relation to the geographic market, CADE established that its concept 
includes the spatial area where an economic agent is able to increase the price of its 
product without making consumers look for other suppliers in other areas. The 
geographic market also includes suppliers from other areas that can rapidly enter that 
market with substitutes. According to CADE, a reasonable time for that entry would 
be one year. The relevant nwket would also be based on potentiality, that is, the 
possibility of identifying the economic agents that would compete in that market if 
certain conditions occurred. 
404 
In the Belgo Mineira case, 405 CADE went further and held that, in order to 
define the market, it would have to take into account not only the demand for the 
product but also the supply because, if only the fonner was taken into consideration, 
the relevant market would not be technically correct. By including the supply, it 
would be including companies that do not manufacture the product but that may do so 
if the market becomes attractive. In this way, though the product manufactured by the 
acquired company was "heavy iron bars", CADE defined the relevant market as that 
of "regular long steel", which included heavy iron bars. 
406 
From these two cases it is possible to determine the elements CADE will 
consider when defining the relevant market. Basically it includes establishing the 
4040pinion of Commissioner Marcelo Monteiro Soares. 
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characteristics of the product, determining the existence of substitutes for that 
product, and defining the possibility of other companies entering that market. This 
cause of action followed by CADE demonstrates that CADE is on the right track. 
However, these are just the first steps to be taken to reach a proper definition of 
relevant market. 
If we turn to the American situation, we will find in the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines more detailed and elaborated criteria to define the relevant market. In the 
first place, the Guidelines define market as "a product or group of products and a 
geographical area in which it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit- 
maximising firm, not subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future 
producer or seller of those products in that area likely would impose at least a 'small 
but significant and nontransitory' increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all 
other products are held constant". 407 Based on this concept and on the probable 
responses to both demand and supply, the relevant market is to be defined. According 
to the Guidelines, this shall be done in the following manner: 
"... the Agency will begin with each product (narrowly defined) produced or 
sold by each merging firm and ask what would happen if a hypothetical 
monopolist of that product imposed at least a "small but significant and 
nontransitory" increase in price, but the terms of sale of all other products 
remained constant. If, in response to the price increase, the reduction in sales 
of the product would be large enough that a hypothetical monopolist would 
405 AC 14/94, supra n. 399. For a discussion on the case, see supra, subsection 4.2. 
406 Opinion of Commissioner Marcelo Monteiro Soares, p. 18. 
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not find it profitable to impose such an increase in price, then the Agency 
will add to the product group the product that is the next-best substitute for 
the merging firm's product. 
(. 
«) 
The price increase question is then asked for a hypothetical monopolist 
controlling the expanded product group. In performing successive iterations 
of the price increase test, the hypothetical monopolist will be assumed to 
pursue maximum profits in deciding whether to raise the prices of any or all 
of the additional products under its control. This process will continue until a 
group of products is identified such that a hypothetical monopolist over that 
group of products would profitably impose at least a "small but significant 
and nontransitory" increase, including the price of a product of one of the 
merging firms. The Agency generally will consider the relevant product 
market to be the smallest group of products that satisfies this test. '-408 
The Guidelines explain that the definition of "small but significant and 
nontransitory increase of price" depends on the industry, and establish relevant 
evidence that should be given particularly weight when assessing substitutes for the 
product. 
The report required by the UK Office of Fair Trading on market definition 
understands that this standard adopted by the DOJ Merger Guidelines is "a sensible 
407 US Department of Justice Antitrust Division Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Merger Guidelines, 
subsection 1.0. 
" id., subsection 1.11. 
219 
way to go about the task of defining the relevant market", 409 as it draws a line 
between the products that are in the market and those that are outside the market, 
without forgetting the influence that the products outside the market may exert on the 
effective competition of the relevant market. This report holds that the notion of the 
relevant market can be applied to different problems faced by the competition 
authorities. 
However, they argue that there are situations where an economically rigorous 
definition is not necessary, in which case an informal approach to market definition is 
more adequate. The report establishes thus four points that it considers important in 
the process of market definition. One of them is "supply-side substitutes", which are 
products manufactured through a system that could easily switch to produce another 
product. Another point is the "continuous chains of substitution", meaning that a 
market definition can be wider when there are products that are linked to one another 
by these unbroken chains of substitution. One more issue to be taken into account is 
the existence of "captive consumers", who are not likely to switch products. The 
report argues that, "as long as there is enough scope for substitution between two 
products to ensure that suppliers of neither could afford to allow their prices to drift 
up of line with the other's product", 410 the existence of captive consumers does not 
mean that these two products should constitute separate markets. The last point to be 
considered is "product differentiation", where absolute differences in prices and 
characteristics of products do not allow for the establishment of different markets. 
409 
supra n. 40 1, p. 5. 410 icL, P. 108/109. 
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Demand substitution and supply substitution are the basic principles for 
market definition adopted by the EC Commission. 411 The Commission notice 
summarises the process of definition of the relevant market: 
"on the basis of the prehminary information available or information 
submitted by the undertakings involved, the Commission will usually be in a 
position to broadly establish the possible relevant markets within which, for 
instance a concentration or a restriction of competition has to be assessed. In 
general, and for all practical purposes when handling individual cases, the 
question will usually be to decide on a few alternative possible relevant 
markets. For instance, with respect to the product market, the issue will often 
be to establish whether product A and product B belong or do not belong to 
the same product market. It is often the case that the inclusion of product B 
would be enough to remove any competition concerns". 412 
By comparing the Merger Guidelines, the OFT report and the Commission 
Notice to the standard adopted by CADE, it is possible to conclude that CADE has the 
right insight of the matter and that in theory it does understand what constitutes a 
market and the economic elements to be considered when defining the relevant 
market. The problem however lies on the manner that CADE applies these elements 
m the concrete case. The two cases discussed above - Melitta and Belgo Mineira - 
constitute the only two cases where CADE elaborated more clearly the definition of 
"1 Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community 
Competition law, published in OJ 372 on 09.12.97. 41ý'id- 
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the market. This, however, is an exception. In the majority of the cases, CADE 
adopted a more "informal" approach to market definition. 
For instance, in the Yolat case, 413 where Yolat acquired 90% of the stock 
shares of Cilpe, a producer of pasteurised skimmed milk, CADE defined the relevant 
market as that of pasteurised skimmed milk because that was the product produced by 
Cilpe. CADE held that longlife milk could not be considered a substitute product 
because it was more expensive. However, CADE did not consider the fact that Yolat 
was a producer of longlife milk and other dairy products and therefore could have 
been a potential competitor. Had the market been defined in a broader manner, Yolat 
and Cilpe would have been considered competitors, and the outcome of the case could 
have been different. What is important, though, is that CADE failed to take into 
account the economic elements necessary for the definition of the market. To 
establish a market based only on the product manufactured by the acquired firm is a 
too much informal way to tackle the issue, even if there is no doubt about the product 
and its analysis does not seem to present complexities. 
In the Hoebras case, 414 where a joint venture was created in order to produce 
nylon and polyester filaments, CADE established that the relevant product market was 
that of polyester filaments, because it was there that the joint venture caused 
horizontal concentration, since the two companies manufactured the product. It is not 
possible to define a market based only on the coincidence of products manufactured, 
and this is what CADE did. CADE started with a conclusion, and then develop the 
"ý AC 11/94, required by Yolat Inddstria e Com&cio de Laticinlios Ltda. on 11.03.94, distributed to 
Commissioner Marcelo Monteiro Soares, and decided on 23.11.94. 
4 14AC 41/95, required by Hoechst do Brasil Quimica e Farmaautica S. A. and Rhodia S. A. in July of 
1995, distributed to Commissioner Neide T, eresinha Malarýd, and decided on 06.03.96. 
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issue. Even this analysis, which consisted only of an examination of possible 
substitutes for the product, did not indicate how it was possible to arrive to that 
conclusion. 
This discussion allows us to conclude that CADE does have the notion of what 
market definition requires and what are the elements involved in it, but does not know 
how to define the relevant market in practice. CADE's approach to market definition 
thus is not based on solid economic grounds. 
The same can be said in relation to the definition of the geographical market. 
If we turn again to the Merger Guidelines, we will find that the same standard adopted 
in the product market applies to the geographical market. Thus, the target is to 
"delineate the geographic market to be a region such that a hypothetical monopolist 
that was the only present or future producer of the relevant product at locations in that 
region would profitably impose at least a 'small but significant and nontransitory' 
increase in price, holding constant the terms of sale for all products produced 
elsewhere". 415 The method applied is also the same, defining the area where the 
merging firms are located and establishing if "in response to the price increase, the 
reduction in sales of the product at that location would be large enough that a 
hypothetical monopolist producing or selling the relevant product at the merging 
firm's location would not find it profitable to impose such an increase in price 51 . 
416 
This is to be done until it is identified a group of locations where a hypothetical 
monopolist could profitably impose a "small but significant and nontransitory" 
increase of price is identified, which will be the geographical market. 
'15 Merger Guidelines supra n. 407, subsection 1.2 1. 
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When defining the geographical market, CADE usually takes into 
consideration the area to which the merging companies supply the relevant product. It 
also attempts to examine the role of exports and imports in that market in order to 
establish if it affects the definition of the area. However, on the whole CADE defines 
the geographical market as the Brazilian territory, because usually the mergers deal 
with companies that supply the whole country. This was the situation in the Melitta 
case, where the domestic market was considered the geographical market, since 
exports and imports were not significant. 
The same happened in the Belgo Mineira case, where the geographical market 
would be the whole country, because the companies that act in the market had a well 
structured net of distribution, and imports were not significant. In the Brasilit case, 417 
where two manufacturers of fibrocernent products decided to merger two of their 
companies which were located at the South area of the country, CADE concluded that 
the geographical market was the Brazilian territory because, though the supply was 
concentrated in the South and Southeast areas of the country, it met the demand of the 
whole country. It follows that the most important element for CADE in geographical 
market definition lies in the area where the merging companies distribute the product. 
This approach is confirmed even by a case where the geographical market was 
not the domestic market, but the metropolitan area of the city of Recife. This 
L- 418 happened in the Mat case. As the relevant product market was defined as that of 
pasteurised skimmed milk, the geographical market - based on the supply approach - 
could only be the city of Recife, because it was only to this area that the acquirmg 
416 
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company sold the product. Had it included longlife or powdered milk, the 
geographical market would have been different. 
The approach to geographical market definition can be also considered 
informal, but in general it does not do much harm when the geographical market is the 
Brazilian territory, though it should be given more weight to the possibility of foreign 
companies entering the market. However, this approach is not correct when a smaller 
area is defined as the geographical market, because it does not take into account the 
possibility of consumers switching to other areas or of producers from other areas 
entering that market. 
5.2 Market share and concentration 
The main reason for CADE to define the relevant market in a merger case is 
that it will be the basis for an analysis of the concentration in that market, which is the 
basic purpose of merger control. Therefore, after defining the market, CADE will 
investigate which companies are part of that market, and then infer the share that each 
company has in that market. Based on this market share, it will be possible to 
determine how concentrated is the market. This is a process that CADE adopts in 
every merger case. 
The examination of one of those cases will help to understand how this works 
in practice. The Carborundum case 41 9 dealt with the acquisition of the abrasive sector 
of Carborundum, a company acting in several economic sectors, by Norton, a 
"' AC 06/94, supra n. 398. 
418 AC 11/94, supra n. 413. 
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manufacturer of abrasive products. In this case, CADE established that two markets 
were involved: the market of sandpaper and the market of grindstone, as they are 
different products. CADE then proceeded to determine the market share of the 
companies in each market. ln the sandpaper market, for instance, Norton had a share 
of 55.39%, while 3M do Brasil had 34.36%, Gothard had 6.28%, and Carborundum 
had 3.97%. The market of grindstone, in its turn, is more atomised, and it includes 33 
small, medium and big companies. Here Norton had 25.91% of the market, while Silo 
Jodo Abrasivos had 13.61%; Carborundum, 13%; and Icder, 10.68%. 
By comparing the two markets, it is possible to conclude that, in the first case, 
the market shares themselves show that the market is highly concentrated, with only 
two companies controlling almost 90% of the market. In relation to the second 
market, however, it is more dffficult to determine its level of concentration. In this 
situation, CADE makes use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (EM), a method for 
measuring the concentration in a market, which is adopted by the US Department of 
Justice in the analysis of mergers. The Merger Guidelines hold that "the I*H reflects 
both the distribution of the market shares of the top four firms and the composition of 
the market outside the top four firms", as well as "gives proportionately greater 
weight to the market shares of the larger firms, in accord with their relative 
420 impoitance in any collusive interaction7' . 
According to this method, the squared market share of the participants of the 
market are to be summed, and the result will show how concentrated the market is, 
which can go from 0 to 10000 points, the latter representing a case of pure monopoly. 
419 AC 05/94, required by Carborundum do Brasil Ltda. and Norton S. A. lndiisýria e Com&cio on 
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A non concentrated market has as index of 1000, a moderately concentrated market 
reaches between 1000 and 1800 points, and a highly concentrated market has an index 
superior to 1800 points. In the first case, the merger would not be considered 
anticompetitive. In the second case, a merger could cause anticompetitive effects in 
the market if the transaction increased the index in 100 points. By applying the ITUR to 
the market of grindstone, the result will be 1391 points before the acquisition, which 
means that the market is moderately concentrated. After the acquisition, the IHTH 
would reach 2065 points, far above the increase considered acceptable. Nevertheless, 
as it will be seen below, the merger was allowed. 
421 
As it was pointed out, the EIM is used to measure the concentration of a 
market, showing the difference in the level of concentration after the transaction, a 
factor that helps in the evaluation of the merger. However, if we take into account the 
Brazilian context, with highly concentrated markets, the utilisation of the fEM seems 
pointless, since it generally indicates that the market is concentrated and that the 
merger will increase even more this concentration. If we take the market of sandpaper 
in the Carborundum case, for example, we will see that the I*H in that market was 
4304 points before the acquisition, and 4774 points after the transaction. 
The same happened in other mergers. In the Yolat case, before the tr-ansaction 
the lffU was 3990 points. In the Hoebras case, 2286 points before the creation of the 
joint venture, and 3298 afterwards. Since these markets are concentrated, CADE 
should not put too much weight on this criteria - and, as it will be seen below, this is 
exactly what CADE does. The Merger Guidelines establish that, when the post- 
25.07.94, distributed to Commissioner Marcelo Monteiro Soares, and decided on 19-10.95. 
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merger ]HIE is above 1800 points, with an increase exceeding 100 points. it is ver-y 
dffficull that these other factors to be considered will provide evidence that the 
merger will not lessen competition. 422 If we apply this reasoning to the Brazilian 
situation, the only possible conclusion is that all the mergers submitted to CADE 
impair competition. 
5.3 Barriers to entry 
One of the possible anticompetitive effects of mergers is that they may create 
barriers to entry of new competitors in the market. It is the threat of other companies 
entering the market that prevents a company with market power from increasing its 
prices. Therefore, the analysis of mergers must include an investigation on the 
existence of such barriers to entry. The initial questions to be asked in such case are: 
what are these barriers? Which elements can be included in the concept? 
In a broader concept, barriers to entry can be understood as anything that 
makes difficult for a company to enter a market. This, however, is not an 
economically accurate concept, as it includes as barriers to entry the superior 
efficiencies achieved by companies already in the market, and this is not accepted in 
economic analysis, because these efficiencies are considered inherent to the tasks of 
the companies, and therefore cannot býe objected to. 
423 However, there is no unanimity 
in relation to what constitute barriers to entry. They may be defined taking into 
account the effects they cause, or they may be seen as cost asymmetries between the 
conipanies already in the market and the potential entrants. 
'20 Merger Guidelines supra n. 407, subsection 1.5. 
421 see Chapter 7, subsection 2.2. 
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Laws and guidelines do not usually define barriers to entry nor determine what 
can be considered as such. What they do discuss is how easy it is to enter a market, so 
that the merging companies would not be able to increase prices above pre-merger 
levels. 1n this way, the Merger Guidelines establish how to assess entry to the market, 
but are not specific about which types of conduct or factors may impair entrance to 
that market. Even the American case law on mergers do not develop the issue. It 
follows that merger control in the USA puts more weight on defining how easy it is 
for a potential competitor to enter a market, without considering in particular the 
factors that make the entrance more difficult. 
In the UK there is also a lack of guidelines in that respect. However, the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) and the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
have been issuing internal documentation, information to the public as well as annual 
reviews and reports that bring some light to this issue. One of these documents 
explains the MMC's approach to the competition acts, which includes the approach to 
barriers of entry. 424 It considers barriers to entry as a relevant factor for assessing 
competition because, among other aspects, they are a threat to the entry and growth of 
competitors. The document also produces a list of what MMC understands as the most 
important barriers, which includes limited supplies, institutional and regulatory 
barriers, economies of scale, economies of scope, economies of vertical integration, 
sunk costs, excess capacity, product differentiation, and retaliation of incumbents, 
predation and reputation. 
'22 Merger Guidelines, supra n. 407, subsection 1.5 1. 
4 ý' 3 Bork, R., The antiowtporadox, Basic Books, New York, 1978, p. 310/311. '2' MMC, "Assessing competition", in London Economics, Barriers to Entn, and Exit in Competition 
Policy: a Reportfor the Oflice of Fair Tra&ng, p. 89. 
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Merger control in Brazil puts a relative weight on the existence of barriers to 
entry as a condition for approving a merger. After defining the relevant market and 
establishing the level of concentration of the market, CADE analyses the barriers to 
entry that may result from the merger. CADE has never developed any theoretical 
analysis of the importance of easy of entry for competition nor evaluated the various 
types of barriers and their effect on competition. Its approach to the issue has been 
practical, examining in a case-by-case basis the aspects of the merger that may 
difficult the entry of other competitors in that market. 
Among these aspects, there are two that CADE sees as more likely to deter the 
access of other companies to a certain market, namely the investments and the 
technology necessary to start a business. It has been argued that the capital needed to 
enter the business cannot be considered a barrier. According to Bork, "fc]apital 
requirements exist and certainly inhibit entry - just as talent requirements for playing 
professional football exist and inhibit entry. Neither barrier is in any sense artificial or 
the proper subject of special concern for antitrust policy". 425 This assertion may be 
true if applied to markets that work efficiently. However, this is not the case of 
emergent economies, wherýe Brazil is included. Due to the instability of these markets, 
the costs of investments have to be considered as a significant barrier to entry. The 
Carborundum case, 426 which deals with the acquisition of the abrasive sector of a 
company, shows CADE's approach to barriers to entry. 
"5 Bork, supra n. 423, p. 320. 
'26 AC 05/94, supra n. 419. 
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This approach is f6flowed in most of the cases, though other kinds of barriers 
are also discussed . 
427 In the Ajinomoto case, 
428 
an acquisition of a producer of a food 
seasoning called monosodium. glutamate (MSG) by another manufacturer of MSG, 
CADE held that there were several barriers to entry that market. High investments to 
install a plant was one of them Technology would not be a barrier because it was in 
public domain, but the problem was that Ajico, the Japanese mother company of 
Ajmomoto, developed technology to increase productivity and reduce costs, and 
transferred it to Ajinomoto, which gave the company more advantage in relation to 
potential competitors. Other barriers were also found, such as the distribution net 
already developed by Ajinomoto in the country, the identification between the product 
and Ajinomoto's trademark, as well as the fact that the product is not an essential 
good in Brazil. 
One characteristic of the way CADE treats barriers to entry is that, although 
CADE does take them into consideration by themselves, they are not - or at least have 
not been - enough to prevent a merger from occurring, even when the barriers are 
quite strong. For instance, in the Belgo Mineira case, 429 CADE found out that they 
were very significant. It included the necessity of high investments to install a 
metallurgical plant, overcapacity of the present plants, solid financial and economic 
situation of the companies already operating in the market, as well as a well structured 
net of distribution. 
427 See, for instance, the Melitta case (supra, subsection 5.1, and Chapter 7, subsection 2.1), the Belgo 
Mineira case (supra, subsection 4.2), and the Rho&a case (Chapter 7, subsection 4.1). 428AC 
19/94, supra n. 390. 429 AC 14/94, supra n. 399. 
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Despite these barriers, the merger was approved. One can thus conclude that 
the examination of barriers to entry are just a pro forma act conducted by CADE, as 
part of what it understands as the economic analysis of the merger that should be 
carried out in these cases. However, this examination does not have any role on the 
L"- - final assessment of the merger. 
5.4 Historical behaviour 
There is an aspect of the economic analysis of mergers that is significant for 
the assessment of the legality of the merger. This aspect is the analysis of the 
behaviour that the merging companies have been adopting during the whole of their 
existence. By examining the previous behaviour of the companies, the competition 
authorities are able to predict the types of conduct that they may adopt in the future, 
and therefore to assess how they are likely to affect competition. This behaviour is 
related to the strategies concerning mainly prices, employment and management. 
When the companies have already been involved in previous mergers, their post- 
merger behaviour in these cases is an essential factor for the approval of the merger. 
CADE gives particular weight to the historical behaviour of the companies. In 
he Brasilit case, 430 such behaviour was decisive for the outcome of the case. As it 
was seen above, this case dealt with the merger between two subsidiaries of two 
manufacturers of fibrocernent products, Etemit and Brasilit. One of the reasons given 
by the companies to justify the merger was that it would result in lower prices for the 
consumers. The two enterprises, however, own together three other companies, and 
one of them, Eterbras-Tec, manufactures fibrocement products. By examining the 
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post-merger conduct of Eterbras-Tec, CADE found out that the prices adopted by the 
companies did not fall. The same happened in relation to one of the other firms. This 
factor, together with the lack of efficiencies resulting from the merger, made CADE 
decide not to authorise the merger. 
The historical behaviour of the ýcompanies can also work in favour of the 
companies. For instance, in the Carborundum case, 431 CADE examined the previous 
behaviour of the acquiring company in particular, in order to gather evidence that 
would allow for a prediction of its future conduct. CADE found out that the methods 
used by Norton, the acquiring company, when attempting to increase its production 
capacity, included expansion of plants and building of new factories. It did not do it 
by eliminating competitors, which would increase the concentration, create barriers to 
entry and reduce competition. This behaviour was one of the factors that concurred 
for the approval of the merger. 
432 
Though CADE gives particular attention to this aspect of merger analysis, it 
will be very difficult to find a merger approved or rejected based only on the 
behaviour of the companies, because it lacks the necessary economic grounds to 
support such decision. 
430 AC 06/94, supra n. 398. 431 AC 05/94, supra n. 419. 432 for a more detailed analysis of this case, see Chapter 7, subsection 2.2. 
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6. Conclusion 
The discussion carried out in this chapter makes evident that CADE has the 
right insight of how the analysis of a merger should be conducted. CADE defines the 
relevant market, examines the concentration of that market, analyses the previous 
behaviour of the companies involved in the merger, investigates the existence of 
barriers to entry the market, and examines the efficiencies resulting from the merger. 
Notwithstanding this thorough assessment of the merger, CADE has not been 
able to draw the proper conclusions from the analysis. Cases were approved where the 
analysis provided evidence that the merger would adversely affect the market due to 
the increase of concentration and the existence of entry barriers. The question here is 
that, though CADE has the necessary skills to develop the analysis, it has not yet 
found the right approach to the issues involved in merger control. For instance, 
CADE's approach to market definition seems to be quite instinctive, in the sense that 
it is never clear how CADE reaches the definition. There is not an economic basis to 
this market definition, as in some cases it seems that CADE establishes the relevant 
market based only on the product manufactured by the merging companies, without 
considering its substitutes, the possibility of other companies starting to produce that 
product, or consumers shifting to other markets. 
This lack of criteria in the definition of the relevant market does not conform 
to the hypothesis that competition law should clearly define its approach to 
competition as well as establish the aspects related to competition. The enforcement 
of the law would then be enhanced. 
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In relation to barriers to entry, the situation does not change much. CADE 
makes an extensive evaluation of the barriers created by a merger, but they do not 
seem to be an obstacle for the approval of a merger, because in the end CADE always 
finds efficiencies that compensate for these barriers. 
Another issue that concurs to this conclusion is related to CADE's approach to 
market concentration. In the majority of the cases CADE uses two tests to establish 
how concentrated is the market: the market share test and the I*H test. Both tests 
usually show that the market is highly concentrated, but CADE does not give much 
weight to this aspect when reaching its decision. It seems that CADE sees the HIHI 
test just as a step in merger analysis, a kind of test that must be done but that does not 
exert much influence in the final result. However, as the existence of highly 
concentrated markets is a characteristic of the Brazilian economy, there is no use in 
ap lying a test that only shows what is obvious. Thus, the application of the ETH test r'p 
is just a tool used in antitrust analysis that CADE has copied from the American law, 
without taking into account the Brazilian reality. 
more accurate conclusion towards CADE's treatment of acts of economic 
concentration can only be reached after the analysis of the defences accepted by 
CADE, as well as the treatment given to horizontal and non horizontal mergers and 
privatisation, which will be done in the next chapter. 
235 
CHAPTER 7- ACTS OF ECONOMIC 
CONCENTRATIONS: CASE ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the elements that CADE takes into 
consideration when analysing cases of mergers. This chapter will concentrate on the 
analysis of the cases themselves, in order to determine CADE's treatment of acts of 
economic concentration. 
Thus, in section 2 it will be examined the defences that CADE accepts to 
approve mergers that present anticompetitive effects. These defences comprise the 
existence of efficiencies that counterbalances the anticompetitive effects of the 
merger; the fact that one of the merging companies is not financially stable; the 
presence of foreign competitors in the market; the necessity of competing in the 
international market, as well as the fact that the merging companies belong to the 
same economic group. An analysis of the treatment given to both horizontal and non 
horizontal mergers will be carried out in section 3. Finally, section 4 will examine 
how CADE has been dealing with the question of privatisation. The conclusion will 
then bring together all the issues discussed in both chapters and attempt to determine 
how far has CADE gone in merger control. 
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2. Exception arguments 
2.1 Efficiencies 
One argument largely accepted by CADE to allow mergers that present 
evidence of being anticompetitive is when there are efficiencies resulting from that 
merger. CADE gives so much iinportance to this issue that it examines the possible 
efficiencies of each merger submitted to the agency, whether the companies have 
argued this defence or not. It Mows that efficiencies are in a kind of grey area in 
merger analysis in Brazil. It is more than a defence to be argued by the companies, it 
is almost an issue of obligatory analysis to be carried out by CADE. This approach in 
part comes from the law, as it establishes that acts resulting in economic concentration 
may be approved if, among other conditions, they yield efficiencieS. 433 
By accepting efficiencies as a counterbalance for anticompetitive mergers, 
CADE is following the approach adopted in the USA. According to the Merger 
Guidelines, "[elfficiencies generated through merger can enhance the merged firm's 
ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, 
enhanced service, or new productS"'. 434 However, it will only be considered 
efficiencies that can be verified by the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade 
Commission and that will be achieved exclusively through the merger. 
433Another reason for this stress on efficiencies results from a tendency to adopt an efficiency approach 
to merger analysis. See Chapter 6, subsection 4.2. 434 US Department of Justice Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Merger 
Guidelines, section 4. 
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Nevertheless, efficiencies have not always been accepted by the American 
435 
courts. In US v. Philadelphia National Bank a bank merger would result in a firm 
with 30% of the relevant market and a combined post-merger market share of the two 
top banks of 59%. Philadelphia National Bank argued that the merger would bring 
more business to the area and increase its economic activities. The Court did not agree 
with the bank, holding that "a merger the effect of which 'may be substantially to 
lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or 
economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial". 
436 
The EEC Merger Regulation is silent about this issue. Its article 2(l) 
establishes the aspects to be taken into account when assessing a concentration, which 
include market structure, market position of the compardes involved, and barriers to 
entry, all compatible with, and inserted into, a common market context. There is no 
reference whatsoever to efficiencies that may result from the merger. The most 
important aspect here is to preserve competition within the Community. 
However, paragraph 13 of the Preamble to the Regulation states that, when 
assessing the compatibility of a merger with the common market, the Commission 
should consider the goals of the EEC Treaty, which includes the strengthening of the 
Community's economic and social cohesion. According to Whish, it is not possible to 
affirm whether the Commission will consider non competition aspects when assessing 
a merger, especially if we take into account that this provision was inserted in the 
Preamble, and not in the Regulation itself 
437 
'35 374 U. S. 321,83 S. Ct. 1715,10 L. Ed. 2d. 915 (1963) 
436 - in Gellhorn, E., and Kovacic, W. E., Antitrust Law and Economics in a Nutshell, 4"' edition, West 
Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1994, p. 38 1. 437 Whish, R., Competition Law, Yd ed., Butterworths, London, 1993, p. 719. 
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Bringing the discussion back to the Brazilian context, the question to be asked 
is how CADE deals with the efficiency defence in practice. We have seen that CADE 
follows the American example and accepts efficiencies as an argument for the 
an oval of the merger. However, it still has to be examined which are the efficiencies Or 
that CADE considers as capable of offsetting the adverse effects of the mergers. 
Here again CADE follows to some extent the American example. The 1984 
Merger Guidelines held that "fc]ognizable efficiencies include, but are not limited to, 
achieving economies of scale, better integration of production facilities, plant 
specialisation, lower transportation costs, and similar efficiencies relating to specific 
manufacturing, servicing, or distribution operations of the merging firms". 438 It could 
also be considered efficiencies related to reductions in general selling and 
administrative and overhead expenses. The 1992 Merger Guidelines, however, refrain 
from determining "cognizable efficiencies", establishing only that they are "merger 
specific efficiencies that have been verified and do not arise from anticompetitive 
reductions in output or service". 
439 
The case law gives a clear idea of how CADE treats efficiencies. The Melitta 
case 440 dealt with the acquisition of Jovita by Melitta. Jovita was a producer of paper 
filters for coffee, while Melitta was a vertically integrated company that acted not 
only in the coffee sector but also in the paper filter sector. By acquiring Jovita, Melitta 
would increase its share in the submarket of paper filters from 69.6% to 87.3%, and 
eliminate a company that had been growing since its creation. Melitta argued that the 
438 1984 US Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, p. 22. 439 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra n. 434, section 4. "0 AC 46/95, required by Jovita Inddstria e Comircio, Ltda. and Melitta. do Brasil lndfisýa e Com&cio Ltda. on 11.11.94, distributed to Commissioner Marcelo Monteiro, Soares, and decided on 19.12.95. 
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acquisition would result in several efficiencies. One of them was that there would be 
an expansion of production of 37.9% between 1996 and 2000, and, as a result, the 
sales of paper filter would increase 38% in that period. 
CADE considered this efficiency feasible, because the history of the company 
demonstrated that it had been performing satisfactorily. Another efficiency would be 
the investments of US$ 15 million that Melitta would make in that period, which 
CADE understood to be consistent with the estimate of production. Also, Melitta 
argued that, by acquiring Jovita's equipment, Melitta would be able to reorganise the 
production process, which would result in productivity gains. One more efficiency 
was that Melitta would increase the supply of trademarks for third parties, which, 
according to CADE, would help to increase competition in the submarket of paper 
filter, because consumers would thus have new options at lower prices. The last 
efficiency argued by Melitta, was that the acquisition would result in reduction of 
costs of 1% per year, which would be included in the final prices. CADE concluded 
that it was satisfied with all the efficiencies resulting from the acquisition, and it 
understood that they should compensate the risks that this merger might bring to the 
market. 
This case shows that, notwithstanding an increase of concentration, which 
created almost a monopoly in the submarket of paper filters, CADE is prepared to 
allow such merger when there are efficiencies that may offset its adverse effects. The 
analysis of the case demonstrates that there are two aspects to be criticised. In the first 
Place, CADE considered as efficiencies any singular benefit resulting from the 
merger. Most of them seemed only as managerial strategies to be adopted in the 
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future, and not a direct consequence of the merger. By establishing an extensive range 
of efficiencies, it is not difficult to approve a merger. The second point is that the 
efficiencies found in this case, even if defined in a broad manner, do not seem to be 
enough to compensate the loss of competition, especially if we take into account the 
fact that the post-merger market share of Melitta increased to almost 90%. It is thus 
only possible to conclude that efficiencies may be used just as an excuse for 
approvmg anticompet ive mergers. 
However, to present an efficiency defence does not necessarily mean that the 
probability of the merger being approved is greater. The Brasilit case441 is an 
442 
example. As seen in Chapter 6 this was the case of a merger between the 
subsidiaries of two manufacturers of fibrocernent products. The merging companies 
argued that the merger would achieve efficiencies resulting form the availability of 
their technology to each other, as well as would lead to lower prices for consumers. 
In relation to the first efficiency, CADE held that the access of each company 
to the other was not a positive factor and therefore could not be the justification for a 
merger, because it is that ignorance of its competitors' behaviour that makes 
competition more dynamic, as competitors try to promote technological developments 
in order to have more chances in the market. By sharing their technology, the merging 
firms would not be achieving efficiencies, but contributing for reducing competition 
in the relevant market. The other efficiency - lower prices for consumers - was 
accordingly not considered feasible by CADE, because both merging companies 
incurred high costs and had high idle capacity. CADE concluded that there were no 
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efficiencies that justified the elimination of competition between the two companies. 
Moreover, CADE held that there were financial gains for the merging companies but 
no benefits for consumers. 
2.2 Failing firm 
The defence of failing firm has been first argued in the USA. According to this 
defence, an anticompetitive merger may be approved when one of the companies is in 
fmancial difficulties and will probably have to exit the market. The first time that the 
US, 443 Supreme Court dealt with this defenee was in Citizens' Publishing Co. v. .. 
where it ruled that this defence would be accepted only when the financial situation 
was really critical, without any chance of recovery, and the only perspective was 
liquidation. Moreover, it had to be proved that the failing company had attempted to 
fmd other buyers that not only the acquirer. 
However, in a more recent case, the Court adopted a more lenient approach to 
this defence, and held that the weakness of a company, though it was not enough to 
make it a "failing company", was sufficient to establish that the company was unable 
to compete in that market, and therefore the acquisition would not cause 
anticompetitive effects. The failing firm defence is considered in the Merger 
Guidelines as well, which establish that the defence is accepted "if imminent failure 
(... ) of one of the merging firms would cause the assets of that firm to exit the relevant 
mar et". 444 The Guidelines require that the companies must prove that the failing firm 
441 AC 06/94, required by Brasilit S. A. and Eternit S. A. on 04.08.94, distributed to Commissioner 
Neide Teresinha Malard, and decided on 25.11.94. 442 
see subsection 4.1. 443 394 U. S. 131 (1969) 
44 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra n. 434, subsection 5.0 
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cannot: a) meet its financial obligations in the near future; b) reorganise in 
bankruptcy; and, c) find another buyer that does not pose much danger to competition. 
One last requirement is that they must prove that, if it is not for the merger, the assets 
of the failing company will exit the relevant Market. 
445 
CADE also had to deal with a failing firm defence. However, toaffirm that the 
defence was argued by the merging companies would not be in accordance with the 
truth. In reality, the companies argued in the Carborundum case 446 that one of the 
reasons for the acquisition by Norton of Carborundurn's abrasive seCtor447 was that 
Carborundum was not interested in investing in that sector because it was the only 
company in the economic group that still acted in the market of abrasive products, and 
this would make the sector obsolete. CADE then extended this argument to a kind of 
failing firm defence, since it concluded that, as Carborundurn was a company that was 
suffering financial problems, had been suffering losses and had not been receiving 
financial support from the parent company, the acquisition would not eliminate from 
the market a company that was financially healthy and technologically advanced. 
If compared to the approach developed by the American Supreme Court, 
CADE's application of the failing firm defence is too liberal. As a result, any merger 
where the acquiring company presents some kind of financial problem is likely to be 
approved without ffifther investigation of the matter. CADE does not require 
prerequisites for establishing a failing firm defence, like the US Merger Guidelines. It 
follows that the number of mergers that will fall inside this defence will probably be 
'45 id., subsection 5.1 446 AC 05/95, required by Carborundurn do Brasil Ltda. and Norton S. A. IndiL,; &ia e Com&cio on 
25.07.94, distributed to Commissioner Marcelo Monteiro Soares, and decided on 19.10.95. 
447 Ille other reason was that it would achieve efficiencies such as economy of scale. 
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considerable. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that the economic situation in 
Brazil has not been stable, therefore even small financial problems are likely to cause 
more serious effects in the companies. If CADE was to apply the Merger Guidelines 
test to the failing firm defence, few mergers would be approved. 
2.3 Foreign competition 
Another reason for CADE to approve an anticompetitive merger is when the 
relevant market is under the influence of foreign competition. In this case, it does not 
matter if the merger will result in a high concentrated market, as long as foreign 
products can be found in that market. Obviously the prices of these products must be 
very low, so that it will inhibit the domestic competitors from adopting higher prices. 
This is what happened in the Hoebras case . 
448 Hoebras and Rhodia, both 
manufacturers of chemical and pharmaceutical products, formed a joint venture called 
Fairway Filamentos with the view to producing nylon and polyester filaments. The 
main reason given by the companies for the creation of this joint venture was that it 
was necessary to combine efforts in the production and commercialisation. of nylon 
and polyester filaments in order to create an efficient company, so that it was possible 
to compete with the foreign products, especially those manufactured by the Asian 
enterprises. 
448 AC 41/95, required by Hoechst do Brasil Quirnica e Farmaautica S. A. and Rhodia S. A- in July of 1995, distributed to Commissioner Neide Teresinha Malard, and decided on 06.03.96. 
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In its analysis of the merger, CADE found out that the market of polyester 
filaments was concentrated. 44' On one hand, Pohenska had a market share of 23%; 
Hoebras, 20%; Rhodia, 19%; Fibra, 16%; and Cobafi, 4%. On the other, imports 
constituted 18% of that market. The imposition of import tariff for textiles was very 
450 
unstable, with the government frequently augmenting or reducing its value. CADE 
also found out that the market had been stable in the previous five years, when no 
competitors entered or exited the market. Moreover, CADE acknowledge the 
existence of barriers to entry, as high investments were necessary to install a plant. 
These factors alone would be enough to prohibit the merger. However, CADE 
approved the merger. In the conclusion of the case, it was held that the joint venture 
was in accordance with article 54, because the proposed efficiencies were feasible and 
compatible with the investments, and the textile industry would benefit from the 
specialisation resulting from the transaction. Moreover, CADE held that the high level 
of concentration in the domestic market did not mean that a substantial part of the 
market was eliminated, since strong competitors remain in the market. Finally, CADE 
understood that the joint venture was within the limits necessary to meet the goals 
aimed at by the companies. It follows that, in its conclusion, CADE did not mention 
the fact that there was strong competition from foreign products. 
However, this does not mean that CADE did not take this aspect into 
consideration. On the contrary, CADE acknowledged that the existence of foreign 
products in the market changed the scenario. CADE held that competition from 
149 The market of nylon filaments was not analysed because concentration did not increase there, as 
Rhodia was the only manufacturer of the product. 
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foreign products can be a positive aspect, as the domestic producers are compeUed to 
seek for efficiencies in order to be competitive. However, if this competition with 
foreign products ceases to exist - which can happen through the adoption of protective 
measures by the government -, competition in the domestic market is reduced, 
because the domestic producers, when faced with an increase in demand, are likely to 
raise production, but not to innovate and reduce costs in order to lower prices . 
45 1 This 
theorisation on the existence of foreign products in the market in general, allied to the 
specific situation of the textile market in Brazil, which has been suffering a severe set- 
back because it has not been able to compete with the low prices offered by the Asian 
producers, presented great influence in the final decision. 
One may argue that in this case CADE acted beyond its power, because the 
decision is clearly an attempt to protect the domestic industry against foreign 
competition, and the protection of the Brazilian industry is not under CADE's 
jurisdiction nor is it included in the purposes of competition law. Besides, it should 
have been given more weight to the existence of import tariffs for textiles, because 
these tariffs are directly related to the level of concentration in the market. 
CADE conditioned the approval of the merger to a performance commitment, 
which included a clause where, if the tariffs were suspended, the company should 
submit to CADE information about the prices of its products, so that CADE could 
compare them with the prices of its competitors. However, concern should not be 
'ý" For instance, in October of 1994 the import tariff for textiles was 16%, then it decreased to 2% and 
even 0%, to increase again in May of 1995 to 161/6. See opinion of Commissioner Neide T. Malard, p. 24. 
451 opinion of Commissioner Neide T. Malard, page 39. 
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directed only towards the prices of the new company, but also towards the possibility 
of collusion between the few competitors in that market. 
2.4 International market 
Another possibility of having an anticompetitive merger approved occurs 
when the merger in question creates a company that is strong enough to compete in 
the international market. By allowing this kind of merger, the competition authorities 
are helping to create national champions, that is, companies that have the necessary 
power to compete with the biggest companies of the world and whose main goal is to 
produce for the external market. In a time where extreme importance is given to 
globalisation, there is a strong likelihood of the competition agencies giving much 
weight to this argument. 
In the UK, some merging companies have argued that the merger was 
necessary to yield efficiencies that would allow the creation of a national or European 
champion, which would be able to compete especially with the Japanese and 
American companies. In the merger between British Airways and British Caledonian 
Group, the MMC was influenced by the fact that the merger would create a major 
British airline, the only one capable of competing with the other big foreign 
companies. 
According to the MMC, "... the merger would also have important beneficial 
results. It would strengthen the competitive position of BA, which is the only British 
company competing with major foreign airlines world-wide, and in future may have 
to face increasing competition from American mega-carriers. Traffic should be 
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increased over the combined present traffic of BA and BCAL as the result of the 
greater number of connecting flights made possible by the enlarged network, 
increased interlining and intralining, and enhanced marketing oppoMmities". 452 
Finbow and Parr quote another NMC's report, this time of the acquisition of 
STC Limited by Alcatel Cable SA, where the MMC held that the merger was "likely 
to be a means of preserving STC's presence in the United Kingdom as a significant 
exporter and employer at the leading edge of telecommunications technology". 453 
This international competitiveness defence has also been argued in merger 
cases in Brazil. The Ajinomoto case 454 is an example of how CADE deals with the 
argument. In this case, Ajinornoto acquired 50% of the shares of Oriento, both 
companies being manufacturers of monosodiurn glutamate (MSG), a food seasoning. 
The argument defended by the companies to justify the merger was that it was 
a strategy to face the international. market, which would be very attractive after the 
import liberalisation in China, the biggest consumer of MSG. The companies held that 
Brazil was already one of the biggest producers of MSG, together with China, 
Indonesia and Korea, and the merger would increase its importance among the other 
producers, because it would be possible to explore the advantages found in the 
country, such as raw material and skilled labour. Moreover, the merger would 
452 British Airways PLC/British Caledonian Group PLC, Cm. 247 (November 1987), para. 8.66, in 
Finbow 
, R. J. and Parr, AX, UK Merger Control: Law and Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995, P. 252. 
113 Alcatel Cable SA/STC Limited, Cm. 2466 (February 1994), para. 7.73, in Finbow, supra n. 452, p. 
253. 
454AC 19/94, required by Oriento Indfistria e Comdrcio S. A. on 05.10.94, distributed to Commissioner 
Carlos Eduardo Vieira de Carvalho, and decided on 13.11.95. 
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transform Ajinomoto and Oriento in the main producers of MSG for the external 
market in the Ajinomoto group. 
CADE did not define the market as that of food seasoning in general. Instead, 
it held that the relevant market was specifically that of MSG, which resulted in a 
smaller number of competitors, showing that the market was highly concentrated. 
CADE found out that, before the merger, there were only three producers of MSG in 
the market: Ajinomoto, with a share of 52%; Viten, with 28%; and Oriento, with 20%. 
However, there was evidence that only 10% of Oriento's and Ajinomoto's production 
of MSG stayed in the domestic market, as 90% of their production was directed to the 
external market. Moreover, during 1994 the exports of MSG brought to the country a 
revenue of foreign exchange credits of US$ 75 million. 
CADE concluded that, though the transaction increased the economic 
concentration in the market of MSG, this relevant market involved a product not only 
of low consumption in the country but also manufactured mainly for the external 
market. Moreover, the relevant nwket was of little importance to Ajinomoto. CADE 
also held that, as Brazil presented advantages for the production of MSG, it would be 
possible for the company to adopt lower prices in the external market, thus putting the 
company among the most important producers of MSG in the world. This factor, 
together with the possibility of growth in the exports of MSG to China, would allow 
the merger to foster an increase in the performance of the Brazilian balance of trade. 
Based on these conclusions, CADE decided for the approval of the merger, 
thus opting for permitting the existence of one strong company capable of competing 
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in the international market, which would result in the creation of new jobs and in 
benefits to the country, instead of supporting a more competitive but not so productive 
market. 
2.5 Same economic group 
There is one argument for the approval of mergers that CADE accepts without 
carrying out an extensive analysis of the case. This happens when the merger occurs 
I'll, 455 
between companies of the same economic group. The Coplatex case illustrate this 
situation with perfection. This case dealt with the acquisition of Callas Textil S. A. by 
Coplatex Ind-dstria e Comercio S. A. Both companies acted in the textile industry, 
producing mostly covers for seats, doors and roof of cars, as well as cloth and foam 
for the shoe and fin-niture industry. Also, the two companies belonged to the same 
economic group - the Coplatex group -, had the same partners and were controlled by 
the same persons. 
The reason given by the companies for the acquisition was that the merger was 
just part of an administrative reorganisation that the group was promoting in order to 
be more efficient and competitive. With the acquisition, Coplatex obtained a share of 
100% in the supply of the products to the car industry, 25% in the reposition segment, 
25% in the shoe industry, and 16% in the foam market. 
CADE held that it would not proceed to a thorough analysis of the market 
because it was not necessary. The rationale behind this reasoning was that companies 
455 AC 33/95, required by Coplatex Indfistria e Com&cio S. A. and Cal-las T&W S. A- on 06.03.95, distributed to Commissioner Edgard Lincoln de Proenýa Rosa, and decided on 16.02. %. 
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with common management and controRed by the same group of partners aim at co- 
ordinated goals established by the group. This means that they do not compete among 
themselves, because they belong to the same economic group and therefore have the 
same targets and adopt strategies that are in the interest of the group. 
In the present case, CADE ruled that the acquisition did not alter the 
participation of the economic group in the market - it increased only the participation 
of one of the companies involved. The stock control of both companies were in the 
hands of the same persons - before and after the acquisition. Therefore, the 
participation of the group in the market as well as the level of economic concentration 
remained the same. 
CADE decided that this acquisition was not to be subject to Law 8884/94, as it 
dealt only with internal organisation of an economic group and therefore did not 
affect competition. This same decision was taken in other cases where the merger 
456 
occurred inside an economic group. 
This approach adopted by CADE can be seen as the application of the 
principle of the single unity, according to which the companies of a multinational 
enterprise should not be regarded as different and separate persons, but as one 
corporate personality. This principle is based on the fact that the multinational 
corporation controls all the activities within the group; the parent company, though 
may not direct the day-to-day activities of its subsidiaries, at least co-ordinates the 
45" AC 04/94 - RLS do Brasil Servigos de, Perfilagem Ltda., AC 07,08,09 and 10/94 - Tubos e Conex6es Tigre Ltda., AC 20/94 - CBV Wdstria MecAnica S. A. 
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organisation of the group. In the present case, CADE applied this principle to a 
Brazilian owned economic group with several units in the country. 
One can argue whether this principle should not be applied to cases on 
competition, as companies on the same economic group may not compete among 
themselves, but nevertheless they stimulate and bring more competitiveness to the 
market in relation to the other companies of that same market. On the other hand, if 
we turn to other jurisdictions, no cases will be found where the question of mergers or 
acquisitions within the same economic group has been discussed. 
I Approach to non horizontal mergers 
Mergers can occur through three different ways. One of them is horizontal 
merger, where the companies involved are competitors in the same product market 
and level of production. This kind of merger is the one that is more likely to affect the 
market in a negative manner, because it may lead to monopoly in a certain market. 
A second kind of merger is the vertical merger, where one company mergers 
with another that is one level up or down the distribution chain. For instance, a 
vertical merger occurs when a manufacture of a certain product mergers with the 
producer of raw material which is used in that product. Vertical mergers are not 
considered as dangerous to the market as horizontal mergers, but they may bring 
anticompet tive results. 
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Finally, the third kind of merger is the conglomerate merger, where one 
company joins another that acts in a different market and is not a competitor nor is 
linked to its production cycle. A company may seek to enter this kind of merger in 
order to expand its business to other areas, and therefore the conglomerate merger is 
less likely to harm the market. 
It has been argued that vertical mergers can only be attacked when they induce 
high prices and create barriers to entry of new competitors. On the other hand, "[ilf 
prices are reasonable and entry frequently occurs, then the decision to impose a 
vertical restraint or to integrate backwards or forwards should be treated as a valid 
457 
exercise of commercial judgement by the producers concerned" . 
During the period where the present research took place, the analysis of the 
Brazilian cases was restricted to horizontal mergers only, because non-horizontal 
cases have rarely been submitted to CADE. The reason for this lack of cases on non- 
horizontal mergers can be found that in the fact that CADE did not understand that 
vertical or conglomerate merger can cause damage to the market, since these mergers 
do not directly result in a change in the structure of the n1arket. 
458 It follows that 
CADE adopted a different treatment to non horizontal mergers. How this is done is 
what will be analysed in this section. 
'" Kay, J., "Vertical integration: the regulatory issues", Lecture on Regulation 199 1, Centre for 
Business Strategy, in Finbow 
, supra n. 
4452, p. 236. 458 However, this understanding has been gradually changing. In CADE's 1997 Annual Report, it was 
shown that during that year six cases of vertical integration were decided by CADE (AC 22/95, 
required by Bayer S. A. and Cia, Nitro Quirnica do Brasil Ltda.; AC 55/95, required by Colgate- 
Palmolive Ltda. and Itap, S. A.; AC 104/96, required by Montecitrus; AC 02/94, required by Ultraf&til 
and Fosf6rtil; AC 139/97, required by Worthington and Metalplus; and AC 59/95, required Honda and Motogear). It has been stressed in the 1997Report the necessity of a deeper analysis of the relevant 
markets in vertical integration, as well as of taking into consideration the transaction costs in such 
cases. (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica, Relat6rio Anual 1997, March 1998, published 
at httpJ/www. mj. gov. br/cade). 
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3.1 Vertical mergers 
Eight of the nine cases chosen to be analysed in this chapter involve horizontal 
mergers only. It was only in the Rhodia case 459 that CADE had to face both a 
horizontal and a vertical merger. The facts in this case are not simple. Two companies 
were involved in the merger, Rhodia S. A. and Sinasa S. A. (Figure 6). The former 
acted in the chemical, textile, pharmaceutical, veterinary, agrochemical and animal 
feeding sectors and controlled several companies. One of them was Rhodia Nordeste, 
Ltda., producer of polyester fibre and owner of the company Rhodia Filmes Nordeste 
Ltda. This last company produced polyester films and owned the Rhodia Fibras Ltda., 
manufacturer of acrylic fibres. The other merging firm, Sinasa S. A., owned 
companies that acted in the chemical, food and textile markets. Sinasa controlled 
Excel S. A., which in its turn controlled Celbras S. A. Celbras produced polyester 
fibres, acrylic fibres, resin and PET containers, and controlled Braspet, which also 
manufactured PET containers. 
The transaction submitted to CADE was the acquisition of Excel by Rhodia. 
The name of the company changed to Rhodia-Ster S. A., and its controUed company 
Celbras was then called Rhodia-Ster Fipack S. A. Rhodia transferred to Rhodia-Ster 
financial resources as well as goods and rights it owned, which included the enterprise 
Rhodia Nordeste and consequently Rhodia Filmes and Rhodia Fibras. Rhodia also 
transferred to the new company its participation in the enterprise Rhodiaco Industrias 
Quirnicas Ltda., producer of polyester raw material, which is used in the manufacture 
of polyester fibres, films and resins (Figure 7). 
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Figure 6- THE RHODIA CASE: RHODIA AND SINASA BEFORE THE 
MERGER 
RHODIA S. A. SINASA S. A. 
Rhodiaco Rhodia Nordeste F- Excel S. A. 
T 
Rhodia Filimes Nordeste Celbras S. A. 
Rhodia Fibras Braspet 
Figure 7- THE RHODIA CASE: RHODIA AFTER THE MERGER 
Rhodia Nordeste Rhodia-Ster Fipack (ex Celbras S. A) 
I Rhodiaco Braspet 
Rhodia Filmes 
Nordeste 
Rhodia Fibras 
459 AC 12/94, required by Rhodia S. A. and Sinasa S. A. Administragao, Participaý&s e Com6rcio in 
May of 1994, distributed to Commissioner Jos6 Matias PereiM and decided on 30.09.94. 
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The transaction submitted to CADE was the acquisition of Excel by Rhodia. 
The name of the company changed to Rhodia-Ster S. A., and its controfled company 
Celbras was then called Rhodia-Ster Fipack S. A. Rhodia transferred to Rhodia-Ster 
financial resources as well as goods and rights it owned, which included the enterprise 
Rhodia Nordeste and consequently Rhodia Filmes and Rhodia Fibras. Rhodia also 
transferred to the new company its participation in the enterprise Rhodiaco Inddstrias 
QuM'Ucas Ltda., producer of polyester raw material, which is used in the manufacture 
of polyester fibres, films and resins (Figure 7). 
In its analysis of the case, CADE pointed out that the merger involved both 
horizontal and vertical integration because the companies were at the same time 
competitors and clients or suppliers of each other. According to CADE, the horizontal 
mtegration, which occurred in the production of acrylic and polyester synthetic fibres, 
was more likely to cause concern, because it included two companies that competed 
with each other at the same level of production. The vertical integration, in its turn, 
took place in the section of production of PET resin and containers, and did not 
change the structure of the market. It follows that CADE put much more weight in the 
horizontal aspect of that merger, which was properly analysed, including definition of 
the relevant market, analysis of the product, definition of barriers to entry, and 
assessment of efficiencies. 
In relation to the vertical merger, CADE acknowledged the existence of a 
vertical integration, but held that it would not increase the concentration of the 
niarket, because it did not involve competitors actmg m the same market. 
Consequently, the economic analysis of the vertical merger was quite superficial. 
256 
CADE did not define the relevant market with accuracy,, nor made a detailed analysis 
of the market, as it uses to do in cases of horizontal merger. Moreover, an important 
aspect of the analysis of vertical mergers was left out, as CADE did not investigate 
whether this vertical merger would have any effect in the suppliers of the raw material 
or in other manufacturers of PET containers. It only recognised that there was a 
vertical merger, established that it happened in the sector of PET resin and containers, 
and ruled that it did not change the structure of the market because Rhodia already 
had the control in the supply of raw material for the final product. 
One can therefore conclude that the treatment given by CADE to horizontal 
and vertical mergers is different. in fact, this would not be a problem, because 
obviously the two kinds of mergers may affect the market in different ways, as it was 
seen above. However, this difference of treatment does not mean that vertical mergers 
should be ignored. 
If we take into account the approach adopted in the USA, we will find out that 
the 1984 Merger Guidelines do establish when non horizontal merger shall be 
challenged . 
460 In the first place, the Guidelines hold that, "[a]1though non-horizontal 
mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive problems, they 
are not invariably innocuous". 461 Based on this assumption, the Guidelines define the 
anticompetitive effects that the merger must cause in order to be prohibited, which 
includes elimination of potential entrants, creation of barriers to entry and facilitating 
collusion. Consequently, a detailed economic analysis has to be conducted, though the 
460 Reference in this specific case is made to the 1984 Merger Guidelines, since the 1992 Guidelines 
refer only to horizontal mergers. 461 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra n. 438, subsection 4.0 
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results of this analysis will be assessed in a different manner in the two kinds of 
mergers. 
This was not the approach adopted by CADE, which opted for approving the 
vertical merger without further investigation. However, one can argue that it is 
necessary to bear in mind that the merger was inserted in the context of a developing 
country, which means that it may be more cost effective as well as beneficial for the 
country if the analysis is initially restricted only to horizontal mergers, due to their 
more imminent danger to competition. Once this analysis is firmed, then an approach 
to non horizontal mergers can be developed. 
3.2 Conglomerate mergers 
Though conglomerate mergers are not in principle likely to change the 
concentration of the market, they may cause some effects that can be anticompetitive. 
fn this way, a conglomerate merger may eliminate from the market a potential 
competitor, that is, a company that could have entered that market if it was not for the 
merger. 
This has been the main issue discussed in conglomerate mergers, and has been 
-Olin Chem. 
C 
., 
462 
where it first developed by the US Supreme Court in US v. Penn 0 
held that "if one of the firms probably would have entered with the other remaining 
'at the edge of the market, continually threatening to enter, ' the venture should be 
disapproved", and that "the possible elimination of a potential entrant, even if the 
evidence failed to show a reasonable probabdity of entry by the second firn-4 would 
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violate section 7". 
463 In a later case, US v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 
464 
the Court went 
further and ruled that it was not important that the potential competitor actually 
intended to enter the market. The mere possibility of being able to do so was enough. 
The approach to conglomerate mergers in Brazil has not yet reached the stage 
of discussing whether the elimination of a potential competitor may have 
anticompetitive effects or not. On the contrary, there is not much discussion on that 
issue. If vertical mergers are not given too much attention by CADE, the approach to 
conglomerate mergers is not better, especially if we take into account that the 
anticompetitive effects of conglomerate mergers are much more difficult to detect. In 
its first three years of existence, CADE has dealt with only one case of conglomerate 
merger. This is the Mat case, 465 a privatisation of a producer of rnilk that belonged to 
the goverment of the state of Pemambuco. 
In this case, after the privatisation had occurred, Yolat, the acquirer, submitted 
the transaction to CADE. Yolat was a producer of pasteurised and longlife milk, 
cream and other dairy stuffs for the Brazilian market, but it did not sell pasteurised 
milk in the state of Pernambuco. Cilpe, the privatised company, produced pasteurised 
skimmed milk for the city of Recife (the capital city of the state of Pernambuco). 
When analysing the case, CADE did not take into account the fact that Yolat was a 
potential competitor that could have entered the market at any moment, nor that 
competition could have suffered less had Cilpe been sold to another company. CADE 
held that, by acquiring Cilpe, Yolat would be a new competitor in the market. 
462 378 U. S. 158,84 S. Ct. 1710,12 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1964), 
4(, 3 Gellhom, supra n. 436, p. 390. 
""' 410 U. S. 526,93 S. Ct. 1096,35 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1973) 
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Moreover, as it was entering the market by taking the place of Cilpe, there 
would be no change in the level of concentration in that market. CADE then opted for 
ignoring that this was a conglomerate merger and fixed its reasoning in the 
concentration of the relevant market, that is, the market of pasteurised skimmed milk 
in the city of Recife. Yolat would then take over a market share of 62%, which was 
evidence of the existence of a highly concentrated market. However, CADE approved 
the merger, because it considered that the efficiencies resulting from the merger 
would counterbalance its anticompetitive effects. 
Once again CADE lost the chance of developing a case law on conglomerate 
mergers. However, the same observation that was made in relation to vertical mergers 
applies here: it may be better for CADE to first develop its approach to horizontal 
mergers and then give more attention to vertical and conglomerate mergers. Besides, 
we have to take into account that the Yolat case dealt with the privatisation of a 
public company, which is a very delicate matter. 
4. The special case of privatisation 
Privatisation in Brazil only started to occur in practice at the begffining of the 
1990s, but the law regulating this issue did not provide for any kind of control of the 
anticompetitive effects that may result from the privatisation of the public companies. 
It was only in 1993 that a decree was enacted establishing that one of the purposes of 
AC 11/94, required by Yolat IndAstria e Corn&cio de Laticffuos Ltdk on 11-03-94, distributed to 
Commissioner Marcelo Monteiro Soares, and decided on 23.11.94. 
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the programme of privatisation was the protection of competition. However, the 
decree was silent about how this should be achieved. 
In practice, only one case of privatisation was decided by CADE during the 
period of this research: the Mat case. 466 As it was seen above, the case dealt with the 
privatisation of a milk producer of the state of Pemwnbuco which, through an auction, 
was sold to Yolat, a producer of pasteurised and longlife milk, cream and other dairy 
stuffi. 
467 The treatment given by CADE to this case was the same given to any merger 
submitted to it. It follows that CADE proceeded to define the relevant market, 
determine the concentration of that market, and examine the efficiencies that it would 
bring to the market. 
The only reference to privatisation can be found when CADE stated that the 
acquisition would give Yolat 62% of a relevant market that once belonged to a public 
enterprise. Thus, though CADE acknowledged that the privatisation would transform 
a public oligopoly into a private one, it did not take any measure to change it. On the 
contrary, it held that this transference of market dominance to a private company 
would not harm the market because it would result in efficiencies. 
However, there was a dissenting opinion in this case. Commissioner Jose 
Matias Pereira understood that there was only a shift in the control of Cilpe, from the 
government of Pernambuco to a private enterprise, and that was something to be 
concerned about, because, according to hin-4 previous privatisations carried out by the 
466 
AC 11 /94, supra n. 465. 4"7 Yolat is a subsidiary of Parmalat Brasil, which also produces dairy products, which includes longlife 
milk, sold in the state of Pemwnbuco as well as in the whole country. 
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federal government caused negative effects to competition. Moreover, the market 
power that Yolat would have would be a barrier to entry of new competitors. 
The law gives CADE the power to break up a merger if it does not comply 
468 
with the requirements therein. This could have happened in the Yolat case. 
However, this was a very delicate case. Until that moment CADE had never examined 
a privatisation case, and there were no guidelines to follow. CADE thus preferred to 
deal with it as if it was a normal case of merger, so it would be able to avoid 
challenging a privatisation allowed by the goverm-nent. As a matter of fact, at that 
time CADE did not have the power to do so. Besides, CADE was still trying to 
establish its position as the authority responsible for enforcement of competition law 
in the country. By challenging a measure taken by the goverm-nent, CADE could 
jeopardise its own role. 
However, this situation is now changing. During the process of privatisation of 
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, one of the biggest public enterprises, acting in the 
sectors of paper and cellulose, gold, iron, electric energy, kaolin, bauxite and 
aluminiun-4 which occurred in May of 1997, the Commission for Economic issues of 
the Senate requested a technical opinion from CADE related to the effects that the 
privatisation would cause to competition. CADE concluded that the privatisation 
would only result in economic concentration in the markets of aluminium. and 
cellulose, and suggested that some measures should be taken by the acquirer to 
prevent any harm to competition. The privatisation was concluded in May of 1997 
and then submitted to CADE, which is still examining it. Taking advantage of the 
468 Article 54, paragraph 9, Law 8884/94. See Chapter 6, subsection 2.1. 
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discussion about privatisation that the Vale case arose, CADE issued a resolution that 
establishes that privatisation cases have priority over the analysis ýof the other types of 
merger . 
469 
5. Conclusion 
In relation to efficiencies, there are three points to be established. In the first 
place, efficiencies are not seen as a defence to be argued, but as part of the analysis to 
be carried out in a merger case. It follows that CADE always investigates the 
efficiencies resulting fTom a merger, even if it is not necessary. Secondly, these 
efficiencies do not c@mprise only the economic or social aspects of the merger, but 
also the managerial strategies adopted by the companies, which are inherent to the 
administration of any business and do not constitute any benefit. Finally, the existence 
of efficiencies has been enough to approve the majority of the mergers submitted to 
CADE. The merger may result in a highly concentrated market, create serious barriers 
to entry, and eliminate a strong competitor, but it is very likely to be approved if it 
presents any kind of efficiencies. It seems that CADE has been using efficiencies 
indiscriminately, not assessing how necessary or feasible they are. 
CADE's interpretation of the failing firm defence is too liberal, as any 
company that presents some kind of financial problem may fall into this category. 
However, one has to take into account that the unstable situation of the economy in 
Brazil does not allow for a strict application of the failing firm defence. In relation to 
469 CADE Resolution n. 7, of 09.04.1997. 
263 
the foreign competition and the international market defences, one may argue that 
they can be used to approve anticompetitive mergers that do not present any real 
efficiency, or to strengthen and protect the domestic firms, which, in this last case, 
may go beyond the role of a competition authority. The law does not give CADE the 
power to create national champions to compete in the international market, nor to take 
the development of infant industries. CADE should restrain its action to the powers 
that the law has bestowed to it and leave to the other authorities the implementation of 
other governmental Policies. 
In relation to the difference in treatment to horizontal and non horizontal 
mergers, it is possible to conclude that CADE does not see non horizontal mergers as 
a threat to competition. However, this does not seem to be a deliberate approach 
adopted by CADE, but just a lack of understanding of how these non horizontal 
mergers can affect the market. Based on the analysis of the cases carried throughout 
the chapter, one can argue that CADE will challenge only those mergers that are 
likely to change the structure of the market. CADE does not take into account, for 
instance, the effect that the merger may have on potential competitors, though this is 
starting to change now, as in two very recent cases CADE did not approve joint 
ventures of Brazilian companies with foreign enterprises because the latter were 
potential competitors that could have entered the market without having to merger 
with the fonner. 
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The analysis of privatisation cases by CADE is a very delicate matter that is 
still starting to develop at CADE, which means that it is not possible to predict what 
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will be the approach adopted. In the case examined here, which was the only one 
related to this issue that CADE has decided, CADE was able to avoid discussing this 
question at all. However, CADE seems now to be eager to have jurisdiction over this 
kind of case, and has already enacted regulations establishing that the analysis of 
privatisation cases will have preference over any other kind of case. 
When analysing mergers, it should be important that CADE take into 
consideration the hypothesis on the adoption and enforcement of competition law on 
which this thesis is based . 
471 Thus, CADE could not copy the tools used in antitrust 
analysis by foreign legislations without evaluating its relevance to Brazilian 
competition law. Moreover, CADE should be coherent in its approach to the different 
aspects of merger analysis as well as in its decisions, which would only bring 
certainty to the economic agents and thus facilitate the enforcement of the law. As 
part of an economic policy framework, CADE should not attempt to achieve certain 
results that are beyond the goals of competition law and that should be pursued by 
other policies. By doing so, CADE would be an efficient administrative body, thus 
making feasible the existence of a well structured and effective institutional 
framework. 
From the overall discussion of the merger cases, the most crucial conclusion to 
be drawn is that CADE is still not sure about how to deal with mergers. Though it is 
in the right path, CADE has not found the right approach to be adopted. However, it is 
not possible to forget that merger control is a very recent phenomenon in Brazil, thus 
470 This happened in the Antarctica case (AC 83/96 - Cia. Antarctica Paulista Ind. Bras. de, Bebida e, 
Conexos e Anheuser Busch International Inc. ) and the Brahma case (AC 58/95 - Cia. Cervejaria 
Brahma, Miller Brewing Co. e Miller Brewing M 1855 Inc. ). 
4" See Introduction, section 3. 
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it is only natural that CADE finds itself in that position. Now it is on CADE's hands 
to develop what it has already achieved in order to establish itself as an expert in 
merger analysis. 
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CONCLUSION 
The regulation of competition is a necessary step for an emerging economy if 
the State wants to achieve a competitive market. The "laissez-faire" approach to 
regulation may be too risky to be adopted, since the time taken to correct the 
distortions of the market may be longer than the afforded. The State then has to decide 
on the goals of the law, the approach to competition, the practices to be considered 
anticompetitive, the treatment to mergers, the procedure to be adopted, the 
institutional framework to be created, among other issues that have to be included in 
any legislation regarding competition. 
In order to do so, several options are open for the State: it can create its own 
law, it can copy the pre-existent laws of other countries, it can seek help in the work 
developed by LNCTAD. One option does not exclude the other, but it was argued 
here that, when enacting a competition law, the legislative authorities should not copy 
wholeheartedly any other law, not even UNCTAD's model law, since they do not 
reflect the country's reality and necessities. 
The present Brazihan competition law has not totaUy Mowed that argument. 
Law 8884/94 was based on existing legislation; for instance, its article 54, paragraph I 
is almost identical to article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty. Moreover, CADE has been 
copying the methods of antitrust analysis adopted by competition authorities in other 
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countries. The positive aspect is that CADE has been trying to develop its own case 
law, and has used foreign decisions only as reference in cases where there are 
controversial issues involved. 
Another argument is that the goals of the law have to be clearly defined and, 
based on that, the provisions of the law must be developed. Law 8884/94 does not 
necessarily conform to this argument. This law has the merit of being able to put some 
order in the chaotic situation in which competition law found itself due to the 
concomitant existence of two laws that were contradictory in some aspects. 
Accordingly, it was enacted as part of the Plano Real, the last econornic plan adopted 
by the government, where competition law was included amongst the trade 
liberalisation measures, thus confirming the hypothesis that competition law should be 
part of a coherent economic policy framework. 
However, the law presents some negative aspects that may hinder its 
enforcement. In the first place, the law does not define the approach to be adopted 
towards competition and its legislative history does not shed any light in relation to the 
goals of the law, which makes dffficult to delineate the path to be followed by the 
enforcers of the law in its implementation. As proposed by UNCTAD's principles on 
the enactment of competition law, the law should define its goal as the enhancement 
and protection of competition. Thus, goals such as the protection of the domestic 
industry, protection of small and medium enterprises, control of prices, should be left 
for other poficies to pursue. 
268 
Another negative aspect of the law is that it includes among the anticompetitive 
practices those that are not related to competition, such as "to abandon or cause 
abandomnent or destruction of crops or harvest, without good cause". The 
consequence is that the enforcers of the law have to waste time on practices that do 
not affect the market nor impair competition. Moreover, the list of anticompetitive 
practices included in the law does not exhaust itself, that is, the practices are just 
examples of types of conduct that may be considered illegal. It follows that any 
conduct that causes or has the purpose of causing the effects established in the law (to 
limit, restrain or in any way injury free competition of free enterprise; to supervise a 
relevant market for a product or service; to increase profits in a discretionary basis; 
and, to abusýe one's dominant position) may be considered anticompetitive and thus is 
subject to investigation by the competition authorities. 
This broadness in definition has two results. On one hand, it includes in the 
jurisdiction of the law any type of conduct that may affect competition, which makes 
the law cover a greater number of practices that could have escaped from the scrutiny 
of the law had the anticompetitive practices been more narrowly defined. On the other 
hand, this broadness incurs in high costs, since a greater number of cases is likely to be 
submitted to the competition authorities, more time will be spent on the analysis of 
cases, and the volume of work will increase enormously. 
If we take into account that there is not a "culture of competition" in Brazil, we 
my argue that it would have been better if the law had been more precise in its 
definition of anticompetitive practices, because this would allow the precise 
comprehension of what is considered as anticompetitive by the law, thus bringing more 
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certamty to the economic agents and facilitating the enforcement of the law. 
At, ordingly, the development of a culture of competition would be improved if the ACC 
law established the practices that are illegal per se, that is, those practices that do not 
require profound investigation due to their intrinsic anticompetitive nature. This would 
save time for the competition authorities and would provide a clearer guidance for the 
economic agents regarding the restrictive business practices. 
The lack of definition of what constitutes a relevant market is another 
drawback of the law. It is crucial for a consistent enforcement of the law that it clearly 
states the elements involved in the concept of relevant market, because the relevant 
market will be the basis for the analysis of restrictive business practices as well as 
mergers. As Law 8884/94 is silent in relation to this issue, it has been left for the 
competition authorities to define the notion, which has been done in the majority of the 
cases, but it has not always been based on consistent economic grounds. An acceptable 
definition of relevant market should include not only the product or service in the line 
of commerce where competition has been affected but also its substitutes, the 
geographical market where the product or service is available and the other areas to 
which the consumers could turn to if prices were increased. The 1992 Merger 
Guidelines of the American Department of Justice provides a detailed test to be applied 
m order to define the relevant market. 
On the other hand, certain developments can be found in Law 8884/94 if 
compared to the previous competition laws. One of them concerns the procedural 
rules. The present law has simplified the procedure for the implementation of the law 
by eliminating the unnecessary acts that were performed by the competition authorities 
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as well as by the parties, and by clearly establishing the steps that have to be followed 
in the two stages of case analysis, the prelininary investigation and the administrative 
proceeding. Moreover, the law decreased the time limits in relation both to the 
competition authorities and the parties. Thus, the procedure is now simpler and 
quicker. 
The treatment W mergeqhas also improved with the present law, as it defines 
more precisely when transactions that result in economic concentration are to be 
submitted to the competition authorities for approvaL as weU as the effects that the 
merger has to produce in order to be approved. The law has opted for establishing 
thresholds for qualifying mergers for investigation, which include a market share test 
(20% of the relevant market) that would involve especially horizontal mergers, and a 
gross turnover test (US$ 400 million gross turnover of one of the parties of the 
merger) that would catch vertical and conglomerate mergers as well. The establishment 
of thresholds is necessary for the limitation of the jurisdiction of the law, thus bringing 
more certainty to the economic agents. 
Brazilian competition law thus does not fully consider the hypothesis that the 
legislation concerning competition must define with rigour the approach towards 
competition and the issues inherent to it. The legislation does not define at all the 
approach to be adopted regarding competition. In relation to the issues, the law is too 
broad and includes practices that are not related to competition. Moreover, CADE's 
development of the concepts does not help. A per se approach to certain practices 
would then be beneficial for the enforcement of the law. On the other hand, the 
provisions on merger control are more precise and thus more likely to be effective. 
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The institutional framework to implement the law created by Law 8884/94 is 
likely to be more effective, since it defines the role to be played by each of the three 
administrative agencies that are part of this framework. Though criticism may be 
applied to certain aspects of this institutional framework, it cannot be denied that the 
unambiguous distribution of power between the three agencies is an improvement In 
the enforcement of the law. Before Law 8884/94 was enacted, there was a confhct of 
jurisdiction between the agencies, which only impaired the enforcement of competition 
law in the country. 
However, the institutional framework created by the law, which comprises 
SEAE, SDE and CADE, is far from being considered stable. There has been rivalry 
between SDE and CADE, attempts have occurred to merger the three agencies, the 
goverment has threatened to transfer some of CADE's powers to SDE. Moreover, the 
tact that CADE is composed by commissioners whose term of office lasts at most four 
years adds no stability to the system. In the first place, the commissioner does not have 
time enough to improve his/her knowledge of competition and acquire the necessary 
experience for a satisfactory perfonnance in the post. By the time that the 
commissioner achieves it, the term of office has expired. Besides, this change of 
comri-iissioners may hinder the development of CADE's work, since the approach to 
competition can vary from commissioner to commissioner and president to president. 
An option that could solve this problem would be to adopt a system similar to 
that of the USA and create "administrative law judges" to deal with competition cases, 
who would not be subject to a fixed term in office but who could be dismissed at any 
time. To implement this solution, however, amendments in the Constitution would be 
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needed, and this involves a strong political commitment that is not easy to find. 
Moreover, the tendency now is to elin-ýinate public bodies and posts in order to 
decrease expenditure of public money. 
Other drawbacks of the framework include the bureaucracy that is inherent to 
the administration, as well as the lack of expertise of the some commissioners and 
personnel as a whole. Another problem is the lack of political will to implement the law 
as weH as govermnental support to CADE's powers. Moreover, there is the question of 
judicial review of CADE's decisions, which may also impair the enforcement of the law 
and consequently CADE's role as a competition authority. 
Notwithstanding all the problems found in the institutional framework created 
by the law, it can be argued that the hypothesis that competition pohcy and law need a 
well structured and effective institutional framework to enforce them can be found in 
Brazilian competition law. It presents well structured framework, division of power, 
integration between the agencies. The problem, however, is that the system is still 
unstable, since it depends on political will to work reasonably well. It is not guaranteed 
that this will always exist. Thus, CADE's power may be curtailed at any time, or the 
-agency may be used to other purposes than that estabfished. in the law, or even the 5 
system may be modified by the government. 
The inclusion of the framework in the administrative system, though, is a much 
better option than attributing the jurisdiction on competition matters to the judiciary. 
The analysis of the cases would then be lengthier, the lack of expertise of persomel 
and judges would be greater, and the enforcement of the law would not be effective. 
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Besides, as part of the economic policies adopted by the government, its 
implementation has to be done through the administration, otherwise it would not 
produce the expected effects. Though the administrative system presents several 
problems, it has more flexibility to develop and enforce competition law. 
The analysis of the cases decided by CADE, which was never done before and 
thus is a new contribution of this thesis to the study of competition law in Brazil, has 
allowed us to better understand the rationale behind CADE's decisions, so that more 
decisive conclusions can be drawn regarding the enforcement of the law to support the 
assessment of Brazilim competition law. 
In relation to restrictive business practices, the analysis of the cases has shown 
that CADE always develops a legal analysis of the practice through the investigation of 
the intention of the parties when adopting the conduct as well as the effects that the 
practice has caused, as required by the law. This investigation confi= the rule of 
reason approach to antitrust analysis indicated in the law. However, there have been 
cases where this thorough analysis is not necessary, as it becomes obvious from a first 
and more superficial analysis that there is no way of the practice causing any harm to 
the market and to consumers. This was the situation in the Valer case, where the 
market share of the company was so smaH that, whatever the conduct, the effects it 
produced would be irrelevant. By doing this thorough analysis in every case CADE is 
wasting a time that can be given to the investigation of practices that are more likely to 
be anticompetitive and thus require more attention from the authorities. 
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A more serious problem can be found in CADE's treatment to the concepts of 
anticompetitive practices. In certain cases CADE shows evidence that it does not have 
My comprehension of the elements involved in the concepts, which obviously 
impairs the enforcement of the law. This problem is the result of the lack of knowledge 
of competition matters. However, it can be easily remedied through personnel training 
and indication of commissioners with expertise in the area. Another result of this lack 
of knowledge is the fact that the analysis of the cases has shown that CADE has not 
yet decided for an approach to competition: it is unclear whether CADE favours 
efficiencies at all costs, social goals or competition. The definition of this approach is 
essential for the effectiveness of competition law because it will establish what it is 
sought to achieve through the enforcement of the law, and thus the economic agents 
will have a clearer idea of what it is expected from them, being able to behave 
accordingly. 
The analysis of merger cases decided by CADE is also a new contribution to 
the study of competition law in Brazil. In its examination of mergers CADE also 
develops an extensive investigation of the issues involved in the merger, which include 
the definition of the relevant market, the level of concentration of the market, the 
previous behaviour of the merging companies, the existence of barriers to entry, and 
the efficiencies resulting from the merger. 
However, CADE has not always been able to draw conclusions from the 
investigation of such aspects of the transaction. By this I mean that the investigation is 
restrained to its faet-finding nature and some of the evidence it provides is not taken 
into account in the final decision. For instance, CADE has ignored in some cases the 
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high concentration of the market or the existence of barriers to entry. Another factor 
that impairs the enforcement of the law is the lack of method in the definition of the 
relevant market, which is the basis for the whole analysis of the merger. The outcome 
of the case depends on the definition of relevant market. As argued above, the 
adoption of the method proposed in the 1992 Merger Regulation of the American 
Department of Justice would provide a satisfactory solution to the problem. 
-D - Regarding the defences accepted by CADE in merger cases, deficiencies can 
also be found. CADE's acceptance of efficiencies as defence involves a too broad 
definition of the concept. The analysis of the cases has demonstrated that CADE is 
prepared to accept any singular benefit arising from the merger as efficiency. The result 
is that only in exceptional cases the merger will not generate efficiencies. By adopting 
this approach towards efficiencies, the majority of the mergers is likely to be approved. 
It is in this situation that the existence of a clear definition of the approach to, and the 
goals of, competition reveals essential. If this had been provided by the law, it would 
have been easier for CADE to figure out what efficiencies would be necessary to 
achieve the result intended by the law. 
CADE's treatment to the failing fn-n defence is also too liberal, but if we take 
into consideration the reality of the country, with an unstable economy, this approach 
is necessary, since even the smallest financial problems may cause disastrous effects to 
the company. 
In its treatment to the foreign competition and international market defences, 
CADE goes beyond its role of competition authority and approves mergers in order to 
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protect the domestic industry from international competition as weH as to create 
national champions to compete in the international market. Here CADE is 
extrapolating its power and dealing with the subject-matter of other trade policies. 
What is interesting to note is that, at the same time that CADE does it, it has been 
having its power curtailed through goverment intervention, such as in the cases of 
restrictive practices concerning price control. 
This is an evidence of the instability of the administrative system created for the 
implementation of competition law and policy, where it is difficult to predict to what 
extent the competition authorities wiR - or are aRowed to - exert their power. CADE 
I, --- finds itself in a position of uncertainty where contradictory signs have been sent by the 
government in relation to its power. It is thus more complicated for CADE to figure 
out the exact limits of this power. By going beyond its role of competition authority, 
CADE may be testing what it is allowed to do. 
The analysis of the merger cases has also demonstrated that CADE failed to see 
the effects that non horizontal mergers may cause in the market. CADE seems to 
consider only how the structure of the market is affected by the merger, ignoring that 
potential competitors may be affected as well. However, recently CADE has not 
allowed two joint ventures because the foreign enterprises were potential competitors 
that could have entered the market by themselves. This signs a development in CADE's 
an roach to non horizontal mergers. rp 
CADE's analysis of the only case involving privatisation decided during the 
period of this research does not allow any definitive conclusion on this issue, since 
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CADE opted for ignoring that the case dealt with a company that was privatised, thus 
avoiding any discussion on that matter. However, this approach has already changed, 
since lately CADE has been analysing privatisation cases as sucL 
The lack of power and governimental support that CADE has suffered since it 
was created has affected the development of competition law in the country. During 30 
years CADE did not have freedom of action and thus was not able to develop its work. 
This situation is now reversing due to the power that CADE has been given, which 
means that CADE has to learn how to deal with it. Moreover, the limited resources 
provided by the administrative system, as weH as the drawbacks of the competition 
framework, do not allow CADE to use aU of its freedom to develop its work. Thus, 
CADE has been compefled to focus its attention on the issues that have more urgency 
to be dealt with, since their effects on the market are more harmful than the effects 
caused by other aspects of competition. This explains the fact that CADE has ignored 
the effects of non horizontal mergers, for instance. CADE may have considered that it 
was necessary to first give more attention to horizontal mergers due to the more 
imminent anticompetitive effects they cause, and then later discuss vertical and 
conglomerate mergers. 
A final aspect to be alluded to is related to the development of CADE's case 
law. Though CADE has been copying in some aspects methods of antitrust analysis 
from other countries, CADE has not been adopting wholeheartedly the reasoning of 
the decisions on cases on competition. Reference has been made to American and 
European decisions, but just to clarify some aspect discussed in the case; they were not 
used as the grounds of the decision. Thus, CADE has been trying to develop its own 
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case law. The problen-4though, is in the instabffiV of the systerm The lack of political 
will to support CADE, the uncertainty in relation to CADE's power, as well as the 
short term of office of the commissioners may contribute to hinder the development of 
CADE's own case law. 
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